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Abstract  
This thesis examines contemporary Jordanian political humour in the 
context of the political history of Jordan and the 2011 Arab Spring 
revolutions. It applies Mikhail Bakhtin’s mid-20th century theory of 
carnival and the carnivalesque (folk humour) as a framework for 
thinking about Jordanian politics and political humour in social media 
spaces following the Arab Spring. The Bakhtinian approach to humour 
has predominantly focused on the role of humour as a revolutionary 
impulse that aims to attack and expose the shortcomings of established 
political power, as well as to highlight public attitudes towards that 
power. The analysis undertaken here of Jordanian politics and political 
humour in Jordanian social media spaces after the Arab Spring found 
that Bakhtin’s ‘marketplace’ is no longer the streets and material public 
spaces, but rather the social media spaces. The nature of the carnivals 
in social media spaces is in many ways just as carnivalesque as the 
‘marketplace’ of Bakhtin’s Medieval France, characterised by 
polyphony, the overturning of social hierarchies and the presence of 
dialogism (and monologism) and the grotesque.  
 
To more fully address the relevance – and some of the limitations – of 
application of Bakhtin’s ideas about carnival to the Jordanian socio-
political context after the Arab Spring, this thesis analyses key political 
cartoons, satirical articles, comedy sketches, politically satirical videos 
and internet memes produced by Jordanians from the start of the Arab 
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Spring to early 2019. The analysis reveals five salient qualities of 
carnivalesque political humour in Jordanian social media spaces 
following the Arab Spring: praising the government (intentionally 
satirical), parodying the government, mocking the government, 
scatalogising the government and, finally, dethroning the government 
(the temporarily and metaphorically comic death of the government). 
These five qualities collectively and individually provide us with a useful 
framework to think of contemporary Jordanian political humour as a 
time and place for socio-political ‘flattening’ and cathartic hedonism (but 
not revolution) that have led to changes in Jordanian society where 
people are more willing to criticise and mock the government. Such 
humour has allowed ridicule of the government but not of the monarch 
and allowed individuals (carnival-goers) in social media spaces to cope 
with socio-economic inequalities and the absurdities of political power.  
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Introduction                                          
Background and rationale  
Humour has become a staple of Jordanian culture following the Arab 
Spring, a major transformative period of social and political changes 
and turbulence in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) since 2011. 
Many Jordanians have used social media spaces to produce counter-
narrative discourses against the government and its economic and 
political reform programmes. The counter-political climate of the Arab 
Spring has rejuvenated Jordanian interest in using humour and satire 
as a tool to counter state repression and as a subversive tool for 
popular resistance to the official discourse and its articulations.  
 
The political context of the Arab Spring in Jordan, which took the form 
of a series of protests against the government from 2011 onwards 
calling for the reform of the regime and launch of far-reaching 
government economic and political reform programmes, raises 
questions about the effectiveness of humour and satire as a tool to 
challenge power and undermine government control and authority. 
Despite the significance of the Arab Spring and social media spaces in 
forging counter-political discourses, there is still a dearth of research 
that examines humour and satire in the post Arab Spring period, and 
more specifically in the use of humour in social media spaces, despite 
the fact that many media commentators and humourists have argued 
for the post-2011 period being one of change. 
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Early Jordanian literature was devoid of political humour. It was imbued 
instead with cynicism, melancholy and a disinclination to life, social 
norms and proper manners (Abu Khalil, 2006). It can therefore be 
argued that Jordanian political humour and satire has a relatively short 
historical tradition. Jordanian political humour flourished following the 
country’s political opening, economic growth and liberalisation, and 
after the relaxation of martial law from 1989. The early practices of 
Jordanian political humour were rooted, among other things, in ethnic 
joking, Gulf War jokes, politically satirical theatre by Nabil Sawalha and 
Hisham Yanis, tabloid newspapers, and a few political cartoons and 
satirical articles that rarely engaged ordinary Jordanians with political 
humour and satire. Early Jordanian humour had been mostly 
characterised by joke-telling and funny show performances, but satire 
(as a tool for political resistance against power and the government) 
had never been popular among Jordanians before 1989. 
 
However, with the start of the Arab Spring revolutions from 2011, 
Jordanian political humour and satire has grown both quantitatively and 
qualitatively in larger parts of Jordanian society, and to a large extent in 
social media platforms, such as Facebook, Twitter and YouTube. To 
reflect on the development of Jordanian humour after the Arab Spring, 
four Jordanian humourists gathered at the non-governmental cultural 
centre at Abdul Hameed Shoman Foundation in Amman on the 13 
January 2014 for a public forum on the development of Jordanian 
humour after the Arab Spring (Khoshman, 2014). The humourists were 
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Yousef Ghishan (socio-political satirist), Musa Hijazin (comedian), 
Ahmad Hassan Al-Zou’bi (socio-political satirist) and Omar Adnan 
Abdallat (political cartoonist). In the forum, the humourists discussed 
the driving forces and motives that seemed to have influenced the 
production of Jordanian humour and satire in the streets, and most 
predominantly in Jordanian social media spaces since 2011. The forum 
was also aimed at challenging the stereotypical and widely held notion 
about Jordanians for being serious, po-faced and unable to produce 
humour and laughter. In particular, the four humourists reflected on the 
significant rise and development of Jordanian humour and most 
importantly the reception of humour and satire among Jordanians 
following the Arab Spring. 
 
Yousef Ghishan, the moderator of the session, who works for the pro-
government newspaper Ad-Dustour (The Constitution), argued that 
Jordanians have become funnier because of the Arab Spring. He 
provides evidence from the large flow of daily satirical comments and 
posts that Jordanians make in social media spaces about local and 
regional politics. Musa Hijazin, a veteran Jordanian comedian better 
known for his two comic characters, Abu Saqer and Som’a, argued that 
the central government has played a significant role in the development 
of Jordanian production and reception of humour since the Arab Spring. 
According to Hijazin, the government has rather (unintentionally) turned 
every Jordanian into a satirist (Khoshman, 2014).   
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Ahmad Hassan Al-Zou’bi argued that the weak performance of the 
Parliament as a ‘rubber stamp’ for the government is the one major 
factor that has most motivated the production and reception of 
Jordanian humour and satire following the Arab Spring (Khoshman, 
2014). Al-Zou’bi is Jordan’s most famous socio-political satirist and 
online activist and has worked for the government-owned newspaper Al 
Ra’i (The Opinion) since 2007. In addition to many politically satirical 
articles, he is best known for his influential, politically satirical play Al-an 
Fahemtukum (Now I Understand You) that was staged in Jordan at the 
beginning of the Arab Spring in 2011.    
 
Abdallat, who produces comic and satirical animations and cartoons, 
argued that elements of frustration and bitter reality have played a 
significant role in the production of young Jordanians’ comedy videos 
and sarcasm in Jordanian social media spaces following the Arab 
Spring (Khoshman, 2014). The four humourists have reflected on how 
social media platforms (as alternative spaces free from the state-run 
media) have greatly facilitated and perhaps encouraged the production 
of humour and satire against power and authority in post Arab Spring 
Jordan.  
 
These observations merit being tested through academic research.   
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Employing Mikhail Bakhtin’s mid-20th century theory of carnival and the 
carnivalesque (folk humour), this thesis focuses on contemporary 
Jordanian political humour and satire before, during and after the Arab 
Spring in social media spaces. The main objectives of this thesis are 
the following:  
(1) To offer a new reading of contemporary Jordanian political 
humour and satire that is based on Bakhtin’s theory of carnival 
and the carnivalesque  
(2) To develop Bakhtin’s theory of carnival in order to understand 
modern-day carnivals in social media spaces  
(3) To discuss the relevance – and some of the weaknesses – of the 
application of Bakhtin’s theory of carnival and the carnivalesque 
in understanding contemporary Jordanian political humour and 
satire.  
 
These objectives will be met through the following research questions:  
(1) To what extent has the Arab Spring influenced the 
volume/frequency and discursive changes in the formation of 
socio-political humour against power and government in Jordan? 
(2) In what capacity has the popular politics of resistance affected 
the production and development of Jordanian political humour 
and satire against power and government in Jordan?  
(3) How has Jordanian society responded to this increase after the 
Arab Spring in quantity, content and forms of humour against 
power and government in social media spaces?  
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(4) How can we critically evaluate the use of Bakhtin’s theory of 
carnival as a framework to understand the role of socio-political 
humour in political protests and change in pre-and post-Arab-
Spring Jordan?  
 
What purposes does humour serve? 
Humour is a core aspect of social life and social relationships. It 
performs multiple social, psychological and political functions. It can 
affect family bonding, personal relationships and social environments. It 
also enables tensions to be released and helps to counter depression 
and mental illness, and support individual wellbeing (Carroll, 2014; 
Eagleton, 2019). Satire can be defined as a literary genre that makes 
use of humour, irony and exaggeration as a tool to criticise a person, 
thing or quality, particularly in the context of contemporary politics and 
absurdities of political power (Oxford English dictionary online, 2014). 
The term ‘carnival’ is usually used to describe a celebratory, ritual and 
yearly festive practice that preceded (and in some places still does) the 
season of Lent in Catholic countries in Europe and Latin America. The 
word ‘carnival’ is originally derived from the Latin phrase carne levare 
which means ‘farewell to meat’ (Oxford English dictionary online, 2014).   
 
The word ‘humour’ (British English) or ‘humor’ (American English) 
comes from the Latin word ‘humor’, which means ‘liquid’ or ‘fluid’ 
(Oxford English dictionary online, 2014). In medieval science and 
medicine, physicians thought that the human body was composed of 
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four bodily humors (liquids). These were blood, phlegm, black bile 
(believed to be associated with a melancholy temperament) and yellow 
bile (believed to be associated with irascibility and anger). These 
physicians believed that if these bodily fluids are unbalanced, certain 
personality traits are more pronounced. For example, an increase of 
blood makes one a hopeful or sanguine person. The term ‘humour’ has 
therefore been associated with the idea of deviation or eccentricity that 
accounts for the ways we understand much humour today.      
 
In humour research and scholarship, humour is primarily viewed as a 
social phenomenon that can build and facilitate communications and 
social relationships (e.g. Martineau, 1972; Al-Khatib, 1999; Kuipers, 
2008). From this perspective, we might think about the use and positive 
functions of conversational humour and humorous personal 
experiences in strengthening family bonding, interpersonal 
communications and relationships with others. At the same time, 
humour can also destroy interpersonal communications and cause 
harm to others. From this perspective, we might think about the role 
and function of ethnic and racist humour to undermine target groups 
and criticise their perceived personal traits.  
 
In his article ‘Humor as a double-edged sword: Four functions of humor 
in communication’ (2000), John Meyer calls this ability to both build and 
destroy “the paradox of humor” (Meyer, 2000, p. 323). This paradoxical 
nature of humour indicates the contrasting functions of humour in social 
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life and social relationships. Therefore, the role played by humour can 
be an ambiguous one. It can help to create stronger personal 
relationships or in other situations, it can be perceived as a threat to a 
healthy relationship.        
 
The paradoxes of humour continue when we think about the two 
aspects of humour in social life. Humour is universal and found in all 
cultures. It is, at the same time, culture-specific and has a culture-
bound influence. For example, we might think about mimicry of others 
as a universal aspect of humour, found in all cultures around the world, 
past and present. At the same time, we might think about the degree of 
reception and appreciation of humour and jokes only among people 
who share the same culture (or subculture). Given the simultaneously 
universal and culture-bound nature of humour, it seems likely that there 
are a number of socio-demographic and psychological variables that 
could enhance and further influence the reception and appreciation of 
humour, irrespective of whether it is considered to be universal or 
culture-bound phenomenon. These variables could include, but are not 
limited to, age, gender, level of education, place of living, intuition, 
disposition, personal taste and one’s (dis)inclination towards humour 
and laughter.  
 
In their book The psychology of humor: An integrative approach (2018), 
the American psychologists and humour scholars Rod Martin and 
Thomas Ford provide one of the most valid and useful definitions of 
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humour, which highlights the complexities and nuances of humour in 
social life. They define humour as a “multifaceted term that represents 
anything that people say or do that others perceive as funny and tends 
to make them laugh, as well as the mental processes that go into both 
creating and perceiving such as amusing stimulus, and also the 
emotional response of mirth involved in the enjoyment of it” (Martin & 
Ford, 2018, p. 3). This definition of humour is useful because it 
acknowledges the core components of humour: the social context, the 
cognitive-perceptual process and the emotional aspect of humour that 
is expressed through mirth and laughter. This definition of humour 
explains the authors’ overriding fascination with the role of humour as a 
psychological and social tool that releases tensions and facilitates 
relationships with others.   
 
The Dutch humour scholar Giselinde Kuipers highlighted (at the 30th 
Conference of the International Society for Humor Studies in Tallinn, 
Estonia in 2018) the problems in various definitions of humour in 
research in the field of humanities and social sciences. She argued that 
all definitions have tended to ‘essentialise’ humour and laughter by 
providing descriptive and small-scale explanations. Instead of 
attempting to give a straightforward definition, she provided what she 
called the ‘ingredients’ of humour. These are incongruity, uses of 
seriousness, pleasure and social ability that views humour as a tool to 
decrease (or increase) social distance and isolation. She demonstrated 
that these ingredients do not necessarily constitute a “theory of humor, 
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but rather a theory about humor, which tries to understand how humor 
works” (Kuipers, 2009, pp. 220–221). These ingredients tend to 
conceptualise humour and laughter as reflections of social interactions 
and social boundaries. As a result, humour can be considered as one of 
the major demarcators of social, moral and cultural boundaries that are 
central to supporting and perpetuating durable social relations and 
institutions.  
 
According to Kuipers (2018), humour and laughter are among the 
strongest markers of social boundaries and relationships: those who 
laugh together feel connected and intimate, whereas those who do not 
feel excluded or alienated from the same cultural group. Kuipers’ view 
that humour cannot be clearly defined, but can be analysed, constitutes 
just one of the complexities and nuances about the question of humour 
in socio-political research. It draws upon concepts of humour similar to 
Bakhtin who argues that laughter has a deep philosophical meaning 
due to its relationship to socio-cultural politics and dissidence.  
 
Political humour can be defined as a branch of humour that emerges 
from and in response to periods of national turmoil, political turbulence, 
political tension and uncertainty at times of politically volatile situations 
(e.g. Bakhtin, 1984a; Benton, 1988; Davies, 2007). As such, it 
encourages popular resistance to political legitimacy and power by 
exposing contradictions and inconsistencies that arise in the gap 
between political articulations and political actions. The Bakhtinian 
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approach to political humour has predominantly focused on the role of 
humour as a revolutionary impulse that aims to attack and expose the 
shortcomings of established political power, as well as to highlight 
public attitudes towards that power (Bakhtin, Rabelais and his world, 
1984). The Bakhtinian approach to political humour, according to Trisha 
Wheelock (2008, p. 25), represents a distinctive form of “popular 
counter-culture” that is marked by opposition, and where the use of the 
language of the marketplace and grotesque imagery are pervasive.  
 
Why Bakhtin? 
My main motivation for the study of contemporary Jordanian political 
humour was the study of power and popular resistance post the 2011 
Arab Spring revolutions. My background in language and literature has 
led me to an appreciation of the language and counter-political 
discourse that have been used against power and authority in Arab 
countries (post the Arab Spring). As a Jordanian national, I was 
particularly struck by the rapid growth of humour and satire against the 
government in Jordanian social media spaces after the Arab Spring.  
 
This led me to read about the existing scholarship on humour and 
resistance (e.g. Draitser, 1978; Kishtainy, 1985; Scott, 1990; Oring, 
2004; Davies, 2007; Badarneh, 2011), and most importantly about 
Bakhtin and his theory of carnival because of its relevance to the 
themes of power and resistance. Bakhtin was a Russian philosopher, 
discourse theorist and a literary critic. He was one of the most influential 
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and controversial Russian thinkers of the 20th century (Clark & Holquist, 
1984). He lived almost all of his adult life in a totalitarian state and 
under a repressive regime. He is best known for his theory of carnival 
and the carnivalesque, which is based on analysis of the works of the 
Renaissance French writer François Rabelais writing in a time of 
extreme political and social division (Bakhtin, Rabelais and his world, 
1984) and of the nineteenth-century Russian novelist Fyodor 
Dostoevsky (Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevsky's poetics, 1984). Bakhtin 
was also using the idea of ‘carnival’ to talk about repression and cultural 
politics during Stalin’s reign by exploring how humour could be used as 
a coded critique of oppression and censorship in the USSR and thus a 
form of popular resistance. The reason why Bakhtin’s theory of carnival 
is applicable to the Jordanian context is because the Soviet Union 
and/or Medieval Europe shared certain similar conditions that are 
applicable to the Jordanian situation. These conditions are:   
(1) The particular form of the regime (autocratic or semi-autocratic 
regime) that cracks down on resistance  
(2) The role of religion (for example, within the Jordanian context, 
religion plays an integral part in social and political life, perhaps 
as much as it did in Medieval Europe)  
(3) The existence of a dissatisfied public that holds resistant views 
against power (in this case Jordan, and many people during the 
then Soviet Union in the 20th century).  
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The theoretical framework used for the analysis of contemporary 
Jordanian political humour and satire before, during and after the Arab 
Spring is influenced by Bakhtin’s work on carnival and the 
carnivalesque, as discussed in his influential and highly-acclaimed two 
books about carnival theory: Rabelais and his world, which was first 
written in late 1930s but was only published in Russian in 1965 and 
translated into English in 1984, and Problems of Dostoevsky's poetics, 
which was first published in Russian in 1963 and translated into English 
in 1984. For brevity’s sake, I will refer throughout this thesis to Rabelais 
and his world as (1984a) and Problems of Dostoevsky's poetics as 
(1984b). The analysis in this thesis highlights the relevance – and some 
of the weaknesses – of application of Bakhtin’s theory of carnival and 
carnivalesque humour to the Jordanian situation. It also sheds light on 
the distinctiveness of the Jordanian social and political context before 
and after the Arab Spring revolutions, which unsurprisingly go beyond 
Bakhtin’s original context and classic framework.  
 
Existing studies into Jordanian humour 
Research into Jordanian humour has tended to over-emphasise 
linguistic and translational points of view. The prior research has 
extensively focused on the application of two linguistic theories of 
humour: the semantic script theory of humour, which was developed by 
Victor Raskin in 1985, and the general theory of verbal humour, which 
was developed by Salvatore Attardo and Victor Raskin in 1991. In the 
context of research into Jordanian humour, there have been up to the 
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date of this thesis seven academic studies conducted by Jordanian 
linguists at various Jordanian universities: Abdullah Shakir and 
Mohammed Farghal’s (1992) study on the cohesion and coherence of 
Gulf War jokes; Mohammed Farghal and Abdullah Shakir’s (1993) 
study of Gulf War jokes in Jordanian streets; Abdullah Shunnaq’s 
(1996) study on the translatability of Jordanian rural jokes into English; 
Mahmoud Al-Khatib’s (1999) sociolinguistic study on joke-telling in 
Jordanian society; Aladdin Al-Kharabsheh’s (2008) study on accidental 
humour as displayed in Jordanian shop signs; Yousef Bader’s (2014) 
study on linguistic pun expressions in Jordanian satirical articles, and 
Kawakib Al-Momani, Muhammad Badarneh and Fathi Migdadi’s (2016) 
semiotic study of Jordanian political cartoons before and after the Arab 
Spring. These studies have demonstrated an overarching emphasis on 
and overriding fascination with the application of linguistic theories of 
humour to the Jordanian situation. The emphasis on using the linguistic 
theories of humour with analysis of Jordanian humour is due to first, the 
researchers' background on linguistics, and second, due to their 
relevance and substantial applicability to the Jordanian humorous 
context. Most Jordanian jokes and humour have tended so far to utilise 
linguistic and translational points of view to achieve their humorous 
effects.          
 
In examining the past literature on Jordanian humour, I have identified 
two main approaches that were used to analyse social and political 
humour. These two approaches I shall call the linguistic approach and 
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the translational approach. The linguistic approach is concerned with 
the analysis and use of linguistic puns, polysemy, homophony and the 
role of stereotyping in generating ethnic humour and stereotypes, 
including local jokes and intrinsic stereotypes about the people of As-
Salt, At-Tafilah and As-Sarih. The studies conducted by Shakir and 
Farghal (1992), Farghal and Shakir (1993), Al-Khatib (1999), Bader 
(2014) and Al-Momani, Badarneh, and Migdadi (2016) are among the 
examples that reflect this linguistic approach. This approach highlights 
the role and function of humour as a safety valve for expressing 
unallowable issues and taboos in Jordanian society, whether political, 
religious or sexual.   
 
To a large extent, the linguistic approach has supported Freud’s theory 
of release, which views humour as a way of venting for the release of 
tensions and individual repressions. For example, in their collaborative 
article ‘Gulf War jokes in Jordanian streets’ (1993), Farghal and Shakir 
argued that the Gulf War jokes provided Jordanians with an “escape 
hatch” for explicitly talking about taboos in Jordanian society and 
culture (Farghal & Shakir, 1993, p. 15). Jokes that made fun at the then 
Arab presidents were widely circulated in Jordanian streets as a way to 
vent anger and frustration about the consequences of the war that 
ultimately went against their ideological inclinations in supporting 
Saddam and Ba'athist Iraq at the time of the war.    
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The second approach I call the translational approach. This approach is 
particularly concerned with the study of the language of humour and the 
(un)translatability of Jordanian Arabic and jokes into English. The 
studies conducted by Shunnaq (1996) and Al-Kharabsheh (2008) are 
two examples that reflected the method and methodology of such an 
approach. The translational approach has highlighted various problems 
and challenges in translating (rendering) Jordanian Arabic and 
Jordanian jokes into English. According to the authors, most problems 
are due to language and cultural specifications that make Arabic and 
English not only linguistically different, but also culturally remote. For 
example, in his article ‘Unintentional humour in the translation of 
Jordanian shop signs’ (2008), Al-Kharabsheh demonstrated how the 
English translations of Jordanian shop signs have infringed some 
notable linguistic and orthographic rules that have as a result provoked 
humour and satire among the educated people. According to Al-
Kharabsheh (2008), the linguistic violation has not only broken one 
language maxim, but also evokes humour in translation to the target 
language. 
 
In addition to the seven case studies highlighted in the two approaches 
above, Jordanian humour has also attracted the attention of many 
young postgraduate researchers in various public and private 
universities in Jordan. These studies have tended to adopt similarly 
linguistic and translational approaches that have focused exclusively on 
linguistic and translational theories of humour, as used by previous 
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Jordanian linguists. These works include mainly Masters dissertations, 
including: Bilal Sayaheen (2009) on the translation of Jordanian culture-
specific ironic expressions from colloquial Jordanian Arabic into 
English; Mohammad Al-Shra’ah (2011) on the translatability of puns in 
Jordanian satirist Kamel Nusairat’s satirical columns from Arabic into 
English; Ala’a Telfah (2011) on the linguistic analysis of engagement 
devices in Jordanian satirical columns published in Jordanian daily 
newspapers; Wafa’ Rawahneh (2016) on linguistic analysis of the 
metaphoric expressions used in Jordanian satirical literature; Rana 
Qawasmeh (2017) on the translatability from Arabic into English of 
ironic expressions in Mohammad Shawaqfeh’s (1996) satirical play Hi 
Muwaten (Hi Citizen). Whilst undoubtedly insightful, studies like these 
also tend and understandably so to be focused on very restricted 
examples of Jordanian humour, and often only from a linguistic 
perspective of one kind or another. In other fields of social sciences, 
such as folklore, literature, psychology and sociology, Jordanian 
humour has not yet received much academic attention. Research in this 
field therefore remains scarce and the phenomenon of Jordanian 
political humour continues to be largely unexamined. The scope and 
focus of the works cited above arguably reflects an ‘over-extension’ of 
the application of linguistic theories of humour to the study of Jordanian 
humour and satire from the Gulf War period to the present. Most 
importantly, the role of humour and satire in countries that have been 
less affected by the Arab Spring (such as Jordan which did not witness 
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an overthrow of the regime but rather a series of government reshuffles 
and façade reforms) has not been researched sufficiently in literature.  
 
Neither the linguistic approach nor the translational approach suffices 
as lenses or methodologies to understand the role and function of 
political humour and satire in Jordanian social media spaces in the 
recent and ongoing period of protests since the 2011 Arab Spring. This 
is because the linguistic and translational approaches have 
understandably focused on the linguistic devices used in humour, such 
as puns, polysemy, prosody and the role of stereotypes in generating 
humour and laughter. There is therefore little academic research about 
how humour has been used as a method of political analysis and a tool 
for resistance in the context of post Arab Spring Jordan. This line of 
research is particularly worth considering when we think about the role 
and function of humour in revolutionary times, such as the Arab Spring 
more widely, and its potentially profound implications for Jordanian 
government policies, where calls for substantial political and economic 
reforms and the end of gerrymandering politics have been in circulation 
in Jordanian streets and social media spaces from 2011. 
 
This research on Jordanian political humour after the Arab Spring thus 
builds and expands on the existing literature on Jordanian humour, but 
it sets out to engage more rigorously with the role and function of 
humour as a method of political analysis and as a counter-political force 
and tool for popular resistance against power in the context of post 
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Arab Spring Jordan. It argues that Bakhtin’s ‘marketplace’ is now the 
social media space, and to a much lesser extent the street and 
conventional public spaces. This research on Jordanian political 
humour examines the ways in which humour has been used as a 
counter-political force against the government’s rhetoric about reform 
and its processes, and against the weak function of Jordan’s parliament 
as a rubber stamp for the government.  
 
This research utilises five salient qualities of carnivalesque politics in 
Jordanian political humour and satire after the Arab Spring in social 
media spaces: praising the government (intentionally satirical), 
parodying the government, mocking the government, scatalogising the 
government and, finally, dethroning the government (the temporarily 
and metaphorically comic death of the government). These five 
qualities of post Arab Spring Jordanian humour reveal the applicability 
of Bakhtin’s ideas about carnival in modern social media spaces. The 
analysis also highlights some moments where Bakhtin is weak and 
offers therefore areas for development to make Bakhtin’s theory of 
carnival and the carnivalesque a more useful approach for analysing 
modern-day carnivalesque political humour and satire in social media 
spaces. The contribution made by this line of research is original and 
without it, attempts to understand Jordanian politics online and 
Jordanian political humour after the Arab Spring would be much less 
effective and useful. Bakhtin’s theory of carnival and the carnivalesque 
offers, because of the context of its making, a somewhat ecologically 
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valid and useful framework for the analysis of Jordanian political 
humour and satire after the Arab Spring.  
Research methodology  
Researching digital humour presents some quantitative and qualitative 
differences to researching humour in the public sphere more broadly 
because of its reactive and interactive nature, as well as the potentially 
huge datasets it can produce. In her study of the first cycle of internet 
disaster jokes, Kuipers (2002) argues that digital humour can be best 
understood as a reaction to news coverage of disasters, such as the 
attack on the World Trade Centre in 2001. She argues that these jokes 
represent a combination of visual collages of media culture, and 
comments on this culture. In Memes in digital culture (2013), Shifman 
considers internet memes in social media spaces as a new form of 
digital participation and civic engagement in democratic and non-
democratic regimes. Internet memes, she argues, are among the 
agents of globalisation, because they are universally the most 
fundamental type of digital humour in the participatory culture of social 
media platforms.  
This thesis on contemporary Jordanian political humour and satire is 
based on qualitative internet research on digital humour, within the 
framework of Bakhtin’s theory of carnival and the carnivalesque, and an 
exploration of how Bakhtin’s theory of carnival would benefit from 
adaptations in terms of its applicability to the analysis of modern-day 
carnivals in social media spaces. Social media platforms, such as 
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Facebook and Twitter, have played an influential role in what has been 
described as ‘post-truth’ politics in political communication and 
mobilisation against power and governments in the Middle East since 
2011 (Salem, 2007, p. 7). For many Jordanians, I argue in this thesis, 
the mode of carnival against the government is now provided by social 
media platforms, primarily Facebook, Twitter and YouTube, and much 
less the streets and conventional public places.  
The researcher chose Facebook, Twitter and YouTube and not the print 
press because these online platforms have been the most widely used 
in Jordan from the start of the Arab Spring in 2011. For example, there 
are more than 5 million active users of Facebook in Jordan, out of the 
country’s population that stands at 10 million, according to the most 
recent Arab Social Media Report, making it the most popular social 
media platform in Jordan (Salem, 2017, p. 35). Most Facebook users in 
Jordan, according to the Arab Social Media Report (Salem, 2017, p. 
38), are young people between 15 to 29 years old. Most Facebook 
users in Jordan are men with 59.4%, while women only represent 40.6 
% of the users, according to the Arab Social Media Report (Salem, 
2017, p. 40). This reflects the fact that social life in Jordan is dominated 
by men, although this is slowly changing at the present. Other social 
media platforms, such as Instagram, were excluded in this research 
because these platforms are not widely used in Jordan. There are only 
260,000 Instagram users in Jordan, according to the Arab Social Media 
Report (Salem, 2017, p. 59). 
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Around 86% of internet users in the Middle East use Facebook to 
express their views on the government (Salem, 2017, p. 14). In the 
context of Jordan, social media spaces are relatively free from 
government control and censorship, with some Jordanians using their 
social media accounts to rally against the government. There are 
nevertheless some widely accepted limits where the king and members 
of the royal family are often beyond criticism (what can and cannot be 
said within legal frameworks and societal expectations). 
The data for this research was collected from the internet and well-
known Jordanian spaces in social media platforms. These spaces 
include but are not limited to: Emad Hajjaj’s Facebook page (Emad 
Hajjaj Abu Mahjoob), Dr Maen Qatamin’s Facebook page (Dr. Maen 
Qatamin الدكتور معن قطامين), Ahmad Hassan Al-Zoubi’s Facebook account 
( سن الزعبياحمد ح ), Osama Hajjaj’s Facebook page (Osama Hajjaj), Omar 
Abdallat’s Facebook page (Cartoonist Omar Abdallat  رسام الكاريكاتير عمر
 تقارب) and a comic Jordanian YouTube channel called (العبدالالت
Takarub), which hosts the Jordanian comedian Musa Hijazin’s videos. 
All the writers/creators/performers selected for this research are famous 
Jordanian humourists and have significantly contributed to the 
development of Jordanian humour since the Arab Spring. The language 
used for making humour in Jordan is Jordanian Arabic, and the average 
video length was 8 minutes for politically satirical videos and 1 minute 
for short comic videos.  
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This research was based on a corpus that consisted of 861 online 
examples of humour (see Table 1 below). The dataset was compiled 
between June 2016 and May 2019 and drew upon the practices of 
netnography. This is the adaptation of ethnographic research design 
and methods to study the online world and people’s practices in internet 
and social media platforms (Kozinets, 2019). Netnography heightens 
our awareness to the performativity of online, and also the limitations of 
working in a medium in which users are often anonymous. It was also 
particularly suited to deal with politically sensitive topics that 
characterise some texts that are analysed in this research. The 
limitation of this research approach draws from its narrow focus on the 
online community, in this case Jordanian people online. There is also a 
difficulty in generalising the results of this research outside the sample 
collected, because netnographic research findings are often limited in 
scope and focus. The researcher undertook significant desktop 
research and used his social media accounts and presence on 
Facebook, Twitter and YouTube to collect data. He was, of course, also 
an actor in this online world and this shaped the selection of material in 
the dataset. It is therefore important to discuss the researcher’s 
positionality.  
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Table 1. The size of the corpus collected for this research 
Category of humour Frequency Percentage 
Politically satirical videos 215 24.97% 
Comic sketch videos 175 20.33% 
Satirical articles 166 19.28% 
Internet memes 117 13.59% 
Political cartoons 98 11.38% 
Socio-political jokes 83 9.64% 
Politically satirical plays 7 0.81% 
Total 861 100% 
  
The researcher is a native Jordanian and therefore an insider to the 
socio-political and cultural context of Jordan. His interest in and 
motivation for this research topic was influenced by his life experiences 
having lived and worked both inside and outside of Jordan. For 
example, as someone from a rural area who studied in an urban 
university, this made him particularly alert to jokes which mocked rural 
Jordanians and their lifestyles. He was also particularly tuned in to 
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jokes which tapped into more universal themes, and for which he was 
familiar with the existence of corresponding jokes in other languages 
and contexts. He was also aware of who were considered the best-
known comics in present-day Jordan. That does not mean that he 
selected jokes that he was best familiar with and found the funniest (or 
the most offensive). Rather, having identified what he thought were the 
most popular comic figures and channels, he then verified this using 
popularity metrics. Then, for each comic or channel, a number of jokes 
were selected based on their popularity (measured in the number of 
followers, likes, views and shares of their posts in Jordanian social 
media spaces) to be put in the dataset, regardless of theme or the 
researcher’s personal taste. One of Dr Qatamin’s videos, for example, 
was selected for the analysis in this research because it was liked by 
15,100, received comments from 4,200, shared by 8,900 and viewed by 
51,800 people on Facebook. Of course, it cannot be known for sure 
(without inside information from Facebook) that the followers and 
commentators on Qatamin’s Facebook page are all Jordanian nationals 
and residents, but not least because of the language and cultural 
context, it seems very likely that almost all are. The main types of comic 
material are outlined in Table 1 above.  
The coding of political jokes into types of humour emerged from a 
preliminary analysis of the dataset. The initial coding framework threw 
up many types of humour, such as social humour, ethnic humour, 
humour about the government and economic reform, humour about 
elections and the parliament, situational comedy and humour about the 
Introduction   26 
 
 
 
absurdities of everyday life. Some of these themes, such as social 
humour, were excluded from this research because they appear to go 
beyond its scope and analysis. The final analytical framework identified 
five themes (qualities) of Jordanian humour in which they provide a 
framework to think about Jordanian politics and the use of humour 
against power and government in Jordanian social media spaces: 
praising the government (intentionally satirical), parodying the 
government, mocking the government, scatalogising the government 
and, finally, dethroning the government (the temporarily and 
metaphorically comic death of the government). These five themes 
were also developed in relation with Bakhtin’s theory of carnival in order 
to test its continuing relevance and potential weaknesses to Jordan and 
the Arab Spring.  
The methods of data analysis included thematic analysis and discourse 
analysis. The thematic analysis was used to aid the researcher in 
analysing the key themes and techniques of Jordanian humour after the 
key qualities of Jordanian political humour began to emerge from the 
data. In the dataset, these qualities sometimes overlapped or co-
occurred because the categorisation was not always clear-cut. The 
thematic analysis was conducted manually without using assisted 
qualitative data analysis software. It was done through categorisation to 
index the texts analysed into themes and connect them to a theoretical 
framework. The discourse analysis was a critical part of the data 
analysis strategy in relation to the broader social and political context of 
Jordan after the Arab Spring. It was mainly used to identify patterns or 
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themes in the data selected, as well as to analyse the use of language 
and figures of speech used in Jordanian political humour that target 
power and the government. It also helped the researcher to review and 
refine the themes identified during the thematic analysis and data 
analysis period. The final process of data analysis involved the constant 
comparison of the data with the existing theme as it emerged from the 
data analysis. This process was important in making connections 
between the themes emerged, until data saturation was reached.     
The data collected for this research have required minimal protections 
and therefore raised few ethical issues. There was no need to be a 
member of these sites to access information. The data have already 
been in the public domain and they are still available to a broad 
population online. The type of data used for this research therefore 
requires minimal protections for keeping track of data online. There 
were no issues of confidentiality that led to the protection of identity and 
private information. In their analysis of the norms for collecting data 
from popular accounts of public figures, Williams, Burnap & Sloan 
(2017) critique the idea that informed consent is not requested when 
using data from Twitter, although the information is in the public 
domain. They point out that the boundary between public and private 
life is often blurred for online users as they participate virtually. This 
important critique is less relevant for my research on Jordanian humour 
and politics as the channels and the humourists I use are seen (and 
see themselves as) public figures and opinion leaders in Jordan. The 
researcher does not have or hold any direct relationships with any of 
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the Jordanian humourists and activists that are analysed in this 
research, and which may lead to a conflict of interest, such as 
promoting specific anti-government views and particular public attitudes 
that may have imparted bias on the findings of this research.   
Organisation of the thesis  
In addition to this introductory chapter, this thesis is composed of five 
chapters that are seeking to examine the relevance – and some of the 
weaknesses – of Bakhtin’s theory of carnival and its applicability to the 
Jordanian context. Chapter 1 seeks to establish a theoretical framework 
for considering how humour has been used and presented in Jordan 
before and after the Arab Spring revolutions. This chapter examines 
first Bakhtin’s theory of carnival and the carnivalesque to create a 
theoretical framework for the empirical analysis used in this thesis. It 
then attempts to marry some elements of Bakhtin and Freud to show 
the relevance of individualism to the Bakhtinian analysis of carnival as a 
collective political experience. Finally, it examines Jordanian ethnic 
humour in the context of Davies’ earlier work on ethnic humour, as well 
as the two dominant theories of humour: the superiority theory and the 
incongruity theory to consider the value of these theories to 
understanding the functions of Jordanian humour.  
 
Chapter 2 presents the context of this research and offers a new 
reading on Jordan and the Arab Spring from the perspective of 
Bakhtin’s theory of carnival. It introduces political grammars and forms 
of political contestation: city versus rural areas; indigenous Jordanians 
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versus Jordanians of Palestinian descent and Jordan before the Arab 
Spring. These frameworks are key in understanding Jordanian politics 
and the humour which emerges, and then make a case for the Arab 
Spring. It argues that there is a clear limitation affecting the application 
of Bakhtin’s theory carnival to the Jordanian socio-political context after 
the Arab Spring. This is because of the difference in the cultural and 
socio-political context: Jordan in the last twenty years is different from 
the Soviet Union in the mid-20th century and from Medieval Europe in 
many respects. This difference matters; nonetheless, Bakhtin’s theory 
of carnival, as evidence will show in this chapter, can be still highly 
relevant. To show this, this chapter maintains a regular contact point 
with the political history of Jordan and the significance of using 
Bakhtin’s theory of carnival as a framework to analyse it.  
 
Chapter 3 examines the development of Jordanian political humour 
prior to and after the Arab Spring. It examines Jordanian political 
humour before and after Jordan’s 1989 political opening, during and 
after the First Gulf War (1990–91), and during and after the Arab 
Spring, in order to talk about the relevance – and some of the 
weaknesses – of Bakhtin’s theory of carnival and its application to the 
Jordanian socio-political context. It argues that Jordanian political 
humour and satire prior to the Arab Spring was less ‘carnivalesque’ in 
nature: it operated within a framework I shall call ‘affectionate satire’ 
that maintained a respectful stance towards power rather than attacking 
it. Based on this observation, this chapter argues that Jordanian 
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political humour before the Arab Spring can be best explained through 
the traditional vantage point of ‘internalised orientalism’ and/or through 
Freud’s theory of humour that highlights the concept of safety valve as 
a means to release tensions and bring people together in times of wars 
and political uncertainties (in this case the Gulf War). Such a view of 
political humour sheds light on the limitations and problems of the 
application of Bakhtin’s theory of carnival on the Jordanian context 
before the Arab Spring. This is largely because Bakhtin did not 
acknowledge (perhaps because of the oppressive and dangerous 
regime in which he lived) how humour is exercised in a culture and how 
changing political contexts (in this case Jordan’s political opening, the 
First Gulf War and most recently the Arab Spring) could influence the 
expression of certain types of humour and satire against power and 
authority.  
 
Chapter 4 examines Jordanian politics and carnivals after the Arab 
Spring in Jordanian social media spaces by focusing on the popular 
politics of resistance against power and the government from 2011. It 
argues that Bakhtin’s concept of ‘marketplace’ can now be considered 
the social media spaces, and much less the streets and conventional 
public places. This chapter demonstrates that social media spaces 
have certain qualities that go (unsurprisingly) beyond Bakhtin’s ideas 
about carnival. This is because these spaces permit anonymity and 
online users’ contributions are even more individualised. By drawing on 
this argument, this chapter demonstrates how Freud’s work on humour 
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can help us to understand the relevance – and some of the 
weaknesses – of application of Bakhtin’s theory of carnival. This is 
evident when it comes to investigating humour in social media spaces, 
particularly following periods of significant social and political 
transformations (in this case the 2011 Arab Spring revolutions).  
 
The last chapter further demonstrates the relevance – and some of the 
weaknesses – of application of Bakhtin’s theory of carnival in the 
context of using humour as a counter-political force and tool for popular 
resistance against the Jordanian government and its rhetoric about 
economic and political reform. To show the relevance of Bakhtin, this 
chapter utilises the application of Bakhtin’s theory of carnival on five 
salient qualities of Jordanian political humour and satire: praising the 
government (intentionally satirical), parodying the government, mocking 
the government, scatalogising the government and, finally, dethroning 
the government (the temporarily and metaphorically comic death of the 
government). The analysis of these five qualities of Jordanian political 
humour suggests that Bakhtin’s carnival can be considered as more 
than just ephemeral, even though its consequences are, in Jordan, as 
yet, slow and indirect. This chapter concludes that Bakhtin’s theory of 
carnival and the carnivalesque would benefit from amendment (or 
development) in terms of its applicability to the analysis of modern-day 
carnivals and political humour and satire shared in social media spaces. 
This is the key contribution of this thesis and one of its major research 
implications in the fields of Bakhtinian studies and humour research.                                                                                      
 
 
 
 
Chapter 1 Political and personal humour: 
Theoretical foundations     
1.1 Introduction 
In his most influential book Rabelais and his world (1984a), Mikhail 
Bakhtin defines humour and laughter in the context of 16th century 
France and the Renaissance as a distinctive form of knowledge and 
cultural politics that can covertly imply a coded critique of power and 
that can create civil and political dissidence. In Bakhtin’s terms, laughter 
has “a deep philosophical meaning, it is one of the essential forms of 
the truth concerning the world as a whole, concerning history and man; 
it is a peculiar point of view relative to the world; the world is seen 
anew, no less (and perhaps more) profoundly than when seen from the 
serious standpoint. Therefore, laughter is just as admissible in great 
literature, posing universal problems, as seriousness” (Bakhtin, 1984a, 
p. 66). Bakhtin’s analysis of humour and laughter has remained very 
relevant to many socio-political contexts in Europe, Asia and Latin 
America, due to the wide applicability and universality of his carnival 
theory beyond its original context: 16th century France and the works of 
François Rabelais.  
 
This chapter seeks to establish a theoretical framework for considering 
how humour has been used and presented in Jordan before and after 
the Arab Spring. It explains the relevance of Bakhtin to studying humour 
in Jordan, within the broader context of humour studies, including the 
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context of research on political humour and satire under authoritarian 
and semi-authoritarian regimes around the world over the last few 
decades. This framework moves from the collective to the individual to 
ethnic and cultural differences and makes Mikhail Bakhtin, Sigmund 
Freud and Christie Davies complementary to the study of Jordanian 
humour before and after the Arab Spring.   
 
The framework opens with the work of Bakhtin and his notion of the 
carnivalesque, where humour is seen as a force for collective political 
resistance and infers a revolutionary zeal. The Bakhtinian approach to 
humour has predominantly focused on the role of humour as a 
revolutionary impulse that aims to attack and expose the shortcomings 
of established political power, as well as to highlight public attitudes 
towards that power. However, Bakhtin’s argument does not 
acknowledge the role of individual agency and the personal which is 
important in shaping modern-day capitalist societies. This deficiency is 
noticeably evident when his work is put in conversation with Freud who 
views humour in his theory of release as a means of regulating 
dissatisfactions and helps deal with the constant anxieties in the 
unconscious.   
 
Taken together, the collective revolutionary impulse is primarily used by 
Bakhtin while the role of individual agency is emphasised by Freud. 
This framework provides useful vantage points to make sense of the 
roles of humour in society and, in particular, the role it plays in societies 
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which might be seen at a turning point in their histories – and this is 
potentially the connection between Bakhtin in the earlier stages of 
construction of the Soviet Union and Jordan in the period of societal 
and political change and liberalism which followed the 2011 Arab 
Spring. Bakhtin and Freud (if converged) provide us with a theoretical 
framework that acknowledges the social, political and personal effects 
of humour, which are also applicable in digital societies which did not 
exist when either author was alive. That said, neither Bakhtin nor Freud 
take into account the purposes of all forms of humour, and notably that 
which dominated in Jordan from 1989 and during the Gulf War and 
which played on perceptions of ethnic and cultural differences. This is 
where Davies’ earlier work on ethnic humour becomes particularly 
useful. Whilst I argue for the relevance of Bakhtin, Freud and Davies for 
understanding Jordanian humour, we also need to remain closely 
attuned to how humour varies in impact, across time and place.   
 
The discussion in this chapter is divided into four sections in order to 
create a theoretical framework to study contemporary Jordanian 
humour. In the first section, I outline and critically examine Bakhtin’s 
theory of carnival and the carnivalesque to create a framework for the 
empirical analysis in this thesis. In the second section, I discuss, in 
greater detail, Freud’s ideas about humour and the unconscious and 
their interconnections and relevance to the thesis. I attempt to marry 
some elements of Bakhtin and Freud to show the relevance of 
individual psychology to the Bakhtinian analysis of carnival as a 
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collective political experience. In the third section, the discussion of 
Bakhtin’s carnival and Freud’s theory of release is enhanced by 
exploring how existing research on political humour and satire under 
authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes around the world over the 
last few decades have applied these concepts.  
 
In the fourth section, I examine the emergence and development of 
ethnic humour and joking in Jordan after the country’s political opening 
from 1989 and during the Gulf War. Jordanian ethic humour, I argue, 
provided a source for pressure relief from the Iraqi failure and defeat. It 
also functioned as a platform for socio-political commentary on global 
and regional powers, and more specifically on Jordan’s declining 
economic conditions and opportunities following the political opening 
that was closely associated with economic liberalisation and 
neoliberalism. In this section, I critically evaluate the validity of two 
dominant theories of humour – the superiority theory and the 
incongruity theory– and their usefulness for the study of Jordanian 
ethnic and political humour particularly in relation to urban-rural 
tensions and divide. Ethnic humour is an important component of the 
post-1989 development of humour in Jordan, and the two dominant 
theories of humour – the superiority theory and the incongruity theory – 
play a role in explaining such use of humour before the emergence of 
more carnivalesque joking in Jordan after the Arab Spring.  
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1.2 Bakhtin and the carnivalesque 
Bakhtin’s theory of carnival was formulated to talk about 16th century 
France and the works of François Rabelais in an exceptionally 
repressive political climate, that of 20th century USSR under Stalin. In 
reading Rabelais, Bakhtin takes the historical origin and significance of 
carnival and tests it in the Medieval context of France by exploring the 
culture of Middle Ages in comparison with the Renaissance. In his book 
Rabelais and his world (1984a), Bakhtin introduces his theory of 
carnival and the carnivalesque as a framework to understand the works 
of Rabelais, and Renaissance culture, as being opposed to the 
established culture of the Middle Ages in Western Europe. Bakhtin 
conceptualises carnival as a collective festivity and experience that 
brings together people from all walks of life against power and authority. 
He indicates that the primary function of carnival during the Middle 
Ages was as a “temporary liberation from the prevailing truth and from 
the established order; it marked the suspension of all hierarchical rank, 
privileges, norms, and prohibitions” (Bakhtin, 1984a, p. 10). In Bakhtin’s 
carnival, the carnivalesque life functions as a medium for liberation and 
a subversive force against all hierarchies in society.  
 
Despite its age, Bakhtin’s theory of carnival and the carnivalesque has 
remained relevant in humour studies and the field of literature and 
applicable to many socio-political contexts around the world. This is due 
to the wide applicability and universality of carnival theory beyond its 
original framework. Studies demonstrating this ongoing relevance 
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include Mbembe (1992) on Africa, Taylor (1995) on Europe, Badarneh 
(2011) on the Arab world (but not Jordan), and Goldstein (2013) on 
Latin America. One of the potential weaknesses of Bakhtin is his 
exclusive focus on the collective purpose of humour, paying little 
interest to the functions it serves for individuals. It seems particularly 
important to address this in the era of social media, when an individual 
is behind a screen and often not participating in the collective 
‘marketplace,’ at least literally. In this context, it is useful to engage with 
Freudian-inspired theories of humour.  
 
The reason why Bakhtin’s theory of carnival is applicable to the 
Jordanian context is because the Soviet Union (and indeed Medieval 
Europe) shared certain similar conditions that are applicable to the 
Jordanian situation after the Arab Spring. These conditions are: (1) the 
particular form of the regime (autocratic or semi-autocratic regime) that 
cracks down on resistance, (2) the role of religion (for example, within 
the Jordanian context, religion plays an integral part in social and 
political life, perhaps as much as it did in Medieval Europe) and (3) the 
existence of a dissatisfied public that holds resistant views against 
power (in this case Jordan, and many people during the then Soviet 
Union in the 20th century).  
 
In Bakhtin’s terms, carnival refers to the “people’s second life” in the 
sense that it transcends the traditional forms and conventional styles of 
everyday life (Bakhtin, 1984a, p. 8). It is free from established orders, 
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conventions and rules that otherwise restrict the self. Bakhtin expounds 
his relational concept of carnival life to include the binary themes of the 
‘official life’ and ‘nonofficial life’ of a medieval person (Bakhtin, 1984b, 
pp. 129–130). He argues that a medieval man lived, as it were, “two 
lives.” One was the official life which is serious and subordinated to 
strict hierarchies and orders from official power and authority; the other 
is called the life of the carnival square. To demonstrate its ongoing 
relevance, Bakhtin identifies four broad qualities of the carnival life in 
the carnival square (Bakhtin, 1984b, p. 123). These qualities are 
described as follows:  
1. Free and familiar contact among people. Life in the carnival 
square promotes a special form of communication that maintains 
equality among people who are taking to the streets. It advocates 
egalitarian principles among all people who are participating in the 
carnival in the carnival square   
2. Eccentricity. Life in the carnival square promotes a special 
category of carnival life that permits many forms of eccentric and 
otherwise unacceptable behaviours among people who are taking 
into the streets to partake in the carnival   
3. Carnivalesque mésalliance. Life in the carnival square brings 
together people from different walks of life. From this perspective, 
it “unifies, weds, and combines the sacred with the profane, the 
lofty with the low, the great with the insignificant, the wise with the 
stupid” (Bakhtin, 1984a, p. 122). In this way, all people in the 
carnival square are collectively unified and interconnected   
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4. Profanation. Life in the carnival square strips the powerful of their 
‘sacred’ authority and encourages instead resistance against 
them.  
 
In his analysis of Rabelais and 16th century France, Bakhtin 
demonstrates that both lives are “legitimate, but separated by strict 
temporal boundaries” (Bakhtin, 1984b, p. 130). They are confined to 
some strict and limited boundaries, which make the life of carnival an 
ephemeral and fleeting period of popular resistance against power. 
Bakhtin’s perception of the carnival life in the carnival square can be 
further discussed in the contexts of ‘carnival time’ and ‘other times.’ To 
illustrate this point, he points out that many forms of barriers and 
restrictions imposed in ordinary life, such as power, age and distance, 
are ‘temporarily’ suspended in the carnival life in the carnival square. 
 
In reading the nineteenth-century Russian novelist Fyodor Dostoevsky, 
Bakhtin further developed his conception of carnival in the particular 
context of a ‘square’ (a place) and a ‘pageant’ (an event) where 
everyone in the carnival square is an active participant. Life in the 
carnival square (as Bakhtin analyses it) can be considered as a 
counter-political force and tool of popular resistance. It is opposed to 
many forms of power and social and political hierarchy promoted by the 
official system and its discourse that often re-emphasises its social and 
cultural hegemony over the middle and lower classes.  
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In reading Dostoevsky’s works, Bakhtin argues that the carnivalesque 
life promotes a “new mode of interrelationship between individuals, 
[which is] counterposed to the all-powerful socio-hierarchical 
relationships of noncarnival life” (Bakhtin, 1984b, p. 123). This mode of 
communication among the carnival-goers in the carnival square, 
according to Bakhtin, is exceptional and unavailable in everyday life 
and realities. In Bakhtin’s terms, the life in the carnival square is free, 
transgressive, and overall unrestricted by many forms of power in 
society. It advocates egalitarian principles among all people who are 
participating in the carnival and carnivalesque politics in the streets. 
This carnivalesque life is full of humour, offense and debasement, often 
used against many people in power. It eventually calls for popular 
resistance against power. It includes myriad carnivalesque activities: 
ritual spectacles and carnival pageants, comic compositions and 
parodies, and other various uses of abusive language (Bakhtin, 1984a, 
p. 5). It also contains many forms of degradation inherited primarily 
from grotesque realism. This explains why abusive language is 
considered an important part of carnivalesque political humour and folk 
culture.  
 
Rather than isolating the reality and meaning of ‘carnival’ in the carnival 
square, I argue that Bakhtin first had a particular need, an intention 
(Rabelais, or indeed whatever alternative context Bakhtin might have 
had in mind) and then tried to use carnival to meet that need (to talk 
about political repression and the regime’s cultural politics during the 
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contemporaneous reign of Stalin). His various definitions of carnival 
emphasise a special language use in the carnival square (a 
metaphorical space – where the ‘square’ just means any space in which 
the carnivalesque behaviour happens). Carnival (as Bakhtin conceives 
it) can be considered ‘heteroglot’ in the sense that it combines at least 
two different voices and viewpoints. It also acts in opposition to 
monologism, which celebrates one source’s voice and considers it as 
final and thus unopposable.  
 
Bakhtin’s theory of carnival has been strongly contested by various 
literary critics. The scholars of Bakhtin such as Burke (1978), Clark & 
Holquist (1984), Mbembe (1992), Gardiner (1993) and Condren (2002) 
argue that Bakhtin was writing to support Marxist ideology. Other 
Bakhtinian scholars, such as Simon Dentith argue that Bakhtin’s book 
about Rabelais was not specifically aimed at analysing Rabelais and 
16th century France, but rather offered a very critical lens to understand 
state repression and the popular politics of resistance during Stalin’s 
rule. In his book Bakhtinian thought: An introductory reader (1995), 
Dentith demonstrates how Bakhtin’s book about Rabelais shows a 
“strong coded attack on the cultural situation of Russia in the 1930s 
under Stalin … The book is to be read as a hidden polemic against the 
regime’s cultural politics” (Dentith, 1995, p. 71). This claim can arguably 
be valid to some point because it explains why Bakhtin’s book about 
Rabelais was not published until the early 1960s, by which time Stalin’s 
reign had ended. There are also debates about the authorship of 
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Valentin Voloshinov and Pavel Medvedev’s works on Marxist 
ideologies, with Bakhtin being suggested as the real author of these 
works. However, this claim about the authorship is far from being 
resolved.  
 
The existing literature on humour in the internet and social media is 
growing exponentially. It often focuses on the relationship between the 
personal and collective voices in digital environments. In her book 
Memes in digital culture, Shifman (2013) makes a connection between 
the role of individual and collective actions by considering internet 
memes as “units of popular culture that are circulated, imitated and 
transformed by individual internet users, creating a shared cultural 
experience in the process” (p. 367). For meme diffusions, she argues, 
individuals can play a greater role to scale up memes to mass levels 
within hours. In his article ‘ironic humor on social media’, Gal (2019) 
argues how social media spaces have been constituting places for 
individual and collective identity work and drawing boundaries for 
personal and collective actions. Such features, he argues, have varied 
social and political implications in relation to power structures in digital 
environments. Taken together, these studies support the notion that 
social media spaces are both individual and collective places.    
 
In the context of Jordanian political humour in social media spaces after 
the Arab Spring, I have found that there are five qualities of Jordanian 
political humour that are highly relevant to the Bakhtinian carnival: 
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praising the government (intentionally satirical), parodying the 
government, mocking the government, scatalogising the government 
and, finally, dethroning the government (the temporarily and 
metaphorically comic death of the government). These five qualities 
show the relevance of individual psychology to the Bakhtinian analysis 
of carnival as a collective political experience in social media spaces. 
These qualities are often highlighted in the existing literature on irony, 
parody, scatological humour and exclusionary or destructive humour 
(e.g. Wickberg, 1998; Kuipers, 2002; Badarneh, 2011).  
1.3 What can Freud bring to Bakhtin? 
Freud’s writings in the second half of the twentieth century came to 
plant personal and psychological issues firmly at the centre of how we 
can further understand the role of the individual in social life. Freud 
views humour as a tool to control individual anger and repression (a 
pressure valve release). Freud presented his first theory of the 
conscious and unconscious mind, which played an important role in the 
development of psychoanalysis theory and interpretations of dreams. In 
his book The interpretation of dreams (1999/1905), Freud viewed the 
structure of the human mind as an ‘iceberg’ where much of its density 
(the unconscious mind) lies beneath under the surface (the conscious 
mind). He argues that the unconscious is the place where socially 
unacceptable ideas, desires and wishes are being repressed. These 
repressed wishes and pleasures, according to Freud, are released in 
dreaming or in daydreaming. This repression in the unconscious, 
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according to Freud, stems from the feeling of guilt and from taboos that 
are imposed by society.  
 
Freud’s model of the mind consisted of three parts: the id, ego and 
superego. In his book about Freud, Anthony Storr (1989, p. 60–63) 
argues that the id is the oldest part of the mind from which the other two 
parts (ego and superego) are derived. It is the innate and instinctive 
part of the mind that includes all the pleasures and desires in life. The 
ego, however, represents the conscious and its primary function is self-
preservation. It acts an intermediary between the id and the external 
world. The superego is the regulating agent of the mind. It is the self-
critical conscious that reflects morals, social standards and injunctions. 
The primary function of the superego is to control the impulses of the id, 
especially those that are forbidden in societal terms, such as sex and 
aggression. Freud demonstrates that where the id is the pleasure 
principle and the ego is the reality principle, the superego represents 
the morality principle that always feels guilty.   
 
In his book Jokes and their relations to the unconscious (2002/1905), 
Freud differentiates between two types of jokes: innocent jokes and 
tendentious jokes. Innocent jokes are dependent on verbal ingenuity 
and wordplay. They give us little pleasure and amusement because 
they usually employ neurotic symptoms, slips of the tongue and 
dreams. Tendentious jokes, Freud argues, are offensive based on the 
use of indirect expression of hostility or obscenity. In his analysis of the 
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techniques of jokes, Freud argues that there are several techniques for 
joking, including the use of condensation and displacement in jokes. He 
argues that whereas condensation jokes make use of the multiple 
meanings of the word to make humour, displacement jokes focus on 
the formation of composite words to make humour. Freud argues that 
humour functions as a release for thoughts that are usually suppressed 
by the superego. To release the tension of the suppression, the 
superego then allows the ego to generate humour to avoid ‘explosion.’ 
To show this, he argues that humour is inextricably bound up with the 
realm of the unconsciousness. According to Freud, humour represents 
the capacity of the superego to console the ego at times of adversity 
and repression. 
 
Freud’s theory of humour (often called the release theory of humour) is 
similar in many ways to Herbert Spencer’s view of humour as a 
pressure valve release of nervous energy (catharsis). The theories of 
Freud and Spencer are based on the idea of negative mental energies 
that function like ‘water,’ moving around in different channels in the 
mind before seeking an outlet to discharge a nervous energy at times of 
pressure. The two theories suggest an accumulation of something that 
is being repressed. The release theory of humour has been criticised by 
some humour scholars because there is little academic research that 
supports its arguments. In his book Humour: A very short introduction 
(2014), Noël Carroll argues that “the theories of Spencer and Freud 
have the liability of presupposing hydraulic views of the mind which are 
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highly dubious. Both postulate the existence of mental energy that 
behaves like water– flowing in certain channels, circumventing 
blockages, and seeking outlets as the pressure builds. Their language, 
though couched in the scientific jargon of their day, seems at best 
metaphorical from the viewpoint of the present” (Carroll, 2014, p. 38). 
The release theory focuses on the role of humour as ‘catharsis’ that 
provides an outlet for the release of repressed emotions and tensions. 
According to the release theory, humour results from the freeing of 
accumulated nervous energies and negative feelings in the mind, which 
views humour as a pressure valve release. The release theory is useful 
for talking about individualism in the context of the effects of 
neoliberalism in Jordan, from the country’s political opening in 1989 to 
the idea of carnival for the late modernity that characterises Jordan 
after the Arab Spring.  
 
In the context of Jordanian political humour and satire during and after 
the Arab Spring, the release theory of humour provides a very useful 
framework that helps us to understand and think about the proliferation 
of humour and satire in Jordanian social media spaces. From the start 
of the Arab Spring in 2011, young Jordanian people have resorted to, 
and continue to use, humour as a tool to release their anger and 
frustration with the government. Many Jordanians in social media 
spaces use humour to express their resentment and discontent about 
the effectiveness of government economic and political reform 
programmes, accompanied by the weak function of Jordan’s parliament 
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as a ‘rubber stamp’ for the government. I argue that such humour has 
been used as a safety valve that releases the tension of Jordanian 
young people online because it provides a ‘discharge’ for restive views 
about the government and the parliament.  
 
From this perspective, we might think of the function of online hashtag 
activism and Jordanian social media humour as a tool that released 
frustration and anger during Hani Al-Mulki’s government. This online 
activism was particularly notable following the government’s decision to 
increase the prices of fuel, bread and electricity, as a part of its wider 
economic reform programme managed by the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF). Politically satirical hashtags such as # الزجاجة _عنق 
(bottleneck), الملقي_ بريزة # (Mulki’s ten pennies) and عمو_ ما_ بدياك# 
(uncle, we do not want you anymore) were famous among Jordanian 
young people in social media spaces as a means to release frustration 
and anger as well as to make fun and jokes about the government’s 
economic decisions. Although release is an internal and private quality, 
I argue that the function of hashtag activism in Jordanian social media 
spaces can be considered as an individual release to the wider 
collective protests and vice versa.   
  
Carrol’s (2014) critique of the release theory is undoubtedly right to 
question the idea of ‘fluid’ temper that must at some point be ‘released’ 
by an individual, but that does not necessarily mean that the release 
theory is entirely discredited for the discussion of political humour and 
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satire. The fact of the growth of political humour and satire in the 
stressful economic and socio-political contexts (time and place) studied 
in this thesis suggests that the release theory still has some validity, at 
a group level, if not for individuals. Release theory can in fact be more 
applicable to groups, as my application of Bakhtin’s ideas will show in 
chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis.        
 
Indeed, despite the contested debates around the release theory, I 
have found it very useful when we think about humour in Jordanian 
social media spaces, and how individuals express themselves online, 
whether through real names or aliases. Social media technology has 
allowed people to communicate freely and share their feeds without 
necessarily revealing their personal identity, seemingly as a way to 
relieve their pressures about things that upset them in real life: to be 
angry without needing to shoulder the responsibility that being 
identifiable requires. This framework has made social media humour 
dependent on the role of avatars and not primarily on the users’ 
identifiable ‘voices.’ Social media spaces have allowed people to say 
things they would not say face to face. Social media can be both 
individual and collective at the same time.  
  
The release theory of humour is notable when we think about the roles 
and functions of humour and satire in social media spaces. For 
example, political humour and satire shared in Jordanian social media 
spaces after the Arab Spring has exposed an internalised and 
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psychological component of resistance against power. It may have 
allowed young Jordanian people online to cope with socio-economic 
inequalities and political repression, rather than calling for regime 
change or revolution. It may have sometimes functioned as a safety 
valve that has both released tensions (which can in fact be useful to 
those people with political power) and been used as a tool for 
resistance against many forms of power in the government. 
 
By the same token, social media activism in Jordanian social media 
spaces after the Arab Spring may have sometimes allowed people to 
use humour as a tool perhaps for personal sanity and wellbeing so they 
can ‘play at resistance’ rather than taking part in actual protests in 
streets and public spaces. This suggests that the function of humour in 
Jordanian social media spaces can be considered as a time and place 
for socio-political ‘flattening’ and cathartic hedonism that has provoked 
significant changes in Jordanian society after the Arab Spring, where 
more people have become more willing to criticise and mock the 
government. The individual can repress their political views and then 
‘release’ them through humour.  
 
Bakhtin’s theory of carnival and the carnivalesque has a functional 
similarity to Freud’s theory of humour because both seem to agree on 
the role of repression to influence the production of humour. Although 
repression is being understood differently (for Bakhtin it is political 
repression, which is usually a conscious decision, and for Freud it is 
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self-repression, which is usually unconscious), humour can provide us 
with a strong mechanism for overcoming repression, or at least, giving 
the individual or the crowd the impression that they are challenging 
repression. The relationship between humour and the repressed is 
therefore crucial to understand the role and function of the carnival and 
the carnivalesque in a repressive context. Humour provides us with a 
‘safe haven’ for breaking what is forbidden or taboo in social and/or 
political terms without necessarily challenging the status quo.    
 
Freud’s work on humour helps us to understand the relevance – and 
some of the some of the weaknesses – of application of Bakhtin’s ideas 
about carnival and the carnivalesque being collective. Freud focuses on 
the role of individual agency, which Bakhtin ignored because of his 
overriding fascination with collective expression and engagement. 
Neither Bakhtin nor Freud lived in the era of social media and the 
boundaries between the individual and the collective, and the political 
and non-political, in the production and function of humour have 
arguably become even more inseparable. Equally, some of the ideas 
which Bakhtin explores in relation to Medieval France, such as the 
anonymity of the masked crowd in the street carnival have become 
even more relevant in the online world. In his seminal work Weapons of 
the weak: Everyday forms of peasant resistance (1985) Domination and 
the arts of resistance: Hidden transcripts (Yale UP, 1990), James C. 
Scott explores how people with little political power indirectly undermine 
those with power through small acts of sabotage, gossip, rumour and 
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refusing to participate in official displays of subservience – indirect, 
disguised, and fugitive forms of resistance which he terms 
“infrapolitics”. Like Bakhtin, Scott’s work on modes of subaltern 
resistance and the ‘weapons of the weak’ suggests that humour has 
little power to change reality but does give those who engage in this 
humour a sense of agency and control over their lives. In a special 
issue of “Infrapolitics and mobilizations”, Scott (2012, p. 115) explicitly 
makes the connection between Rabelais, Bakhtin and contemporary 
social media by asking: 
“Does the contemporary proliferation of electronic media and cyber 
communities represent, in this sense, a vast new terrain of anonymous 
individual and collective actions?”     
 
As Scott underlines, individual action does not exclude collective action 
or vice versa. The modern carnival is about the collective participating 
in the (virtual) community through individual expression – the online 
account for example. Although the modern carnival is less about social 
and community participation and more about individual presence and 
expression, taken together the contributions shared in modern day 
carnivals in social media spaces are more collective than individualised 
because they create collective voices. At the same time because social 
media spaces are primarily individualised spaces with a proliferation of 
different voices and permit greater anonymity than Bakhtin’s street 
carnival, there is a greater role for individual identity and expression.  
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Freud’s work on humour and the metaphorical language of ‘release’ 
also helps us better understand how the relative anonymity of social 
media functions as a disinhibiting factor in how individuals express 
themselves online, whether through real names or aliases. They can be 
angry without needing to shoulder the responsibility that being 
identifiable requires. By the same token, social media activism (in this 
case in Jordan after the Arab Spring) has sometimes allowed people to 
use humour as a tool perhaps for personal sanity and wellbeing so they 
can ‘play at resistance’ rather than taking part in actual protests in 
streets and public spaces.  
1.4 The application of Bakhtin and Freud  
Research on political humour and satire is vast and broad in scope. A 
significant amount of research is in English and is based on the 
American and British contexts (to cite only the most recent examples: 
Wagg, 2002; Plumb, 2004; Conners, 2005; Brassett, 2016; Hall, 
Goldstein & Ingram, 2016; Davis, 2017). Research on political humour 
and satire in those two domains has found that political humour 
proliferates exponentially in times of political instability and unrest, such 
as wars, protests and political tensions and uncertainties. In Jordan, for 
example, humour has grown rapidly after the Arab Spring. Political 
humour increases in times of unrest because humour as a form of 
political resistance highlights the absurdities of political power and 
people’s attitudes towards power. The most useful contexts to compare 
Jordan to when examining how humour is used, however, are not 
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democratic political systems such as that of the contemporary UK and 
US, but rather authoritarian and semi-authoritarian political systems.  
 
In examining the past literature on political humour, I have identified two 
main approaches that have been used to analyse humour under 
authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes around the world: the 
Bakhtinian approach (or the collective approach) and the Freudian 
approach (or the individual approach). The Bakhtinian approach is 
concerned with using humour as a tool for popular resistance against 
power and government. It also focuses on the circulation of disaffected 
views and emotions about political power that cannot be expressed 
directly and openly in public spaces. The Bakhtinian approach also 
provides a way for building an ‘alternative world’ and narratives outside 
the repressive world of exaggeration, flattery, obedience and 
subservience. The Freudian approach is, however, particularly 
concerned with the function of humour as a safety valve that releases 
the tension of oppressed people under authoritarian and semi-
authoritarian regimes around the world. Both these aspects of the 
reaction to political humour are important. However, only Bakhtin 
provides a possibility of influence in the political sphere.    
 
In his article ‘Funny, but not vulgar’ (1968/1945), Orwell takes the idea 
of ‘resistance’ in political humour and captures very beautifully the key 
aspects of political humour as well as the idea of blending humour with 
resistance. He highlights the potentially subversive capabilities of 
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humour and jokes shared under authoritarian regimes and the idea of 
humour as an active form of popular resistance. He argues that “every 
joke is a tiny revolution … Whatever destroys dignity, and brings down 
the mighty from their seats, preferably with a bump, is funny. And the 
bigger the fall, the bigger the joke” (Orwell, 1968/1945, p. 284). 
According to Orwell, political humour and jokes have tiny moments of 
revolutions and seemingly active forms of popular resistance, but of 
course these kinds of revolutions are symbolic and do not lead to the 
actual overthrow of political power and regime. These tiny jokes can 
upset dictators and help to undermine some of a regime’s established 
orders.   
 
The Bakhtinian approach suggests that political humour permits 
emotions that cannot be expressed openly. For example, in his article 
‘Laughter behind the iron curtain: A sample of Romanian political jokes’ 
(1971), Alan Dundes (p. 51) found that under politically stressful 
circumstances, “people were reluctant to tell jokes to strangers. 
Informants usually spoke in low tones after glancing around to see if 
there was anyone else listening.” He argued (1971, p. 51) that “in 
political jokes in Iron Curtain countries, one frequently finds said what 
many individuals feel but dare not utter.” He demonstrated that 
Romanian political jokes “provide a much-needed vent for emotion,” 
because “they provide a socially sanctioned frame which normally 
absolves individuals from any guilt which might otherwise result from 
conversational … articulations of the same content.” This line of 
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argument suggests the precarious act of sharing political jokes under 
repressive regime, and how humour is considered as a tool to release 
repressed tensions and emotions, and therefore linked to Freud. This 
might explain why the cultural art of joke telling under some 
authoritarian regimes has been (and still) considered a perilous and a 
very risky business, “with a keen eye as to who is within listening 
distance” (Brandes, 1977, pp. 334–335). For the fear of losing their 
control and dignity, I argue that many dictatorships and authoritarian 
regimes around the world have repressed humour and criticism.  
 
The Bakhtinian approach to political humour thus sees political humour 
as neither resistance nor sublimation of aggression, but rather as a 
form of metaphoric substitution of a real political act that allows the 
creation of a controlled symbolic reality. Where the Bakhtinian approach 
has been applied in the context of the Arab world, this lack of change to 
the status quo has often been underlined. For example, the humour 
scholar Khalid Kishtainy argues against the effectiveness of political 
humour and jokes under repressive regimes. In his book Arab political 
humour, he argues (1985, p. 7) that “people joke about their 
oppressors, not to overthrow them but to endure them. People who 
have guns do not need jokes.”  
 
In his collaborative book with C. Branc [pseud] First prize: Fifteen years! 
An annotated collection of Romanian political jokes (1986), Dundes 
analysed Romanian political jokes under communist suppression and 
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found that political humour provided people with a tool that let them 
speak the ‘unspeakable’ to political power. The two authors argued that 
“criticism can be uttered only sotto voce and that is why political jokes 
play so important a role in Eastern Europe … One can speak in jokes 
when one cannot speak otherwise .... In Eastern Europe, what one 
cannot talk about are the inadequacies of the government. Hence there 
are far more political jokes in Eastern Europe than in the United States” 
(Banc & Dundes, 1986, p. 10).  
 
In his article ‘What courage!” Romanian “Our leader” jokes’ (1989), 
Robert Cochran argues that political humour and jokes under the long-
time ruler Nicolae Ceausescu offered a time for self-expression. He 
points out that political humour is “at once an assertion of defiance and 
admission of defeat … No public change is affected” (Cochran, 1989, p. 
272). Writing about Russian political humour and jokes, Alexander 
Rose argues that political humour offers one of the best exercises for 
popular endurance and regime repression. He argues that humour 
provides “temporary pain relievers [that can serve] as a substitute for 
being allowed to participate in real politics” (Rose, 2001–2002, p. 68). 
This form of carnivalesque political humour offers some sorts of 
alternatives to the regime’s policies and practices, but only fleetingly, 
and only in certain, limited spaces.  
 
In his article ‘Political jokes under communism’ (2007), Davies extends 
this notion of political humour and satire further and argues that political 
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humour and satire can be considered as a form to reflect disaffection, 
and not resistance. He sees it as a sign of regime instability, but not as 
a call for regime change or revolution. In the light of this claim, he 
argues that political jokes are “thermometer not a thermostat; they can 
be used as an indication of what is happening in a society but they do 
not feed back into the social processes that generated them to any 
significant extent” (Davies, 2007, p. 300). This argument helps us to 
assert the negligible impact of political humour and satire in Jordan 
(and probably nearly everywhere) to achieve any change or significant 
impact in the near to medium term. This line of thought is found similar 
to those in Bakhtin’s and Scott’s theories about ordinary people’s 
resistance to power and its impact when Bakhtin and Scott spoke about 
the ephemerality of carnivals against power.  
 
Explicitly drawing on the Bakhtinian theory of carnival and the 
carnivalesque, Muhammad Badarneh (2011) argues that contemporary 
Arab political humour has provided a form of “hidden dialogue” between 
the oppressed (and their marginalised discourse) and the regime (and 
its dominant power and its unilaterally autocratic discourse). Badarneh 
argues that the political humour shared under some Arab authoritarian 
and repressive regimes act against state repression and monologist 
discourses. Political humour, shared under these regimes, provides a 
tool for the proliferation of covert acts of popular resistance by creating 
counter-narratives and promoting the ordinary politics of alternatives.  
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According to Badarneh (2011), contemporary Arab political humour has 
built an alternative second world, outside the regime’s autocratic and 
monologist world. In the light of Badarneh’s argument, the people who 
are participating in this carnivalesque second world aim to disturb and 
potentially undermine the power of the regime using puns and irony that 
make fun of the regime and its institutionalised discourse. Although 
these acts of resistance occur momentarily, people who use anti-regime 
jokes demonstrate a profound act of popular resistance against many 
structures of power and regime policies. Such form of political humour 
may succeed in escaping regime crackdown on and prosecution of 
dissenting voices. This is because it uses ‘play with words’ using puns 
and metaphors and does not therefore directly attack political power 
and government.  
 
At the same time, much work by historians, anthropologists and political 
scientists on the language of politics and political debate in the MENA 
underline the importance of not taking at face value superficially 
subversive discourse. ‘Licensed disruption’ is referred to using different 
terms (each of which mean something slightly different) by various 
scholars of Middle East Studies. Miriam Cooke (2007), for example, 
uses the term ‘commissioned criticism’ to talk about when those in 
power actively encourage a certain degree of criticism in order to boost 
their ‘democratic’ credentials. Cooke (2007) draws on an example from 
Syria under Hafiz Asad’s regime, which facilitated the expression of 
anti-government views and sentiments in order to pre-empt any wider 
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popular protests against the regime. ‘Commissioned criticism’ goes 
beyond ‘licenced disruption’ – a concept commonly employed by 
scholars of Bakhtin – as it is actively encouraged (‘commissioned’) 
rather than simply allowed. Sometimes those engaging in ‘licensed 
disruption’ can believe they are more subversive than they actually are. 
Discussing post-independence Algeria, Benkhaled and Vince (2017) 
talk about ‘consensual criticism,’ whereby different parties and people 
appear to be presenting opposing points of view but are in fact 
reinforcing core ideas about political legitimacy and Algerian identity. 
This discussion highlights the importance of avoiding coming to 
sweeping conclusions about the extent to which humourists are 
subversive, and the extent to which they think their humour is 
subversive. It also underscores the importance to paying close attention 
to the specific contexts in which jokes are being told and the codes 
which they play on. Carnivalesque politics do not necessarily 
destabilise political system nor do they prop it up. Indeed, they can 
function as a form of ‘licensed disruption’. For example, in the context of 
Jordan after 2011, I argue that the carnival humour of Jordan after the 
Arab Spring can be considered a form of ‘licensed disruption’ that 
allows ridicule of the government whilst the ‘red lines’ of criticising the 
monarch which would be profoundly subversive and a direct attack on a 
political system rather than ‘just’ holders of government office is never 
crossed. This has been seen when a certain degree of criticism is 
allowed by those in power, to allow the population to ‘let off steam’ 
during socio-political unrests.  
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The Freudian approach of humour sees humour as a mode of 
psychological defence: a defence against anxiety and repression. This 
approach originated in Freud’s work and analysis of humour, which 
views humour as a safety valve (catharsis) that releases tensions and 
individual anger. This approach was applied by Antonin Obrdlik during 
the Second World War (1939–45), when he analysed Czechoslovakian 
political humour under the rule of Nazi Germany. In his article ‘Gallows 
humor: A sociological phenomenon’ (1942), Obrdlik argued that 
Czechoslovakian political humour took the form of a psychological 
mode of resistance and “morale booster,” and served as a source of 
“liberation” for the Czech people who were resisting the Nazi 
occupation during the war. George Mikes (1971, p. 109) considers this 
type of political humour as “the only weapon the oppressed can use 
against the oppressor. It is an aggressive weapon and a safety valve at 
the same time”.  
 
In his article ‘Peaceful protest: Spanish political humor in a time of 
crisis’ (1977), Stanley Brandes (p. 345) arrived at a similar conclusion 
about the role of political jokes under repressive contexts. He argued 
that political jokes shared in Franco’s Spain functioned as “a safety 
valve for anti-regime sentiment.” In his article ‘Political humour in a 
dictatorial state: The case of Spain’ (1977), Oriol Pi-Sunyer (p. 185) 
found similar observations to those in Brandes and argued that “humor 
in such circumstances … helps to alleviate anxiety and there were 
periods during the long Franco rule when levels of anxiety were very 
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high.” These observations about political jokes suggest the precarious 
act of political humour shared under repressed contexts. 
 
In her book Folklore fights the Nazi (1997), Kathleen Stokker makes 
similar observations to those of Obrdlik and explains how political 
humour was used by the Norwegian people as a secret and covert 
weapon of resistance during the German occupation of Norway (1940–
45). According to Stokker, “the Norwegian material portrays instead the 
oppressed taking the upper hand, deprecating the occupiers to their 
faces and refusing to be intimidated or even to alter the slightest details 
of their lifestyles in deference to German regulations” (Stokker, 1997, p. 
104). In his article ‘Wit and politics’ (1998), Hans Speier refers to this 
theory of political humour that is shared clandestinely under oppressive 
regimes and stressful circumstances as “whispered jokes” (Speier, 
1998, p. 1384). According to Speier, such humour has critical views 
about power that cannot be shared publicly. It characterises the power 
of the oppressor and the weakness of the oppressed. This approach of 
political humour highlights the role and function of humour as an active 
form of ‘internalised resistance’ against dominant power. Although the 
effect of political humour is minimal in the short to medium term, people 
under repressive regimes continue to use this form of humour to 
display, even if only to themselves, their resistance and noncompliance 
with power.  
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The existing literature on political humour under repressive regimes 
thus provides us with a means to understand the connections between 
the social, political and personal effects of humour, and whether this is 
explicitly or implicitly acknowledged, much of this draws upon or make 
similar arguments to Bakhtin on the collective revolutionary impulse and 
Freud on the role of individual agency and psychological benefit. 
However, this framework ignores specific ethnic and cultural 
differences, and how humour varies in impact because of those 
differences. Davies’ (1990) work on ethnic humour plays a role in 
explaining Jordanian humour before the Arab Spring because it 
considers how humour functions in varying social and political contexts 
and in relation to urban-rural divide.  
1.5 Ethnic jokes and superiority theory 
Jordanian ethnic humour is an earlier type of Jordanian political 
humour, where urbanites in the capital city Amman often make jokes 
about the people in the Jordanian steppe and the hinterlands and view 
them as culturally inferior and less civilised. I argue that this type of 
ethnic humour can be highly politicised because it is connected to the 
ideas of the postcolonial elite, class struggle and political polarisations 
and the tensions between urban and rural dwellers: the urban who are 
largely composed of Jordanians of Palestinian origin and the rural 
people who make up the majority of original Jordanian tribal nationals.  
Before examining this type of political humour in Jordan during the Gulf 
War, I first examine the definition of ethnic humour and some of the 
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existing research into ethnic humour around the world. I then focus on 
the application of Davies’ 1990 theory of humour because ethnic 
humour in Jordan is based on binary oppositions and on the creation of 
stereotypes and urban-rural division. Davies’ 1990 theory of humour 
focuses on urban versus rural, and canny versus stupid. For the 
application of this theory, I aim to review examples of ethnic jokes in 
Jordanian society that target the people of As-Salt, At-Tafilah and As-
Sarih to demonstrate the idea of identity politics and its representation 
in Jordanian political humour after the 1989 political opening.  
 
First, such ethnic humour emphasises the political notion of 
‘internalised orientalism,’ with its in-built notions of ‘the other’ and 
superiority over that other. Second, this humour sheds light on several 
socio-demographic and linguistic variables that are political, including, 
most importantly the idea of identity politics amongst Jordanians. Third, 
Jordanian ethnic humour has some relationships with the rise of the 
Gulf War jokes and political humour in Jordan after the 1989 political 
opening. For example, the people of the town of At-Tafilah in the south 
west of Jordan have been used as a target for humour and laughter by 
the Jordanian urbanites in some Gulf War jokes.  
 
Ethnic humour is operationally defined as a “type of humor in which fun 
is made of the perceived behaviour, customs, personality or any other 
traits of a group or its members by virtue of their sociocultural identity” 
(Apte, 1985, p. 198). This suggests that this type of humour is based on 
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the creation of stereotypes about other people who are often perceived 
as ‘lower’: culturally ignorant and underdeveloped. A stereotype can be 
defined as a presupposed mental image created by powerful people in 
order to describe a world that is beyond their knowledge or reach 
(Lippmann, 1922, pp. 31–38).  
 
Jordanian linguists and humour researchers, such as Mohammed 
Farghal and Abdullah Shakir (1993, p. 18), have acknowledged 
Lippmann’s 1922 definition of stereotype and argued that some 
stereotypes are culturally determined in the sense that they can provide 
a ‘kernel of truth,’ but this form of truth is subjective to individual cultural 
perspective and presupposition. Therefore, stereotypes offer most often 
factually incorrect interpretation and knowledge. Sometimes, these 
interpretations have nothing to do with the target group’s reality and 
empirical truth. Examples of ethnic jokes around the world are myriad: 
consider English jokes about the Irish, French jokes about the Belgians, 
Canadian jokes about the Newfies (people from Newfoundland), 
Russian jokes about the Georgians and Tajik, and many more.  
 
In his book Ethnic humour around the world (1990), Davies expounds 
there are three key themes that influence the creation of ethnic humour 
and jokes around the world: stupidity, canniness and sexual behaviour. 
He maintains that ethnic jokes about stupidity are dependent on three 
important factors: (1) geography (e.g. urbanites versus rural dwellers), 
(2) language and culture (e.g. urban dialect versus rural dialect), and 
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(3) economy: the joke-teller is often an urbanite and wealthier than the 
target who is a rural dweller and less wealthy (Davies, 1990, p. 10). The 
dominant people in urban centres often make jokes about the people 
who live in peripheral, rural areas by viewing them as linguistically and 
culturally underdeveloped and therefore less civilised. This is evident in 
the case of Jordan because ethnic humour was based on the creation 
of stereotypes and urban-rural division: Jordanians of Palestinian origin 
in urban centres make jokes about Jordanians of Transjordanian origin 
in rural areas for being culturally inferior and backward.    
 
In his analysis of the Tunisian ethnic jokes that target Libyans, Ibrahim 
Muhawi (1996) makes observations that are similar to those in Davies 
(1990). He shows how the themes of stupidity, canniness and economy 
have impacted the creation of Tunisian ethnic jokes about Libyans. He 
argues that the Tunisians’ sense of superiority has not been based on 
materialistic resources (in this case because of the oil in Libya) but 
rather on wit, intelligence and the use of language in the marketplace 
(Muhawi, 1996, p. 40). Ethnic jokes in Tunisia are based on the 
supposed ignorance, ill-manners and inferiority of Libyans, compared to 
Tunisians who view themselves as more educated and cultured, and 
too canny to be outsmarted. Ethnic humour seems therefore to be part 
of political humour because of its relevance to the question of identity 
politics and power relations (the more powerful make jokes about the 
more powerless).     
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I argue that the study of Jordanian ethnic humour can be usefully 
explained through Davies’ earlier theory of ethnic humour (1990), and 
Muhawi’s (1996) framework, because it focuses on the creation of 
stereotypes and tensions between urban and rural dwellers. In Jordan, 
as elsewhere, many urbanites in the capital city Amman consider 
themselves to be canny and smart in comparison to people who live in 
rural areas, many of whom are viewed by many city dwellers as 
ignorant and naive. Urbanite ethnic humour in Jordan often targets the 
people of As-Salt, At-Tafilah and As-Sarih.  
 
The people of As-Salt are stereotypically perceived as savage and 
tactless, the people of At-Tafilah are as stupid and lacking discretion, 
and the people of As-Sarih as naive and primitive. Examples of this 
type of urbanite humour are to be considered later in this section. 
Before then, I present in Figure 1 below a map of Jordan, which shows 
the geographic locations of As-Salt and As-Sarih in the north west of 
Jordan, and At-Tafilah in the south west. These three areas are the 
targets of urbanite humour because they are rural and peripheral areas, 
if compared to urban areas such as Amman.        
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Figure 1. Map of Jordan showing the localities of As-Salt, At-Tafilah and 
As-Sarih (the targets of Jordanian urbanite humour) 
 
According to the Jordanian linguists Hassan Abdel-Jawad (1986) and 
Enam Al-Wer (2007), the 1921 naming and subsequent growth of 
Amman as the capital city of Transjordan (now Jordan) gradually 
deprived As-Salt from its privilege as being at that time the largest 
Transjordanian town. Abdel-Jawad (1986) and Al-Wer (2007) have 
argued that the urbanites who live in the capital city Amman did not 
have an indigenous dialect and population to speak of. Rather, they 
have developed for themselves a dialect that is largely influenced by 
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Palestinian Arabic and Palestinian dialects. These observations about 
the formation of the dialect of Amman are important to the study of 
ethnic humour in Jordan because they have created new fault lines and 
cultural differences between urban and rural dwellers.    
 
It is also presently observable that the people of Amman have 
developed for themselves an economic and political ‘aristocracy’ that is 
based on their fortune and regime favourites, compared to those who 
dwell in the hinterlands who are viewed as less fortunate and 
economically deprived and stagnated. Notwithstanding the existence of 
this self-assured ‘aristocracy,’ Jordanian society in Amman can be 
considered fragmented and culturally diverse. Most of the residents of 
Amman come from Palestine, and from other multi-ethnic groups from 
outside Jordan, including Armenians, Chechens, Circassians and 
Turkomans. The population of the city rapidly increased after the influx 
of Palestinian refugees after the 1948 war and the 1967 war with Israel 
(Alon, 2007, p. 152; Tell, 2013, p. 22). Over time, the city has 
developed a heterogeneous urban political identity, albeit largely 
identified with Palestine and with mild opposition to the regime. Of 
course, one way in which a heterogeneous group can find ‘common 
ground’ is by opposition, that is, by the identification and mocking of a 
group from elsewhere.     
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Ethnic humour in Jordan is predominately politically motivated. It is 
based on urban-rural divide and tensions: Jordanians of Palestinian 
origin in urban centres and Jordanians of Transjordanian origin in rural 
areas. I argue that this type of ethnic joking sheds light on the nature of 
political humour in Jordan after the 1989 political opening: the powerful 
make jokes about the powerless. This type of political humour (ethnic) 
is highly politicised because it sheds light on cultural stereotypes and 
sense of superiority over the rural dwellers who comprise the majority of 
Transjordanian people in As-Salt, At-Tafilah and As-Sarih. These 
people are ‘original’ Jordanian nationals who often work for the military 
and for the security services. They are the bedrock of the regime.  
 
Furthermore, it can be argued that ethnic humour in Jordan is related to 
regional division in order to reflect politically cultural ideologies, 
geographic origins and regional identities. I have noticed that some 
urbanites in Amman make jokes and laugh at the Bedouin and the 
dialects of rural areas and use them as a source for their urbanite 
humour and jokes. In his analysis of the linguistic practices used on 
contemporary Jordanian radio stations, Jona Fras (2017) found that 
Jordanian urbanites tend to laugh at the coarse pronunciation of the 
affricate consonant letter Č in the rural dialect instead of K as in the 
refined urban dialect in words, illustrated in words such as Ča‘āčīl 
instead of Ka‘ākīl. This word refers to a traditional Jordanian dish that is 
made of fermented yoghurt and groats (Fras, 2017, p. 183). The 
humour in the rural pronunciation of the word Ča‘āčīl designates an 
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element of Jordanity, which refers to the original Jordanian culture and 
identity that is being viewed by Jordanians of Palestinian origin in urban 
centres as backward and unrefined.  
 
In his book The Jordanian satirists (2013), the Palestinian-Jordanian 
writer Jamil Swais, who writes under the pseudonym ‘Nazih Abu Nidal,’ 
provides a (relatively short) analysis of urbanite ethnic humour and 
about the creation of stereotypes in Jordan. He found that the people of 
As-Salt are among the key targets of Jordanian urbanite ethnic humour 
(Abu Nidal, 2013, p. 11). He demonstrates that throughout the last few 
decades, the people of As-Salt in Jordanian ethnic humour have been 
mockingly viewed as ‘culturally backward’ and ‘ignorant.’ They eat 
Mansaf, ‘attack’ with their heads (a metaphor to describe their savagery 
and inconsiderate social behaviours) and often die of strokes as a result 
of their stressful and hostile temperaments.  
 
For some Jordanians, stereotype has a ‘kernel of truth’ in Jordanian 
local cultural politics, which considers the people inhabiting the 
mountainous areas, such as As-Salt and Ajloun, to be stubborn and 
hard-headed. They are often perceived to have an oak-like constitution 
because of the hardness of the tree and its numerousness in the 
Jordanian mountainous areas. The residents of these mountainous 
areas in Jordan are believed to be strongly opinionated, if compared to 
the easygoingness and cultural familiarity of the residents of urban 
areas, such as the residents of Amman. This assumption is based on 
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the impact of mountainous environments and wildlife on culture, 
everyday life and social interactions among the residents of these 
areas. Jordanian ethnic humour seems to be a part of earlier Jordanian 
political humour that emerged after the country’s 1989 political opening. 
This form of ethnic joking reflected a new kind of humour that acted as 
a tool for social and political commentary about the rural people from 
the Jordanian hinterlands.  
 
First, the people of As-Salt were among the earliest targets of 
Jordanian ethnic humour (Abu Nidal, 2013, pp. 11–12). One joke 
portrays the people of As-Salt as savage and often dying as a result of 
stroke due to their overly rich diet (Mansaf). They are sometimes 
stereotypically perceived as uncivilised and tactless in their 
relationships with others. Here for example are two urbanite jokes about 
the stubbornness of people of As-Salt: A too intransigent man heard 
there is another person in the town of As-Salt who is more stubborn 
than he. Feeling curious, he headed to the Salti’s (a person from As-
Salt) home of residence and knocked at the door. The Salti asks the 
man “who are you?” The man said, “it’s me.” The Salti said, “No, it’s not 
you” (Abu Nidal, 2013, p. 12); a Salti’s father has been asked by his 
own son about a few questions in life. “What do you know about 
pluralism, father? “I do not know, son.” “What do you know about email, 
father?” “I do not know, son” “What do you know about reincarnation?” 
“This is the first time I heard such a term, son.” At this time, the Salti’s 
wife interfered and asked her son not to bother his father anymore. The 
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father replied, “No, wife, let our son develop his “No’s” in life” (Abu 
Nidal, 2013, p. 13). These two examples show the stereotypical notion 
held by the Jordanian urbanites about the people of As-Salt for being 
stubborn and hard-headed.           
 
Second, the people of At-Tafilah in the south of Jordan are also mocked 
by Jordanian urbanities for their presumed stupidity and lack of 
discretion. Although urbanite jokes about the people of As-Salt are 
more prominent and widespread in Jordanian jocular discourse, jokes 
about the people of At-Tafilah have grown in number in the last few 
decades. Urbanite jokes about the people of At-Tafilah focus on the 
indigenous people’s ignorance, lack of discretion and stupidity that 
sometimes overtakes that stereotypically held to be true of the people 
of As-Salt. Consider the following three urbanite jokes about the people 
of At-Tafilah.  
 
The first joke was disseminated during the Gulf War when the 
Jordanian government and most people in Jordan chose to side with 
Iraq in the war: A Tafili in the Iraqi missile force receives orders to 
economise in the use of missiles against Israel because of their high 
cost in the Gulf War. However, one night he was ordered to launch ten 
missiles at Tel Aviv, but, using his discretion, he launched them at At-
Tafilah (Farghal & Shakir, 1993, p. 22). The second joke is politically 
oriented because it highlights a political stance in relation to the people 
of Gaza who are more identified with the Muslim Brotherhood and Iran 
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(Iraq’s regional rival during the war). One Tafili’s salary statement 
showed a deduction of 20% to the people of Gaza in Palestine. Feeling 
outraged, he decided to donate his entire salary to the Jews in Israel.  
The third joke, however, highlights the political notion of ‘internalised 
orientalism’ with its notions of ‘the other’ and superiority over those who 
live in the hinterlands. A student from At-Tafilah used to fail his exam 
every year. His fellow citizens went to the student’s headmaster and 
begged him to help the student. The headmaster agreed, provided that 
the student could answer a simple question. The headmaster said, “If 
the student can provide the correct answer to this question, then he will 
be passed without sitting for an exam.” Everyone, including the student, 
accepted this condition. So, the headmaster asked, “What’s the sum of 
one and one?” “Two,” the student answered quickly. However, before 
the headmaster could say anything, all the people of At-Tafilah who 
accompanied the student shouted, “Please sir, give him another 
chance” (Al-Khatib, 1999, p. 268). These three examples show the 
stereotypical notion held by some Jordanian urbanites about the people 
of At-Tafilah for being stupid and naive.     
 
Jokes that combine the people of At-Tafilah with their counterparts (the 
people of As-Salt) were also widespread in Jordanian urbanite humour 
after the 1989 political opening. These types of jokes often resonate 
more strongly and achieve a greater audience impact and engagement 
than one single joke about the people of At-Tafilah or the people of As-
Salt. Consider the following two jokes: One Salti and one Tafili were 
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heading to a train station. Upon arrival, they both started chasing the 
train. The Tafili outran the Salti and got in the train. When asked why he 
laughed hysterically, the Salti indicated that the Tafili was supposed to 
give him a lift. (Abu Nidal, 2013, p. 11); A Tafili Sheikh once asked the 
people of his town at one Friday’s prayer to multiply their prayers and 
supplications to Allah Almighty. When he was asked about the reason, 
he logically stated [sic] that he does not want to see that the entire 
people of paradise are from As-Salt. I think those people who view 
themselves as ‘elite’ in Jordanian urban centres have tended to accept 
the stance of orientalism and influence from Western modernity as a 
form of power that has enabled them to stereotype, whilst rural dwellers 
lack the power to challenge that stereotype.      
 
Third, the people of As-Sarih in Irbid have become the subject of a 
considerable number of Jordanian urbanite humour and jokes. As-Sarih 
is a former village and now suburb, located at the outskirts of the city of 
Irbid. The people of As-Sarih are therefore the suburbanites to the city 
dwellers of Irbid in northern Jordan. The people of As-Sarih are 
stereotypically perceived by the urbanites in Irbid to be too naive and 
ignorant. Consider the following two urbanite jokes about the people of 
As-Sarih: Why do the people of As-Sarih put their beds outside and 
sleep inside during the summer? Because, in this way, they can 
conceal their presence, and get away from the mosquitoes; a Sarihi (a 
person from As-Sarih) once cancelled his wedding party because the 
invitation cards had been leaked. These two examples show the 
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stereotypical notion held by some urbanites in Irbid about the people of 
As-Sarih for being naive and ignorant. The Jordanian socio-political 
situation after 1989 shows evidence of the existence of ethnic humour 
that took advantage of the country’s political opening and freedom of 
speech and expression.        
 
After 1989, some Jordanian urbanites who are mostly Jordanian of 
Palestinian origin view the people of Hebron in Palestine as a target for 
their urbanite humour and ethnic jokes. The people of Hebron (in 
Arabic, the people of Al-Khalil) are stereotypically known for their greed, 
avarice and poor discretion. For the last few decades, they have been 
the subject of an increasing number of urbanite jokes in Jordanian-
Palestinian jocular discourse. For example, consider the following three 
jokes: A Khalili (a person from the town of Hebron in Palestine) built a 
mosque and after he saw many people coming into it, he transformed it 
into a restaurant; a Khalili was informed by his friend that tomorrow will 
be Valentine’s Day. The Khalili asked his friend if there is a special 
prayer to be performed with reference to prayers performed by Muslims 
on Eid days; a Khalili invited a Jew for a meal at his home. Having 
experienced the generosity of the Khalili, the Jew asked the Khalili if his 
religion requires him to do so. The Khalili replied in a heartbroken 
manner “Yes.” The Jew replied, “I do not have to do such thing in my 
religion.” After that, it has been reportedly said that the Khalili embraced 
Judaism instead of Islam. The examples above show the role of 
stereotypes in the creation of Jordanian ethnic jokes about the people 
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of As-Salt, At-Tafilah, As-Sarih and the people of Hebron in Palestine 
for being greedy and tight-fisted, which often compares to or exceeds 
the stereotypical notion held about the Jews. The emergence of these 
jokes gives a clear indication of the role of stereotyping and other 
regional influences in generating Jordanian ethnic humour that targeted 
the people of Hebron in Palestine. These indications reflect the key 
moments of diversification in Jordanian society and its reception of 
humour, and how humour has been both reflective of and participative 
in this complex of cultural forces. This discussion matters for the issues 
in this thesis because these jokes later influenced, in ways explained in 
chapter 3 of this thesis, the development of Jordanian political humour.  
 
The superiority theory of humour is among the oldest theories of 
humour and laughter. It originates in the classical and philosophical 
works of Plato and Aristotle, who viewed humour as a pleasure derived 
from someone else’s misfortune or calamity. The 16th century English 
philosopher Thomas Hobbes was one of the main proponents of this 
theory of humour. In Hobbes’ words, laughter “is nothing else but 
sudden glory arising from some sudden conception of some eminency 
in ourselves, by comparison with the infirmity of others, or with our own 
formerly [self-deprecatory humour]” (Hobbes, 1650/1987, p. 20). The 
Hobbesian “sudden glory” resonates to me with the Arabic word 
‘shamateh’ (gloating), which denotes the same feeling of pleasure 
derived from someone else’s misfortune or calamity. In one of his 
politically satirical articles ‘Thanks to all corrupted people’ (2011), 
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Jordan’s most famous socio-political satirist Ahmad Hassan Al-Zou’bi 
compared his profession, social satirist, to that of a winch driver. He 
argued that both (the satirist and winch driver) earn their livelihood 
through the misfortune and adversities of others. Al-Zou’bi’s description 
of his profession is notable here for its relevance to the superiority 
theory of humour and laughter.         
 
In the context of Jordanian humour, we might think of several domestic 
ethnic jokes by the urbanites in the capital city Amman, that target the 
inferiority and stupidity of the people of As-Salt and At-Tafilah in the 
rural areas in Jordan, as examples relating to the superiority theory. In 
the view of this theory of humour, Jordanian urbanites laugh at the 
people of At-Tafilah because they are stereotypically perceived as 
stupid, ignorant and backward. They are popularly assumed by the 
Jordanian urbanites to be simpletons and less clever. According to this 
theory, humour is derived from the feeling of superiority, which can be 
best understood in the larger context of ‘moron jokes’ and binary 
oppositions: the cunning of the joke teller as well as the listener, 
compared to the stupidity of a target group (Carroll, 2014, p. 9). Moron 
jokes (as the name suggests) stem from stereotypical perceptions 
about others. They highlight the role of stereotypes as a motif for 
generating humour and satire over the other.  
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Indeed, the superiority theory of humour has a great capacity to explain 
the politics of ethnic jokes (e.g. urban-rural tensions), disability jokes, 
‘lightbulb’ jokes and the like. The superiority theory of humour provides 
therefore a valid perspective to think about political humour and satire 
in the Jordanian socio-political context. This theory combines elements 
of two social groups: the superordinate over the subordinate people 
(the more powerful and the more powerless). However, because one of 
the functions of the ‘carnival’ is to flatten power and eliminate social 
superiority, the Bakhtinian perspective on humour superficially dents 
the relevance of the superiority theory when thinking about humour in 
Jordan on social media spaces. Such humour has mocked and 
criticised power and the government.     
 
Nonetheless, in the country (and region) under consideration in this 
thesis, jokes readily explainable by the superiority theory of humour can 
be considered a form of elitism, or a home-grown Arab identity that 
emerged following the departure of western imperial powers in the mid-
twentieth century. People who live in urban centres hold the belief that 
they are ‘modern’ and more influenced by western modernity. From this 
perspective, Guido Rings (personal communication, 15 May 2013) 
thinks that the Jordanian urban elite reveal in their urbanised discourse 
a tendency towards the idea of ‘internalised orientalism’ through the 
assimilation of western views about modernity and progress. This has 
eventually led to a marginalisation of, if not discrimination against, 
larger parts of traditional Jordanian society in the steppe and the 
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hinterlands. The superiority theory of humour is therefore valid for 
understanding ethnic joking as well as the urban-rural divide in Jordan. 
And with a post-colonial lens, as suggested by Rings, above, ethnic 
joking in Jordan can be understood as theoretically ‘political’. However, 
superiority theory is invalid for analysis of the particular humour 
phenomenon that is the subject of this thesis because much humour 
after the Arab Spring in Jordan has tended to flatten power, eliminate 
social superiority and challenge the dominant power discourse.  
1.5.1 The incongruity theory  
The incongruity theory of humour can be considered as one of the most 
informative and useful approaches for thinking about jokes that are now 
in Jordan predominantly located and disseminated in social media 
spaces. Much humour in these social media spaces has tended to 
result from two elements: expectation and surprise. From my 
observations, I have seen many Jordanian people laugh at things that 
are least expected. They laugh at the joke about the Tafili who heard 
about the death of 100 people during the annual Islamic pilgrimage to 
Mecca in Saudi Arabia and hoped if they were Jews. These two 
examples and more demonstrate the wide applicability of the 
incongruity theory of humour, even when other theoretical lenses like 
superiority are also valid, in the Jordanian social context.  
In the light of the incongruity theory of humour, consider the following 
Jordanian joke, which is based on the use of oxymoron used to 
misplace ‘elephants’ in the category of things that can fly. The joke 
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reads as follows: a schoolteacher in a Jordanian town once asked his 
students to name a few things that can fly. Most students in the class 
responded with reasonable lists of things that can fly. However, one 
student listed ‘elephants’ in the category. The schoolteacher (who is 
presented here as canny) asked the student about his father’s job. The 
student responded: “My father works for the intelligence service.” 
Feeling intimidated, the schoolteacher said: “Well, then, elephants can 
fly, but you know (and your father knows, for sure) that their altitude in 
the sky will not be that high if compared to birds.”   
 
The incongruity theory of humour provides a useful approach to think 
about political humour and satire, as well as the absurdity of political 
power, through exposing the contradictions between political 
articulation and official declarations. In this case, we might think one 
political cartoon that was drawn by Jordanian cartoonist Omar Abdallat 
on 21 February 2018 as an example to understand the incongruity 
theory of humour. The cartoon mocks the political discourse and 
statements of Jordanian Prime Minister Hani Al-Mulki when he 
proclaimed in a televised interview in 2018 that “Jordanian economy will 
recover and get out of the bottleneck by 2019” (Prime Ministry of 
Jordan, 2018, 19:09). The ‘man in the bottle’ cartoon can be understood 
using incongruity theory because a man cannot actually fit inside a 
bottle, so the image is incongruous. The cartoon depicted an image of a 
very depressed Jordanian young man inside a bottle waiting for his exit 
from the bottleneck in 2019, with a mocking statement that reads “It is 
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getting nearer, Boss” (Abdallat, 2018). The incongruity theory of 
humour can expose in a very subtle way the contradictions and 
inconsistencies between political discourse and political actions. 
Political humour is an important component of the post-2011 
development of humour in Jordan, and incongruity theory plays a role in 
explaining such political humour, but it is not at all sufficient for analysis 
of ‘carnivalesque’ political humour in Jordanian social media spaces 
since the Arab Spring. Alternative theoretical perspectives are needed: 
Bakhtin and Freud.  
 
Of the three theories of humour, I find that the incongruity theory of 
humour provides the most comprehensive and informative approach to 
understand humour in modern everyday life and in many social 
domains. People generally tend to laugh at incongruent jokes. For 
example, in British humour, we might think of ‘a horse walks into a 
bar…’. In Jordanian humour, we might think of several incongruous 
jokes that start with an opening passage, such as ‘once upon a time 
there was/were …’. For example, ‘one upon a time, there was an 
elephant who got married to an ant. After a few months of marriage, the 
elephant decided to divorce his ant wife. The ant got angry and cried 
out: “…and what about the little elephant in my abdomen.”’ Jordanians 
often laugh at these jokes because they highlight an element of 
incongruity that often contradicts the joke’s subject-matter or the 
narrative that sets up the joke (in this case, an ant and elephant).  
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The incongruity theory is valid when we think about ethnic joking in 
Jordan before the Arab Spring. For example, Jordanians laugh at the 
Tafili who was sitting with his beloved at a public space. After seeing 
her father from afar, he told her “Listen, tell your father I am your 
brother.” This joke utilises the element of ‘stereotype’ about the 
stereotypically held notion in Jordan about the people of At-Tafilah 
being stupid and having poor discretion in various social situations. It 
also reveals an element of incongruity when the Tafili proposes a stupid 
solution for his girlfriend’s feeling of embarrassment. This joke 
highlights some social codes about male and female as well as the 
social construction of gender in Jordan.   
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1.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has presented a theoretical framework for considering how 
humour has been used and presented in Jordan before and after the 
Arab Spring. This framework has moved from the collective to the 
individual to cultural difference. It has used Bakhtin, Freud and Davies: 
Bakhtin on the collective revolutionary impulse, Freud on the role of 
individual agency and Davies on specific ethnic and cultural differences. 
This framework will inform our approach to understanding how humour 
functions and what purposes it serves in Jordan. The Bakhtinian 
approach views humour as a tool for non-violent resistance as well as a 
tool that admits the defeat of resistance in the face of an undefeatable 
oppressor because it explains how political humour can provide a ‘safe 
haven’ to comment on social and political structures and escape 
prosecution. This approach has a few connections with Freud’s theory 
of humour as a safety valve that releases tensions and repressed 
emotions and Scott’s view of humour as a weapon of the weak.  
 
Furthermore, this chapter has explored the marrying of Bakhtin’s theory 
of carnivalesque humour to Freud’s theory of humour, which views the 
latter as a pressure valve release to reduce individual anger and 
repression. The way in which Bakhtin’s theory of carnival is discussed 
from the perspective of Freud reveals the relevance – and some of the 
weaknesses – of application of Bakhtin’s ideas about carnival and the 
carnivalesque when we think about humour as a safety valve that 
releases tensions and repressed emotions in modern-day carnivals in 
Chapter 1 Political and personal humour: Theoretical foundations               84 
 
 
 
social media spaces. Although social media spaces permit greater 
anonymity and have more individualised distinctive qualities that go 
(unsurprisingly) beyond Bakhtin’s theory of carnival, this does not make 
Freud more important than Bakhtin, but rather, the collective experience 
of social media spaces makes Bakhtin more important than Freud.  
 
This chapter has examined Bakhtin’s conception of carnival and the 
carnivalesque in the context of the existing research on political 
humour, the dominant theories of humour, and how they can be applied 
to Bakhtin’s ideas about the carnival and the current Jordanian 
economic and socio-political situation before and after the Arab Spring. 
It has considered the extent to which Bakhtin’s carnivalesque humour 
might be considered an active form of popular resistance when we think 
about the recent and ongoing period of protests and sometimes 
revolutions in parts of the MENA region. It has argued that Bakhtin’s 
theory of carnival and the carnivalesque offers, because of the context 
of its making, a valid and useful framework to think about the 
proliferation of political humour and satire in Jordanian social media 
spaces after the 2011 Arab Spring revolutions.  
 
Ethnic humour, where the urbanites in the capital city Amman make 
jokes about the people who live in the steppe and the hinterlands, is an 
older type of Jordanian political humour and satire. The urbanites in 
Jordan, as it is elsewhere, often reinforcing their cultural advantage and 
sense of superiority over those who live in rural areas and those who 
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dwell in the Jordanian steppe and the hinterlands in small towns or 
villages in the periphery. Jordanian ethnic humour is (and always has 
been) ‘political’ because it concerns with power between different 
groups. It is used by a more empowered (or wealthier or better 
educated) group to create a collective sense of superiority over the 
‘other.’ It is important for this thesis on Jordanian political humour and 
satire in the sense that the street protests and resistance since 2011 
has enabled the dis-or less empowered rural people in the Jordanian 
hinterlands to develop a counter-superiority tendency and laugh at the 
powerful in urban centres. The development of ‘carnivalesque’ political 
humour in Jordan since the Arab Spring brings such humour in close in 
some respects to Bakhtin’s carnival. Jordanian social media spaces, as 
will later be shown, have become places for socio-political ‘flattening’ 
and cathartic hedonism that has provoked significant changes in 
Jordanian society after the Arab Spring, where more people willing to 
criticise and mock the government.  
 
In the next chapter, I highlight the legal frameworks and societal 
expectations, political and social fault lines, and the languages and 
metaphors that are used to (and still) articulate Jordanian political 
humour discourse. I argue that the specificity of the Jordanian context 
after the Arab Spring needs to be considered when talking about the 
application of Bakhtin’s carnival. This is because this theory was 
postulated in a pre-IT and pre-internet age as well as the notable 
differences in the cultural and socio-political context of Bakhtin’s Soviet 
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Union and Jordan after the Arab Spring. Nonetheless, this has not 
altogether negated the relevance of this theory due to its relationship to 
the idea of power and popular resistance.  
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2 Jordan and the Arab Spring 
2.1 Introduction   
During the First World War (1914–18), the Middle Eastern countries 
were created and controlled by a patchwork of foreign imperial powers. 
Britain and France divided the Arab provinces and territories (that were 
formerly under the Ottoman Empire) into British and French 
protectorates. Britain created what would become Transjordan (later 
Jordan), Iraq, Palestine and all the Gulf countries, while France created 
what would become Syria and Lebanon. Eventually, these Middle 
Eastern countries developed independence and political autonomy, 
native cultural politics and new forms of national identities that emerged 
to reflect different social and political changes (Yapp, 1987; Hourani, 
1991). The Middle East thus underwent profound social and political 
transformations in accordance with British and French designs after the 
First World War.      
 
In this chapter, I examine how Jordan as a new state-nation (rather 
than nation-state because the state was created before the nation) is 
represented in and important for the study of political humour and 
satire. Throughout this thesis, I argue that whilst Bakhtin’s carnival is 
not perfectly descriptive of Jordan and the Arab Spring, it is certainly 
very relevant in several ways. Bakhtin's theory of carnival can be 
considered very relevant in several ways to the study of social and 
political humour in contemporary Jordan since the Arab Spring. 
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Bakhtin’s ideas about carnival seem a valid lens to view the role and 
function of political humour in Jordan since the Arab Spring, although 
there is a clear limitation affecting the application of the Bakhtinian 
carnival: the difference in the cultural-political contexts (the cultural and 
political contexts of Jordan and the Soviet Union have some similarities 
but also some differences because Jordan in the last few decades is 
not like the Soviet Union in the mid-20th century under Stalin, as 
summarised in Table 2 below). Nonetheless, carnival is highly relevant 
to the socio-political context of Jordan after the Arab Spring. I made a 
choice in the Table below to ‘end’ the Soviet Union at 1975 because 
that is when Bakhtin died. I think whatever happened between 1975-91 
could have no influence on Bakhtinian thought. For this reason, I tried 
to compare the contexts when political humour was actively emergent, 
and not to compare the countries themselves because they are very 
different: Jordan is an Arab Islamic country under a constitutional 
monarchy, and the Soviet Union was a communist state that was ruled 
under an authoritarian regime. That is why I selected 1989 for Jordan 
and I wrote in the Figure title ‘Bakhtin’s Soviet Union’ rather than ‘the 
Soviet Union.’  
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Table 2. Overview comparison of selected aspects of Bakhtin’s Soviet 
Union and Jordan from 1989 
 
 Soviet Union 1919–
1975 
Jordan 1989– 
Politics and 
government  
Communist state Constitutional 
monarchy  
Socio-political 
structure  
Authoritarian regime  Semi-democratic, 
semi-authoritarian 
regime  
Cultural practices, 
including religion  
Orthodox Christianity, 
Soviet culture    
Islam, Arab culture   
Level of freedom of 
expression  
Severely limited  Less limited  
Forms of censorship  Strict state 
censorship  
Limited government 
censorship  
Diffusion of political 
humour 
Whispered jokes, 
coded criticism 
Direct jokes and 
criticism in public and 
social media spaces  
 
Bakhtin’s framework and concepts enable us to examine how groups 
create spaces in which to express dissent in contexts where 
straightforward opposition is problematic. For example, in terms of the 
limits on freedom of speech and expression, Jordan is partially free, 
and the regime can be viewed as semi-democratic compared to the 
authoritarian regime in the Soviet Union during Stalin’s de facto reign. 
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This difference in the cultural and political contexts matters; 
nonetheless, carnival is still highly relevant because of its relationship to 
regime cultural politics, level of freedom of speech, the existence of a 
disaffected public, political repression (though differing in degree) and 
mobilisation against political power. Bakhtin provides a valid and useful 
framework to understand the context of the socio-political history of 
Jordan and the shifting political environments instigated by the 1989 
country’s political opening, and more recently the 2011 Arab Spring 
revolutions.  
 
To explore the applicability of Bakhtin in this way, I first provide some 
background information on the 1921 creation of and subsequent history 
of Transjordan. I then examine Jordan’s struggles with identity politics, 
managed elections and economic and political reforms, from 1989, to 
demonstrate the idea of using humour and satire against political 
power, and for resistance. I then argue that Jordan, despite its 
inauspicious beginnings in 1921 and constant domestic and regional 
challenges, has proved to be the most stable and resilient regime in the 
Middle East region. The resilience of the Hashemite regime in Jordan is 
important for the study of political humour and satire because it has 
influenced a new type of humour (resilience humour) in Jordanian 
streets and predominantly in Jordanian social media spaces since 
2011, a humour that has constantly called for reform but not for regime 
change or revolution.      
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The discussion in this chapter is divided into four sections in order to 
examine the key themes and language (‘political grammars’) in the 
political history of Jordan, and how Jordan as a new state-nation is 
represented in contemporary humour. The first section focuses on the 
historical context and creation of Transjordan by the British after the 
collapse of the Ottoman Empire in Southeast Europe, Western Asia and 
the MENA in the early 20th century. The second section examines the 
question of identity politics in Jordan in relation to the indigenous 
people (better known as East Bankers) and Jordanians of Palestinian 
descent (better known as West Bankers). This section demonstrates 
the idea of identity politics (urbanites versus rural dwellers) and its 
representation in Jordanian ethnic and political humour, as well as the 
division of Jordanian society between pro- and anti- Palestinian 
sentiment.  
 
The third section examines the formation of general elections and 
gerrymandering politics and the distribution of constituencies in 
Jordan’s elections. It discusses how Jordan’s electoral law and reform 
(since 1989) has constantly tended to favour the overrepresentation in 
the House of Parliament of Transjordanian nationals in rural areas and 
the hinterlands over the majority of Jordanians of Palestinian origin in 
urban centres, such as the capital city Amman, and Az-Zarqa. This 
section argues that there is a degree of ‘façade reform’ that has taken 
place in Jordan since the 1989 political opening, and humour has been 
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used as a tool to address the negligible impact of reform programmes 
on Jordanian social and political realities.        
 
In the last section of this chapter, I examine in detail Jordan before and 
after the 2011 Arab Spring revolutions to demonstrate the ideas of 
political mobilisation and the use of humour and satire as a counter-
political force and tool for resistance against the government and its 
official discourse about economic and political reforms. In this section, I 
focus on how Jordan can be considered a forerunner of the Arab 
Spring. This is demonstrated through the examination of the politics of 
protests and political mobilisation started in 2009 by labourers’ and 
schoolteachers’ strikes, and the 2010 ‘revolt of military veterans’ 
against the state’s neoliberal policy and the de facto project that aims to 
transform Jordan into an ‘alternative homeland’ for the Palestinians. I 
also analyse struggles over reform, and how the Jordanian regime 
responded and successfully weathered the Arab Spring street protests 
and youth activism that started in Jordan from 2011. In terms of Jordan 
before and after the Arab Spring, I demonstrate how ‘carnivalesque’ 
political humour has been used to critique neoliberalism, fixed elections 
and a weak parliament that has automatically approved many 
government dictates without consideration.       
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2.2 The making of Transjordan  
Before 1921, Transjordan (also hyphenated Trans-Jordan) did not exist. 
The Emirate of Transjordan (Arabic: Imarat Sharq al-’Urdunn, literally 
‘Emirate of East Jordan’) emerged as a very new state after the First 
World War and division of the Ottoman Empire in the MENA. The 
Emirate of Transjordan was established, on 11 April 1921, as a 
protectorate under British administration (Alon, 2007, p. 40). 
Transjordan was created as an ‘artificial state’ in the area that is located 
to the east side of the Jordan River (Tal, 2002, p. 2). The British created 
Transjordan as a separate entity that was severed from the already 
British-controlled territory of Palestine.  
 
When created in 1921, Transjordan had only a small population and no 
urban centres to speak of. The population was estimated to be in the 
neighbourhood of 200,000 people (Wilson, 1990, p. 229). The majority 
of the population comprised Transjordanian nationals who lived in rural 
and nomadic tribal areas in the steppe and in the hinterlands, and 
around 10,000 of the population originated from various non-Arab 
minorities, including Armenians, Chechens, Circassians and 
Turkomans (Mandate for Palestine, 1924). Although the majority of the 
population was Muslim, there were around 15,000 Christians, who lived 
in proto-urban towns, such as Amman, As-Salt, Irbid and Karak 
(Mandate for Palestine, 1924). The provincial town of As-Salt was 
considered the largest populous area in Transjordan. Amman, the 
newly established capital of Transjordan was in 1921 sparsely 
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populated. According to Hassan Abdel-Jawad (1986) and Enam Al-Wer 
(2007), Amman at that time had no defining local dialect, and 
comprised only a few tens of thousands of people, of whom the 
overwhelming majority were non-Arab nationals.  
 
Transjordan was ruled (nominally) by the Hashemite Emir Abdullah bin 
Hussein, the son of Sharif Hussein, from 1921 to 1951. With the help of 
the British, Abdallah created the Emirate of Transjordan and installed 
himself on the throne in 1921. The Emirate of Transjordan remained 
under the British Mandate from 1921 to 1946. In his book The making 
of Jordan: Tribes, colonialism and the modern state (2007, p. 52), Yoav 
Alon argues that with the assistance of the British army and the British 
Royal Air Force, Emir Abdallah was able to successfully defeat the two 
local rebellions, the Adwan and Kura rebellions between 1921 and 
1924, that called for ‘Jordan for Jordanians,’ along with various irregular 
Wahhabi incursions into Transjordan by tribesmen of Najd in present 
day Saudi Arabia.  
 
In her article ‘Choice, loyalty and the melting pot: Citizenship and 
national identity in Jordan’ (2008), Stefanie Nanes argues that Emir 
Abdullah achieved the loyalty of Transjordanian nationals through the 
enlistment of tribal members into the national regular army of 
Transjordan (Nanes, 2008, pp. 88–89). The Emir was therefore very 
successful in creating “deep bonds” between the Hashemite regime and 
the Transjordanian nationals in nomadic and rural areas. The loyalty of 
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Transjordanians was therefore dependent on employment by and the 
patronage of the Hashemite regime. This early-established patronage 
has maintained an influence right into the present through the loyalty of 
the Transjordanians in the hinterlands to the Hashemite regime.   
  
Writing about the artificial creation of Transjordan in 1921, the American 
historian Mary Christina Wilson argues in her book King Abdullah, 
Britain and the making of Jordan (1990) that Jordan “had no reason to 
be a state on its own rather than a part of Syria, or of Palestine, or of 
Saudi Arabia, or of Iraq” (Wilson, 1990, p. 3). She asserts that the 
establishment of Transjordan served and fulfilled Britain’s imperial 
interests in the Middle East. She demonstrates that Transjordan served 
as an important regional link to facilitate British imperial 
communications in the region. This includes the securing of the Suez 
Canal and the ‘Fertile Crescent’ after the discovery of oil fields in Iraq at 
the beginning of the 20th century.   
 
Transjordan remained under British administration for almost 25 years, 
from 1921 to 1946. After gaining independence on 25 May 1946, 
Transjordan became known as The Hashemite Kingdom of Transjordan 
(HKT). In 1949, the HKT was constitutionally renamed to become The 
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (HKJ). To this date, the HKJ remains 
under Hashemite rule. The British army and some of its generals, such 
as Captain Frederick Peak and Sir John Bagot Glubb (known as Glubb 
Pasha), had a considerable impact on the creation of Transjordan as 
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well as the establishment of the Jordanian army, the (then) Arab 
Legion, in 1921. The Jordanian army was created, led and financed by 
the British (Avi, 2007, p. 17). In 1921, Captain Frederick Peak had 
created the Arab Legion, which was the regular army of the Emirate of 
Transjordan. In 1939, John Bagot Glubb had succeeded Peak and 
became the Commander-in-chief of the Arab Legion, later the 
Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF). Under the command of Glubb, the Arab 
Legion became one of the best-trained armies in the Middle East. After 
independence from Britain, for example, it conducted significant military 
actions in the 1948 Arab War with Israel by annexing the West Bank to 
Jordanian rule.  
 
In his book Glubb Pasha and the Arab Legion (2017), Graham Jevon 
argues that the British generals “stood out as the real powerbroker in 
Jordanian politics as all those interested in Jordanian affairs looked 
towards Britain as the arbiter of Jordan’s future” (Jevon, 2017, p. 205). 
This suggests the tremendous impact of the British on the creation and 
construction of Transjordan as a new political reality at the heart of the 
Middle East. In his analysis of Glubb’s legacy in Transjordan, Joseph 
Massad in his book Colonial effects: The making of national identity in 
Jordan (2001) offers some interesting insights into the role of the 
military and the forces of law and order in state-building and more 
specifically in the construction of Jordanian national identity during the 
1940s. He argues that unlike his predecessor Peak, who favoured 
townsmen in the Transjordanian army, Glubb sedentarised the formally 
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nomadic Bedouin by enlisting them in the army (Massad, 2001, p. 52). 
In doing so, Glubb has been seen as a creator of a new cultural 
tradition that later defined the national culture and identity of Jordan, 
which since then has been based on the Bedouin culture and the 
traditions of people in the Jordanian steppe and the hinterlands. This 
lasting cultural identity matters for this thesis because many Bedouins 
have remained loyal to the Hashemite regime, a loyalty that has 
contributed to the scope, source and targets of Jordanian political 
humour.  
 
It was not until 1956 that King Hussein (in power from 1952 to 1999) 
declared the Arabisation of Jordanian Army command and dismissed 
Glubb and other senior British officers commanding the Arab Legion 
(now the JAF). From 1957, King Hussein began the process of 
consolidation of the power of the Hashemite regime in Jordan by 
strengthening his role within the Arab world more generally. At that 
time, King Hussein (then aged 20) had “no intention of playing the pliant 
puppet role the British had intended for him” (Jevon, 2017, p. 208). 
Within three years of his accession to power in 1953, Hussein had 
dismissed Glubb from command of the Jordanian army. According to 
Jevon, Hussein’s decision “was not simply about striking a blow against 
Britain. Rather, it was about reacting against British obstinacy, breaking 
free of British constraints, and Glubb was the perceived personification 
of this problem” (Jevon, 2017, p. 242). The necessity of this action 
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suggests the previous extent of the impact of Britain on the formation of 
Transjordan and its military, domestic and foreign policies.  
2.3 The regime’s resilience  
Despite its inauspicious beginnings in 1921, the Hashemite regime in 
Jordan has proved, at many times, to be unexpectedly resilient and 
stable. King Hussein traversed the difficult period from 1955 to 1967 
with a surprisingly stable country (Tal, 2002, p. xi). The King faced 
many local and regional challenges, including the loss of a prototype 
Hashemite throne in Iraq in 1958, his survival of many attempted coups 
and planned assassinations, and, overall, the rising tension between 
Jordanians and Jordanians of Palestinian origin, which continues to this 
day, and which has directly influenced the development and nature of 
political humour in Jordan.  
 
In 1957, a battalion of the Jordanian army that consisted mostly of 
Bedouins foiled a military coup, formed by Arab nationalist units, 
against King Hussein and the Hashemite regime. That coup resulted in 
the dismissal on 10 April 1957 of the first elected government of 
Suleiman Nabulsi of the Nationalist Socialist Party (Tal, 2002, pp. 39–
44). At that critical time, martial law was imposed to restore order, 
political parties were suspended, and all Palestinian military units 
involved in the 1957 coup were disbanded. Jordan’s move towards a 
constitutional monarchy, as existed in the 1952 Constitution, was 
therefore curtailed.  
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Later, in the early 1960s, King Hussein barely survived the significant 
impact of Gamal Abdel Nasser’s Arab socialist enterprise that promoted 
radical pan-Arabism and anti-imperial agendas (Tal, 2002, p. 6). 
Nasser’s strong regime in Egypt, through his popular radio service 
Sawat al-Arab (Voice of the Arabs), rejected outright the occupation of 
Palestine and the annexation of the West Bank to Jordanian rule in the 
aftermath of the 1948 Arab war with Israel. He also called for and 
popularised the liberation of Arab monarchies in Jordan, Iraq and the 
Arabian Peninsula from western imperial powers and influence.    
 
Some Middle Eastern political scientists who have studied Jordanian 
politics and affairs have attributed the resilience of the Hashemite 
regime to several crucial socio-political factors. For example, in his 
book The social origins of the modern Middle East (1987), Haim Gerber 
focused on the unquestionable loyalty of the Jordanian army in 
imposing order and repressing unruly peoples. In his book Al-tahdith wa 
al-’Istiqrar al-siyasi fi al-’urdunn (Development and political stability in 
Jordan, 1989), Muhanna Bani Hassan made similar observations and 
emphasised the role of King Hussein’s personal and political qualities, 
which were evident in his policy of co-optation and reconciliation with 
opposition figures, whether at home or abroad.  
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In his analysis of the resilience of the Hashemite regime in Jordan 
during the turbulent years 1955 to 1967, Lawrence Tal (2002, p. 10) 
focused on the cohesion of the national security establishments, the 
political elite and the military in preserving the Hashemite regime. He 
argued that the security establishments and the policymaking body 
played a significant role in maintaining the Hashemite regime and 
protecting the territorial integrity of Jordan and its national unity.  
 
However, the resilience of the Hashemite regime has also always 
rested on the family’s lineage. The Hashemite royal family in Jordan are 
direct descendants of the Prophet Muhammad’s lineage through his 
daughter Fatimah (wife of the fourth and last caliph Ali ibn Abi Talib, 
who reigned over the Islamic Caliphate from 656 to 661 A.D). The 
incumbent King Abdullah II of Jordan (son of the late King Hussein) 
belongs to a branch of the Hashemites who ruled the Emirate of Mecca 
from the tenth century in 968 until 1924. Having lost their power in 
Mecca at the beginning of the 20th century, the Hashemite family in 
Jordan declared their custodianship of Jerusalem’s holy sites, which 
includes the sponsorship of Muslim and Christian religious sites.  
 
The resilience of the Hashemite regime in Jordan can also be 
understood in relation to foreign grants that supported and continue to 
support the country’s budget, financially and militarily. Jordan has been 
a recipient of many international grants and donations, primarily from 
the United States, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, the 
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European Union and other world contributors, such as Canada, Japan, 
Kuwait and Qatar.  
 
According to Tariq Tell (2013), these cultural, historical and political 
factors have all contributed to the creation of the “Hashemite Compact” 
(Tell, 2013, p. 132). This survival strategy has enabled the Hashemite 
regime to act as an external, neutral powerbroker that stabilises ethnic 
tensions and maintains the loyalty of the Transjordanian nationals in the 
hinterlands who are considered the bedrock of the regime. This regime 
strategy has been very successful in achieving the resilience of the 
Hashemite monarchy in Jordan since 1921. It has ensured the loyalty of 
Transjordanian nationals who control the army and security services. 
This strategy has to a great extent created a unified and collective 
identity for Jordanians, irrespective of their origins and descents, 
exemplified in the implementation of two important royal slogans and 
initiatives: Jordan First in 2002 and We are all Jordan in 2006.  
 
These represent one way in which the Jordanian regime has used 
national identity discourse to broker some kinds of settlement in 
domestic unrest. The regime has always resorted to the reinvigoration 
of Jordan’s national identity discourse as a tool to renew the loyalty of 
the Jordanian people and the military. In his article ‘Identity politics, 
reform and protest in Jordan’ (2011b), Curtis Ryan, a renowned 
American political scientist of Jordanian affairs, argues that the 
Hashemite regime in Jordan has always presented itself as  
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a unifying force [that brings] together multiple communities - 
Palestinians and East Jordanians, urbanites and Bedouins, 
Muslim and Christians, secularists and Islamists, and Arabs 
as well as Circassians and Chechen minorities. [This survival 
strategy] is not a matter of divide and rule, but [rather] a deft 
royal policy of pluralism and inclusion. (Ryan, 2011b, pp. 
568–569).   
 
Many Transjordanian nationals have been in favour of the Hashemite 
strategy of unity, but at the same time worried about the increasing 
numbers of Palestinians in Jordan, as well as their empowerment in the 
government. They fear that one day Jordan will be an ‘alternative 
homeland’ for Palestinians (Alon, 2007, p. 156). The Hashemite form of 
apparently inclusive governance has at times been fiercely challenged 
by Transjordanian peoples in the hinterlands. In 1989, a public revolt 
erupted in the Transjordanian city of Ma’an over price increases, cuts to 
food subsidies and government austerity measures. In 1996, bread riots 
occurred in the Transjordanian city of Al-Karak in the south of Jordan 
over an increase in bread prices and the government’s neoliberal 
policy, implemented to comply with IMF requirements and government 
austerity measures.  
 
The East Bankers in Jordan have always been discontented with the 
government’s increasingly neoliberal policies that have tended to favour 
urban centres, such as the capital city Amman, and neglect therefore 
the hinterlands where the majority of Transjordanians live. This 
neoliberally biased strategy has produced a divergence in Jordan’s 
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domestic politics and challenges to the Hashemite loyalty and 
governance among the East Bankers. It has affected most directly the 
livelihoods of people living in rural areas, after price hikes, cut subsidies 
and increased taxes. Many Jordanians from the East Bank have 
already voiced their outrage and called for the ‘Jordanisation’ of the 
state, better known in Jordanian Arabic as Ardanat Ad-Dawlah (Sayigh, 
1991, p. 148). Many Transjordanian people have argued that the 
country is moving towards neoliberalism, which is of a greater benefit to 
Palestinians who mostly live in urban centres and who largely control 
the economy and the private sector.  
 
In their book chapter ‘Jordan: Evolving activism in a divided society’ 
(2014), Mohammad Yaghi and Janine Clark argue that this neoliberal 
regime policy has caused the majority of Transjordanian people to feel 
that they are “losing their own state to a small circle of elite Palestinian 
Jordanians close to King Abdullah II” (Yaghi & Clark, 2014, p. 242). 
This form of disaffection has recently paved the way for more complex 
patterns of popular resistance in Jordanian social media spaces, from 
many disaffected young people from several rural and remote areas in 
Jordan. Economic hardship, coupled with economically liberal 
government policies, has influenced (and continues to influence) the 
primary sources of social and political unrest in Jordan from 1989, 
mainly in the hinterlands where the majority of East Bankers dwell.  
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In an interview, Tariq Tell (2012, August 22), labelled these troubles in 
the East Bank hinterlands as “signal revolts,” that aimed to attract the 
attention of the Hashemite regime, rather than challenging its rule (Abu-
Rish, 2012). Economic hardships from 1989 have forced Jordan to 
renegotiate deals with the IMF and other international lenders to reduce 
the country’s burgeoning fiscal deficits and improve its monetary 
policies. The government’s goal has always been to reduce the 
country’s burgeoning fiscal deficit after a fall in foreign aid, mainly from 
wealthy gulf countries, the United States and the European Union. 
Turning to IMF loans (since 1989) resulted in economic stagnation and 
consequently eroded living standards for most Jordanians.  
 
The surprising resilience of the Hashemite regime in Jordan has given 
rise to a new form of, in Bakhtinian terms, ‘carnivalesque’ political 
humour in Jordanian streets and social media spaces, which I call 
‘resilience humour’, a humour that has constantly called for reform and 
not for regime change or revolution. The loyalty of the army to the 
Hashemite regime, the political elite and the wider population and 
Jordan’s overall stability in the region, have all contributed to the 
emergence of this type of humour among Jordanians. Only very few 
‘carnival-goers’ in Jordanian streets and (predominantly) in Jordanian 
social media spaces have actually wanted to challenge or dethrone the 
Hashemite regime. This is a testament to the solidity of the regime, 
itself the result of the combination of social, historical and cultural 
factors addressed above.   
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2.4 Ethnicity and identity politics     
Jordanian society can be viewed as a patriarchal, tribal society that is 
mainly controlled by men. In his book The social and economic origins 
of monarchy in Jordan (2013), Tariq Tell writes about the tribal structure 
of Jordanian society and emphasises how the society is made up of 
various ‘groups’, rather than ‘individuals’. He argues that “the population 
of Trans-Jordan was everywhere tribal, and both Fallah [residents of 
rural areas] and Bedouin recognized the authority of customary law and 
prominent shaykhly houses” who were in control of districts, localities, 
or even small neighbourhoods (Tell, 2013, p. 31). This explanation 
suggests that power was divided and socially constructed among local, 
powerful men during Ottoman rule and early Transjordanian period. For 
example, in the Transjordanian town Ajlune, Tell (2013) notes that “the 
villages were organized into defensive communes (nahiyats), each 
headed by the Za’im or leader of the locality’s most powerful clan” (Tell, 
2013, p. 31). This fact speaks of the very tribal nature of Jordanian 
society and the communal identity that continues to have considerable 
impacts on the construction of relationships among groups, clans and 
tribes.  
 
Jordanian society can be considered heterogeneous. In addition to 
Arabs who make up most of Jordan’s population, the country hosts a 
small number of non-Arab ethnic and religious minorities. These include 
Armenians, Chechens, Christians, Circassians, Druze and Kurds. 
These minority groups have long supported and preserved the 
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Hashemite monarchy in Jordan. For example, the Chechens and 
Circassians formed the early military units that made up the regular 
army of Transjordan in 1921 (Shami, 2009, p. 145). The successful 
integration of non-Arab minorities into Jordanian society has enabled 
them to attain high-status government and military posts. Most of these 
minority groups speak Arabic, while still maintaining their native 
languages, such as Chechens and Armenians at home (Dweik, 2000; 
Al-Khatib, 2001). Jordanian electoral laws have always designated 
special quota seats in the House of Parliament for Chechens, 
Christians and Circassians, whereas other minorities, such as Kurds 
and Druze, are left under-represented in the Jordanian parliamentary 
system and elections.    
 
In the aftermath of the 1948 Arab war with Israel, Jordan received a 
significant number of Palestinian refugees (Alon, 2007, p. 152). Most 
were not in fact considered to be ‘refugees,’ because Jordan annexed 
the West Bank to its rule after the 1948 war. Rather, they were 
considered ‘migrants’ who travelled from one city (or town) to another. 
They soon became Jordanian nationals through the legal naturalisation 
of their national identity. Indeed, the 1948 Arab War with Israel 
dramatically changed the social and political structure of Jordanian 
society. According to Tell (2013), the War had a “profound impact effect 
on Trans-Jordanian society - feeding political unrest in the Arab Legion, 
curtailing migration for work in the Palestinian coastal plain, and 
transforming cities, such as Amman, Irbid, and al-Salt through inflows of 
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settlers and refugees” (Tell, 2013, p. 22). This explanation gives an 
overview of the tremendous impact of Palestinian refugees on the 
population of Jordan after the 1948 Arab War with Israel.  
 
The population of Jordan witnessed an exponential increase after 1948. 
Yaghi and Clark (2014, p. 240) indicate that the population of Jordan 
increased suddenly from 375,000 to 1, 270, 000 in 1948. The 1950 
annexation of the West Bank to Jordanian rule functioned as a tool to 
protect the remaining part of the Palestinian territories and to re-assert 
the Hashemite custodianship of Jerusalem. This control is sometimes 
known as the ‘Jordanisation’ of the West Bank (Alon, 2007, p. 152). The 
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan then included the East Bank and the 
West Bank. The seats of the Chamber of Deputies (now the House of 
Parliament) were equally divided between the two peoples: the people 
of the East Bank (Transjordanian nationals) and the people of the West 
Bank (Palestinian Jordanians). The population of Jordan was further 
increased after a second wave of Palestinian refugees after the Six-Day 
War in 1967 (Tal, 2002, p. 4). This war resulted in a decisive military 
victory for Israel (Alon, 2007, p. 153). Jordan lost the West Bank. Egypt 
lost the Gaza Strip, which had been under its control since the 1948 
war. Syria lost the Golan Heights.  
 
After the 1970–71 civil war in Jordan between the Jordanian army and 
members of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO), Jordan’s 
national identity discourse became highly contested (Alon, 2007, p. 
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156). As mentioned above, identity politics in Jordan mainly comprises 
difference and increased tension between Transjordanian nationals 
who are the indigenous people and generally live in rural and nomadic 
areas in the hinterlands, and Jordanians of Palestinian origin who 
generally live in urban centres, in major cities such as Amman, Irbid 
and Az-Zarqa.  
 
In the aftermath of the 1970 civil war, the Jordanian government began 
a process I call a ‘national purge’ that favoured the employment of 
Transjordanian nationals in the army and security forces. Jordanians of 
Palestinian origin were left, however, to create their own business 
establishments and stay away from political power. This political 
strategy was part of the government’s wider approach that has aimed 
since then to reunite Transjordanian nationals in opposition to 
Jordanians of Palestinian origin. Transjordanian nationals have always 
seen themselves as “one Jordanian family” (Massad, 2001, p. 65). The 
Bedouin culture of Transjordanian nationals was thereby re-promoted to 
attain the image of ‘Jordanianness’ at both national and international 
levels. The project to ‘re-transjordanise’ the country as a whole has 
implications for the humour that is the focus of this research because it 
demonstrates the relationship between ethnic joking and identity politics 
in Jordan.   
 
 
Chapter 2 Jordan and the Arab Spring      109 
 
 
 
King Hussein’s 1972 federation plan, based on his argument that 
‘Jordan is Palestine and Jordan represents Palestine,’ further 
influenced the question of identity politics in Jordan (Sayigh, 1991, p. 
144). This political plan was based on the establishment of a Jordanian- 
Palestinian federation named ‘The United Arab Kingdom.’ However, 
King Hussein’s idea was highly controversial and rejected by the most 
involved parties in the aftermath of the 1974 Arab League Summit in 
Rabat, Morocco (Sela, 2002, pp. 158–160). The Arab Summit gave the 
Palestinian people the right for self-determination and establishment of 
their own state in the Palestinian territories. Arab leaders voted 
unanimously for the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the 
Palestinian people. According to Yaghi and Clark (2014), 
Transjordanian nationals after 1974  
came to believe that the state was theirs and developed a 
narrative of national identity revolving around the role of the 
Hashemite family in building Jordan and their traditional tribal 
origins, while Palestinian Jordanians maintained a 
Palestinian national identity, one revolving around the conflict 
with Israel (Yaghi and Clark, 2014, p. 241).  
 
Transjordanian nationals have had always a fear that Jordan may turn 
one day in the future into an ‘alternative homeland’ for Palestinians. 
This geopolitical project has been commonly referred as the ‘Jordanian-
Palestinian Confederation’ (Ryan, 2018c). This option is frequently 
promoted and popularised by the United States administration and 
Israel as one of the most workable and feasible solutions to end the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the problem of Palestinian refugees in 
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the Middle East. Quite recently, this plan was reintroduced again by the 
Trump administration under ‘the deal of the century’ as a tool to resolve 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, at, of course, Jordan’s expense (Ryan, 
2019). However, this option has remained strongly opposed and 
rejected by the Hashemite regime and the Jordanian people, as well as 
by the people of Palestine. These people fear that the alleged 
confederation plan would attempt to solve the Palestinian question at 
the expense of Jordan, and eventually lead to the erosion of Palestinian 
identity, and Palestinians’ right of return to their homeland. The issue of 
this locally unwanted ‘plan’ is potentially of relevance to the 
development of satire in Jordan because it may have impacted the use 
of humour against people in power.      
 
The process of ‘Jordanisation’ of the army and security forces started in 
the aftermath of the 1970–71 civil war between the Jordanian army and 
the PLO. East Bankers began dominating the military and security 
forces. The army, police and intelligence services are now largely 
recruited from the East Bankers in the hinterlands, and from non-Arab 
minorities, such as the Chechens and Circassians. Many 
Transjordanian nationals have since then seen their role as “the 
guardian, protector, and stronghold of Jordanian nationalism in the face 
of a demographic or political Palestinian takeover of Jordan” (Tell, 
2004, p. 16). This indicates the rising tensions between Transjordanian 
nationals and Palestinian Jordanians: the deep-rooted source of 
Jordan’s identity problem.  
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Although there is no official census about the number of Palestinians in 
Jordan, Luisa Gandolfo, in her book Palestinians in Jordan: The politics 
of identity (2012), claims that the number of Palestinian Jordanians and 
Palestinian registered refugees was, in 2013, approximately 60% of 
Jordan’s population (Zarali, 2013, para. 1). In 2016, the population of 
Jordan reached 9.523 million (Ghazal, 2016, January 30). It included 
more than 1.4 million registered Syrian refugees and a few tens of 
thousands of Iraqi refugees. Borders with Syria and Iraq were sealed in 
2015, but in the summer of 2018, Jordan reopened them, to facilitate 
trade relations and encourage a voluntary return of Syrian refugees 
after the defeat of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. The regional 
turmoil in the Middle East has necessitated Jordan’s implementation of 
what Ziad Abu-Rish (2016) called a “public relations campaign” in both 
domestic and foreign policies. This state campaign was aimed to 
position the Jordanian regime at “the forefront of reform, stability and 
security in the Middle East” (Abu-Rish, 2016, para. 13). To some extent, 
the security paradigm has revealed itself in a somewhat authoritarian 
regime that cracks down on opposition and regime critics.  
 
In section 1.5 of chapter 1 on ethnic jokes and superiority theory, I 
examined how ethnicity and the idea of ethnic joking were more 
relevant than after the Arab Spring. This was explained through the 
rising tensions between Jordanians and Jordanians of Palestinian origin 
in relation to the formation of ethnic joking that is based on the idea of 
urban and rural division in Jordanian society. The discussion in this 
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section has argued that the people of some Transjordanian towns, such 
as As-Salt, At-Tafilah and As-Sarih, became the butt of many ethnic 
jokes by the urbanites in Amman and elsewhere, who make up the 
majority of Jordanians of Palestinian origin. The people of these small 
towns and villages have been often stereotyped for their backwardness, 
lack of discretion and stupidity, compared to the cleverness, modernity 
and high culture of the Jordanian urbanites.       
2.5 Façade reforms   
There is a degree of ‘façade reform’ that has taken place in Jordan 
since 1989, and parliamentary elections can be considered as the best 
example to reflect on this type of illusive and cosmetic reform (Milton-
Edwards, 2011, pp. 195–199). Elections in Jordan are based on social 
alliance, in which the most powerful and dominant tribes and clans are 
likely to support tribe’s candidates unconditionally (Fathi, 2005, p. 892). 
Election, therefore, exemplifies one’s loyalty to the tribe and family. In 
Jordanian political affairs, ‘elections’ refers to the general elections of 
the House of Parliament and other local elections that produce 
mayoralties and municipal and government councils. Because election 
in Jordan is based on a form of tribal patronage, it sometimes mirrors 
the increased tension between Transjordanian nationals and those of 
Palestinian origin. 
 
Elections in Jordan are as old as the Emirate of Transjordan. However, 
they have been intended to produce pro-government, loyalist legislative 
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bodies, rather than strong parliaments (Gao, 2015, p. 56). For example, 
the first general election was carried out in 1929, after the 1928 Treaty 
with Britain that shifted the power (nominally) to Emir Abdullah. 
Although the Treaty defined Transjordan as a would-be constitutional 
monarchy, the 1929 elections occurred in the form of the election of a 
pro-government legislative council that served as a supervisory 
authority and consultation body loyal to the government and the Emir. 
There were several elections of legislative councils until 1946, when 
Transjordan gained its formal independence from Britain and became 
known as the HKJ. In 1946, Jordan’s House of Parliament was created 
with bicameral chambers: the House of Representatives (Majlis al-
Niwab) and the House of Senators (Majlis al-A’yan).   
 
During the 1948 Jordanian annexation of the West Bank, there were 
several elections of the House of Parliament and constituencies were 
equally divided between the two sides of the River Jordan: the East 
Bank and the West Bank. In 1957, Jordan witnessed the formation of its 
first elected parliamentary government, led by Suleiman Nabulsi from 
the socialist party (Tal, 2002, p. 37). Although the government of 
Nabulsi won the greatest share of votes in the House of Parliament, the 
cabinet was short-lived and Nabulsi was later dismissed by King 
Hussein over controversial government policies, such as the decision to 
establish diplomatic relations with the then Soviet Union (Hiro, 2003, p. 
352). After the dismissal of Nabulsi, Hussein declared martial law, and 
banned all political parties in 1957 after the alleged coup against the 
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regime. Between 1957 and 1967, all these previous measures to 
liberalise political life had been rescinded. However, after 1967, national 
advisory councils were formed to replace the role of the House of 
Parliament in overseeing the performance of governments; these 
councils remained in place until 1984.  
 
In 1988, Jordan witnessed a major political transformation. The country 
disengaged from the West Bank after the PLO had created the first 
Palestinian government in-exile, in Algeria in 1987 (Sayigh, 1989, p. 
247). The PLO has been proclaimed ever since to be the sole legitimate 
representative of Palestinian people. A year after this disengagement, 
in 1989, Jordan witnessed a return to democracy that has since put an 
end to martial law and the ban on political parties. The implications of 
these changes were demonstrated in the outcomes of the 1989 general 
election and the state’s democratic transition. That period is better 
known in the Jordanian context as al-Infitah al-Isyassi (political 
opening), a period of political opening and a return to democracy and 
liberalisation as stipulated in the 1952 Constitution. It has also involved 
an ‘open-door’ policy towards foreign investments and privatisation of 
state-owned enterprises from public to private ownership and control.  
 
In 1992, Jordan moved from the idea of a block voting electoral system 
to the single non-transferable vote system, better known as ‘one-man 
one-vote’ (Gao, 2015, p. 56). The move can be interpreted as a means 
first to curb the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood, which achieved most 
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seats in the 1989 general election, and second to increase the 
representation of Transjordanian nationals from the rural areas and the 
hinterlands. The 1993 general elections produced therefore a loyalist 
parliament, formed mainly from Transjordanian nationals who 
supported the regime. The electoral system favoured the 
overrepresentation of rural areas (mainly inhabited by Transjordanian 
nationals and tribes) over urban centres (mainly inhabited by 
Jordanians of Palestinian origin). The 1997 and 2003 general elections 
also produced loyalist parliaments that did not have the power to 
challenge the government. Tribal candidates who represented 
Transjordanian nationals achieved the largest share of seats in the 
House of Parliament. Jordanians of Palestinian origin in urban centres 
remained significantly underrepresented.  
 
In his article ‘A decade of struggling reform efforts in Jordan’ (2011), 
Marwan Muasher points out how the 2007 general elections were 
notorious for gerrymandering politics and the unequal distribution of 
electoral districts. He demonstrates the fact that despite the re-
participation in the 2007 elections of the Islamic Action Front (IAF), the 
political arm of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, the IAF suffered “its 
worst defeat, with its representation in parliament falling from seventeen 
seats to just six in the 110-member legislature” (Muasher, 2011, p. 16). 
Ma’rouf Bakhit, Jordan’s then Prime Minister, later resigned following 
allegations of fraud in the 2007 election, which favoured Transjordanian 
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nationals in rural areas and the hinterlands over ‘non-Jordanians’ in 
urban centres.  
 
To reset Jordan’s internal political problems, King Abdullah II, in 2009, 
dissolved the unpopular House of Parliament and called for a snap 
election to be held in November 2010. According to Muasher (2011), 
the 2007 elections had been widely perceived as “the product of 
systematic rigging by the intelligence services” (Muasher, 2011, p. 17). 
However, the then government, that of Samir Rifa’i, produced an 
“election law that once again retained the one-person, one-vote 
formulae” (Muasher, 2011, p. 17). As a result, the 2010 general 
elections produced another pro-government parliament that consisted 
mainly of tribal representatives of Jordanians in the hinterlands.  
 
In the aftermath of the 2011–12 protests in Jordan, King Abdullah II 
dissolved the House of Parliament in 2012, and called for early general 
elections in January 2013. The 2013 general election was based on a 
new electoral system that allowed a voter to cast two votes: one for the 
candidate in his/her constituency and the other for party lists elected by 
the implementation of a proportional representation scheme at a 
national level. Although the 2013 parliamentary elections were 
overseen by an independent body, the Independent Election 
Commission (IEC), the 2013 elections produced another loyalist 
parliament that included many pro-government representatives from the 
hinterlands.  
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In 2015, the government of Abdullah Ensour introduced significant 
changes to the electoral system that had marred past elections with 
fraud and vote rigging. This was due to the ‘one-man one-vote’ system. 
In the light of these changes to the electoral system in Jordan, Ryan 
(2015) argues that the electoral reform to the following 2016 general 
election was run under proportional representation, and it seemed to 
many local and international observers as a return to the 1989 election 
law that was based on a block voting.  
 
In conclusion, the House of Parliament in Jordan has been structurally 
weak and has little power in reality. The weak function of Jordan’s 
Parliament can be seen through its automatic approval and 
authentication of many government decisions and dictations without 
any proper consideration. In chapters 4 & 5 of this thesis, I argue that 
such a highly manipulated political context of managed elections and 
economic and political reforms has produced and perhaps even 
necessitated many examples of what is, in Bakhtinian terms, 
carnivalesque political humour and satire against the government. 
Furthermore, voting under this disproportionate electoral system can be 
considered, in Bakhtinian terms, monologist, because it enforced 
gerrymandering politics and an overall official discourse that favoured 
Transjordanian people in the hinterlands over Jordanians of Palestinian 
origin in urban centres. Many young people in the streets and more in 
Jordanian social media spaces have used humour and satire as a 
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counter-political force and tool for resistance to voice their frustration 
and disaffection about government control and authority.          
2.6 Jordan and the Arab Spring  
The Arab Spring refers to a series of revolutionary waves against long-
term and autocratic regimes in the MENA between 2011 and 2012. 
Arguably, the Arab Spring, like many significant social and political 
transformations in history, did not have a single and straightforward 
beginning, but rather a series of transnational moments of popular 
resistance to power and government. The key trigger for these 
revolutionary ‘waves’ started in Tunisia on 17 December 2010 with the 
self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi, a street vendor who set himself 
on fire in protest against the confiscation of his wares by a municipal 
authority (Lynch, 2014, p. 1). This individual act quickly turned into 
nationwide protests that formed the Tunisian Revolution (also known as 
the Jasmine Revolution), which toppled on 14 January 2011 the long-
time regime of Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali (in power since 1987). The swift 
success of the Tunisian Revolution profoundly influenced other peoples 
in MENA to take to the streets and demand regime change. For 
example, the 2011 Egyptian Revolution that began on 25 January 
managed to overthrow on 11 February 2011 the long-time and 
autocratic regime of Hosni Mubarak, who had been in power since 
1981.  
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Before attempting some explanation of the Arab Spring and its impact 
on Jordan (and thus on Jordanian humour and ‘carnivalesque’ politics 
and popular resistance), it is important to know where the term ‘Arab 
Spring’ comes from, as well as its specific meaning(s) and context(s). 
The American political scientist Marc Lynch, who specialises in 
contemporary Middle Eastern politics, was the first to coin and 
popularise the term. In a newspaper article ‘Obama’s ‘Arab Spring’?’ 
(2011, January 6), he created the term to label the series of 
transnational, regional protests and clashes with security forces in 
several Arab countries in response to inflation, economic desperation 
and political freedom.  
 
Although the term ‘Arab Spring’ is of non-Middle Eastern and non-Arab 
creation, many people in the MENA have used and continue to use the 
term (al-Rabi’ al-’Arabi, the Arab Spring) to describe the revolutions that 
swept in various Arab countries since 2011. The fact that the term was 
created by a ‘foreigner,’ someone who looks at the region from afar, 
gives a clear indication of the tremendous impact that foreign nations 
and actors (in the political sense) have in the creation and construction 
of the MENA and its politics. As will be shown, however, the 
‘carnivalesque’ response in Jordan, seeded by the Arab Spring, has 
been less steered by extra-national forces, and is more ‘indigenous.’   
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Extending the metaphor, many people in the region have already 
signalled that the ‘Arab Spring’ has turned into an ‘Arab Winter,’ given 
the resurgence of totalitarian regimes and the rise in Islamic 
fundamentalism since 2014 (Grinin, Korotayev & Tausch, 2019, pp. 1–
24). The ‘Arab Winter’ has referred to the gloomy ends of many ‘Arab 
Spring’ revolutions that ended with despair and frustration with political 
power. The Arab Winter has referred more specifically to the crisis that 
began in Egypt with the removal of President Mohamed Morsi and 
seizure of power by the military, in addition to other developing stories 
from the Syrian Civil War, Libyan Crisis, Yemeni Civil War and the Iraqi 
insurgency.  
 
In the context of research on international relations and Middle Eastern 
politics, there are several explanations that attempt to demonstrate the 
‘Arab Spring:’ the phenomenon itself and the term. One of the first and 
early explanations of the phenomenon was proposed by Mohamed 
Elbaradei, a renowned Egyptian scholar and senior diplomat. In an 
interview with the German magazine Der Spiegel on 25 January 2011, 
Elbaradei used the Domino Effect Theory as a framework to describe 
the phenomenon of the 2011 Arab Spring revolutions. He argued, 
“perhaps we are currently experiencing the first signs of an ‘Arab 
Spring,’ similar to the so-called Prague Spring of political liberalization 
in Czechoslovakia in 1968” (Bednarz, 2011). This suggests that 
Elbaradei’s explanation is historically based, drawing on the 
metaphorical use of the word ‘spring’ in many world cultures. This 
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argument constitutes therefore a simple and surface-level claim to 
describe the phenomenon and not just the term. His explanation 
focuses on the significance of these past transnational moments of 
ordinary people’s resistance to power, though it is notable for this 
thesis’ use of Bakhtin that Elbaradei drew upon the example of protest 
in a then-Communist country.   
 
Elbaradei’s explanation of the term can be further expanded to many 
historical references to the term ‘spring’ in previous revolutionary 
periods. For example, first, the revolutions of 1848, known often as the 
‘Spring of Nations,’ that took place in western and central Europe 
against absolute monarchies; second, the ‘Berber Spring’ during the 
1980s, which called for state recognition of Berber identity and 
language in Algeria; third, the 2009 ‘Persian Spring,’ that demanded the 
removal of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad from his post.  
 
In his book The second Arab awakening and the battle for pluralism 
(2014), Marwan Muasher, a senior Jordanian diplomat and former 
foreign minister, uses a similar historical framework to analyse the 
phenomenon of the 2011 Arab Spring revolutions. He uses the context 
of the 19th century ‘first’ Arab awakening, which called for revolution and 
independence from western imperial powers. He argues that the 
contemporary Arab Spring should be referred to as the ‘Second Arab 
Awakening’ because of its demands for pluralism and freedom from 
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autocratic regimes that took power after the departure of colonial 
autocracies in the mid-20th century.         
 
A second explanation of the Arab Spring phenomenon was put forward 
by Koert Debeuf, the Director of the Tahrir Institute for Middle East 
Policy in Washington D.C. In his article ‘The Arab Spring seven years 
on’ (2017), Debeuf uses a useful historical framework to better 
understand the Arab Spring: Crane Brinton’s (1965) analysis of the 
1789 French Revolution. He argues that the Arab Spring is very similar 
to the French Revolution because the Arab Spring stemmed from “a 
younger generation aspiring for more political freedom and rights” 
(Debeuf, 2017, p. 41). This explanation suggests that the Arab Spring 
revolutions should be understood in the context of young people, 
politics and their fight against marginalisation and political repression. 
This too has repercussions for the use of Bakhtinian ‘carnival’ as an 
analytical lens.   
 
In his intriguing analysis of the 2011 Egyptian Revolution, he identifies 
four similarities between the Arab Spring in Egypt and the French 
Revolution. These four phases are “the rule of the moderates; the reign 
of terror and virtue; Thermidor; and the end of the revolution” (Debeuf, 
2017, p. 44). The “rule of the moderates” was manifested in Egypt 
through the interim rule of the military between 2011 and 2012. The 
second “reign of virtue” signals the inauguration of Mohamed Morsi 
from the Muslim Brotherhood as the first democratically elected 
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President of Egypt from 2012 to 2013. The third phase he termed as 
“the Egyptian Thermidor,” which refers to the counterrevolution of 30 
June 2013 that ended Morsi’s rule and pronounced a return to 
autocratic regime. The fourth phase is explained through the military 
coup d’état by the Field Marshal Abdul Fattah El-Sisi (in power since 
2014). This last phase, in Briton’s words, signals “the end of revolution.” 
Debeuf’s application of the four stages to Egypt suggests a gloomy end 
for the Arab Spring revolution in Egypt.    
 
In his article ‘Are we seeing a second wave of the Arab Spring?’ (2019), 
Georges Fahmi provides a very useful explanation of why the Arab 
Spring remains an ‘unfinished business.’ He argues that there are four 
main characteristics of the 2011 Arab Spring revolutions: (1) the 
protests were nationwide because they spread over many different 
cities and areas; (2) sustainability which is evidenced by the continuity 
of protests; (3) development of clear political demands that went 
beyond the socio-economic grievances that triggered the early protests; 
(4) interconnection (or inspiration) which means that the protests were 
influenced by one another. In the light of these four qualities, he argues 
that the pan-Arab protests after 2011 draw parallels with the 2011 Arab 
Spring revolutions. They show evidence that we are still experiencing 
the impact of the 2011 Arab Spring, but the significance and outcomes 
of these protests are yet to be known.                
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In the context of Jordan after the Arab Spring, Jordanian political 
scientists and scholars such as Tariq Tell (2015) have argued that 
Jordan was a forerunner of the 2011 Arab Spring revolutions. In his 
article ‘Early spring in Jordan: The revolt of the military veterans’ 
(2015), he shows that the protests, strikes and sit-ins of schoolteachers 
and other workers, were active from April 2009– a year and a half 
before the ‘actual start’ of the Arab Spring in Tunisia. Jordanian 
schoolteachers were demanding the establishment of a national 
teachers’ association and an increase of their salaries, and other 
workers were protesting their disenfranchised rights and against social 
exclusion.  
 
In addition to schoolteachers’ and workers’ strikes and active 
demonstrations before the Arab Spring, the Jordanian National 
Committee for Retired Servicemen issued on 1 May 2010 a highly 
controversial statement (petition) that was critical of the role of King 
Abdullah II (in power since 1999). The petition condemned privatisation, 
high-official corruption and most importantly the ‘plot’ that was being 
manipulated by high state officials to turn Jordan into an alternative 
homeland (al-watan al-badil) for Palestinians. The petition became 
widely known by the people of Jordan as the “veterans’ uprising” or “the 
revolt of Jordan’s military veterans” (David, 2010) or “the revolt of the 
military veterans” (Tell, 2015). The protest against the regime was 
unprecedented. It emerged from the military, the traditional and long-
standing power base for the Jordanian regime from 1921, as explained 
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above. According to Yaghi and Clark (2014, p. 249), the petition 
included a committee of 60 signatories that harshly criticised the state’s 
neoliberal policies and the appointment of Jordanians of Palestinian 
origin to high government posts, as well as the policy of naturalisation 
(Tajnis) of tens of thousands of Palestinians in Jordan since 1999.   
 
In Bakhtinian terms, the Arab Spring revolutions led to the formation of 
various forms of ‘carnivalesque’ politics of popular resistance in the 
streets and more in social media spaces. These include the launch of 
strikes and most importantly the use of counter-narratives in social 
media spaces against the government and the House of Parliament. 
For example, some public squares, such as Tahrir Square in Egypt and 
the Pearl Roundabout in Bahrain, and Gamal Abdel Nasser’s 
Roundabout in Jordan and the Fourth Circle in the capital city Amman, 
became sometimes popular ‘carnival’ places for revolutionary politics 
and political mobilisation against political powers. Young people in 
several Arab countries have used and continue to use these public 
spaces, along with social media spaces, to express their restive views 
about government. They use politically humorous placards (in real 
space) and memes (in virtual space) against regime and government. 
In Bakhtin’s theory of carnival and the carnivalesque, real public space 
is highly significant; I argue in chapter 4 of this thesis that Bakhtin’s 
marketplace is now made up of social media spaces, and much less the 
streets and conventional public spaces.            
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2.6.1 The 2011–12 protests  
In January 2011, Jordan witnessed a series of nationwide peaceful 
protests in several urban and rural areas, including the capital city 
Amman, Al-Karak, As-Salt, At-Tafilah, Irbid, Ma’an and Theiban. The 
protests happened like clockwork, set off after each Friday midday 
prayer in various Jordanian towns and cities. These protests were often 
dubbed ‘Fridays of rage’ against the government (Jordanians brace for 
a ‘day of rage’ Friday, 2017). The protests were believed to have 
started in the Transjordanian town of Theiban in Madaba in the south 
west of Jordan in early January 2011, when a group of young people 
gathered outside a main mosque to protest unemployment and poverty. 
Yaghi and Clark (2014) explain that  
the Jordan Spring began in a small southern town in January 
2011. Seven young men independently gathered in front of 
the main mosque of Thieban to protest unemployment and 
the rise of gas [petrol] prices (in excess of 30% in 2010). The 
seven became seventy when bystanders, who shared their 
frustrations with the regime’s economic policies, joined them; 
by the time Friday prayer had finished, the group had 
become five hundred. By the second week, the IAF had 
joined the protests. By the third week, there had been 
protests in Jordanian cities from Irbid to Maan (Yaghi and 
Clark, 2014, p. 244).    
 
Later, when the protests grew in number, those young people in 
Jordanian streets arranged a ‘sit-in’ in an attempt to emulate an 
Egyptian-style revolution, with a protest camp in Diwar Ad-Dakhiliyyeh 
(also known as Gamal Abdel Nasser’s Roundabout) in Amman. The 
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protests initially called for the dismissal of the government of Samir 
Rifa’i because of deteriorating economic conditions and alleged 
corruption charges, along with the rising unpopularity of the government 
of Rifa’i. In the words of Muasher (2011),  
the choice of Rifai [for Prime Minister] was particularly 
controversial, given his lack of government experience and 
his affiliation with the conservative school of thought, led by 
his father, Zeid Rifai, who had led the fight against reform for 
decades. His unpopularity, almost from the day he was 
appointed, reflected a widespread sentiment that he was ill-
equipped to carry out a genuine reform process (Muasher, 
2011, p. 17).   
 
The protests became known as ‘the 2011–12 Jordanian Protests.’ They 
were inspired by turmoil and instability in the wider region that had 
started earlier in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Bahrain, Yemen and Syria. 
However, Jordan’s version of the Arab Spring was different from those 
experienced in the aforementioned countries because the Jordanian 
protests called for government reform and not for change of the 
Hashemite regime, or revolution. According to the Middle East scholar 
Asher Susser (2011), Jordan, in relation to the 2011 Arab Spring, has 
proved to be a case unto itself (Susser, 2011, p. 1). The country has 
weathered the political turmoil of the Arab Spring surprisingly well, 
despite the greater regional challenges. The Hashemite regime has 
been very resilient and has tended to enjoy large and popular support 
among Jordanians.  
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In his article ‘Revising activism in Jordan’ (2016), Ryan argues that “the 
crowds [in the Jordanian 2011–12 protests] were small compared to 
those in Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen and Bahrain, but the turnout was 
sustained and marked a significant uptick for Jordan, where peaceful 
protests had not been uncommon” (Ryan, 2016, p. 1). This argument 
suggests that the 2011–12 Jordanian protests marked the beginning of 
significant political mobilisation in Jordan, but without fully amounting to 
an Egyptian-style revolution of the kind that removed Mubarak’s 
authoritarian and autocratic regime from power.  
 
Ryan (2011b) argues that the 2011–12 Jordanian protests witnessed 
two important instances of protests against the government. The first 
occurred when a group of young people, identifying themselves as 
‘March 24 Movement’, took to the streets and marched in demands for 
government reform and end of state corruption. The second was the 
demonstrations arranged by the Muslim Brotherhood, who are mainly 
Jordanians of Palestinian origin. The first wave of protests, which was 
led by Transjordanian nationals, was “non-partisan and national in 
focus, while the second was often seen as ideological and Palestinian 
rather than Jordanian” (Ryan, 2011b, p. 571). This explanation 
suggests a division of Jordanian society in ‘carnivalesque’ politics and 
popular resistance against the government.    
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The 2011–12 Jordanian protests were largely informed by economic 
and political grievances. Unlike the protests in neighbouring Arab 
countries, such as Egypt and Syria, the Jordanian protests called for 
substantial and far-reaching economic and political reform programmes, 
but not for regime change or revolution (Ryan, 2011, p. 367). The 
protests were met by peaceful security confrontations and resulted in 
no casualties among the protestors who took to the streets against the 
government.  
 
Previous marches for political reform in Jordan had had little impact in 
changing the government’s political programme and the regime’s 
powerful stance. For example, the 2005 National Agenda provided a 
holistic approach for reform programmes, but successive governments 
did little to implement reform programmes or to change Jordan’s 
economic and political directions. The heads of governments in Jordan 
have often paid lip service to a wide range of economic and political 
reform programmes (Muasher, 2011, p. 2). The King’s directives for 
implementation of wider comprehensive economic and political reforms 
were often “ignored, diluted, and at times directly opposed” (Muasher, 
2011, p. 4). They have often resulted in a “watered-down version of 
reform, or no reform at all” (Muasher, 2011, p. 12). According to Yaghi 
and Clark (2014), the 2011–12 Jordanian protests called, at times, for 
the implementation of “constitutional reforms aimed at limiting the 
King’s executive authorities, namely his prerogatives to appoint and 
dismiss the government, dissolve the parliament, and appoint deputies 
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to the Upper House of Parliament” (Yaghi and Clark, 2014, p. 236). I 
argue that the 2011–12 Jordanian protests called for further several 
reform initiatives and demands, including  
1. A return to democracy, as stipulated in the 1952 ‘original’ 
Constitution, that characterised Jordan as a parliamentary 
monarchy  
2. The combating of endemic corruption, cronyism and nepotism in 
state appointments and posts, and prosecution of officials involved 
in corruption cases  
3. The need to build a system of checks and balances which ensures 
that power is not concentrated in the hands of certain individuals 
or elite groups  
4. The swift dissolution of the House of Parliament, after the 2007 
and 2010 general elections were marred with fraud and vote 
rigging through an increase in vote shares from the hinterlands, 
where the East Bankers dwell  
5. The end of gerrymandering politics and unequal electoral districts 
between urban and rural areas.       
 
The 2011–12 Jordanian protests made an unprecedented and unusual 
call in the history of Jordanian protests and political mobilisations 
against the government. The protests began mildly to criticise King 
Abdullah’s rule as well as the legitimacy of the Hashemite royal family. 
This suggests that the King and other royal family members were no 
longer immune from the indirect criticism of people participating in the 
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protests and strikes against the government. Yaghi and Clark (2014, p. 
246) support this claim by referring to the fact that in some rallies 
against the government, protesters chanted “Hey Abdullah, the son of 
Hussein: Where is the people’s money?” Some protestors also 
arranged a popular dance, inspired from dabka [folk dance], and named 
it the ‘corruption dabka,’ in which the dancers (protestors) chanted “Ali 
Baba and the forty thieves.” The last metaphor is powerful and 
suggests an allusion between the King and Ali Baba (the sponsor of 
corruption) who is assisted by his forty thieves, some of whom were 
explicitly named as royal family members.  
 
I argue that the Arab Spring in Jordan presented itself in the context of 
political concessions made by the Hashemite regime. Throughout 2011 
and 2012, King Abdullah II led many political reform initiatives. He 
dissolved the House of Parliament and called for an early general 
election, to be held in 2013. He granted a license for the establishment 
of a teachers’ association. He established the IEC, which has been 
responsible for supervising and monitoring parliamentary and municipal 
elections since 2011. The King also responded to the 2011–12 
Jordanian protests with a top-down reform initiative. He sacked the 
unpopular liberal government of Samir Rifa’i on 9 February 2011, a few 
weeks after the government had received the vote of confidence at the 
House of Parliament. The government of Rifa’i had broken the record 
and unexpectedly received 111 out of 119 votes of confidence at the 
House of Parliament (David, 2011, para. 11). This information suggests 
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the extent to which the House of Parliament was almost entirely 
controlled and managed by the government.  
 
The government of Samir Rifa’i had been insufficiently committed to the 
launch of a comprehensive political reform based on the King’s 
directives. In his letter of designation to Rifa’i, the King had tasked Rifa’i 
with acceleration of “the process of reform and modernization started 
several years ago.” The King had highlighted the importance of building 
“the plans, programs and objectives of the National Agenda that can 
achieve prosperity and progress for our country” (King Abdullah's letter 
of designation to Samir Rifa’i, 2009). However, the choice of Rifa’i was 
unsuitable for Prime Minister, as explained above.   
 
The King then named Ma’rouf Bakhit, an ex-army general, to lead a 
new reforming government that would expedite reform. In the King’s 
letter of designation to Bakhit on 1 February 1, 2011, the King tasked 
Bakhit “to take practical, swift and tangible steps to launch genuine 
political reform, reflecting [Jordan’s] vision of comprehensive reform, 
modernization, and development” (King Abdullah’s letter of designation 
to Ma’rouf Bakhit, 2011). The choice for naming Bakhit for Prime 
Minister was highly controversial because of his little experience in 
economic reform programmes.               
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The precise difference in wording between the King’s designation letter 
to Rifa’i and that to Bakhit reflects an interesting and qualitative step in 
the King’s discourse about the significance of reform in Jordan after the 
Arab Spring. It reveals ‘change’ in the King’s attitude about reform. For 
example, his use of adjectives ‘swift’ and ‘tangible’ in the later letter 
suggests a recognition of the need for genuine action that was not 
present in the much less urgent-feeling letter to Rifa’i. His use of 
‘higher-gear’ adjectives can be analysed in terms of his direct response 
to the protests and demands of people in the streets. What was novel 
about the letter of designation to Bakhit was its abundant references to 
the significance of political reform. The King emphasised, more than 
once, that the whole process of political reform in Jordan “has been 
marred by gaps and imbalances” (King Abdullah’s letter of designation 
to Ma’rouf Bakhit, 2011). He pointed out that these were as a result of 
the “fear of change by some [people] who resisted [reform] to protect 
their own interests … costing the country dearly and denying it many 
opportunities for achievement” (King Abdullah’s letter of designation to 
Ma’rouf Bakhit, 2011). The language of the letter implied the King’s 
seeming change in attitude in response to the protests and significance 
of political reform.   
 
However, the expectations of Bakhit’s government were very low in the 
eyes of protesters who continued to take to the streets and demanded 
change. For many people and protesters in Jordan, Bakhit was not the 
answer. Bakhit was an army general, security-oriented and according to 
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one commentator a “politically [ultra] conservative leader to the point of 
inertia” (Muasher, 2011, p. 16). He was not, also, an economic expert. 
He had been accused of approving the first casino in Jordan, although 
the establishment of such business violates Jordanian law (Carlstrom, 
2011). His government had been viewed as responsible, as mentioned 
above, for the oversight of the controversial and forged 2007 elections 
that produced a loyalist parliament. Despite these concerns, the 
government of Bakhit survived an impeachment vote at the House of 
Parliament. This suggests again the weak role of Jordan’s parliament 
as a ‘rubber stamp’ for the government.  
 
According to Muasher (2011), the government of Bakhit had shown that 
it had “no intention of doing so [political reform], having been one of the 
most vocal opponents of this very initiative.” Prime Minister Bakhit “paid 
lip service” to the King’s reform initiative and dropped all references to 
reform in his government work and programme (Muasher, 2011, p. 15). 
This suggests the way in which the King’s directives can be opposed by 
heads of governments and result (most often) in a moderate version of 
reform or no reform at all. Thus, whilst the ‘carnivalesque’ but relatively 
modest protests of 2011 and beyond had seemingly influenced the 
King, the Bakhit government’s unwillingness to respond to the former’s 
unquestionably sharper request for reform resulted in no substantial 
political change. The ‘carnival of protest’ seemed in its early iteration to 
be mostly impotent, so the protests continued.      
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After weeks of protests, the King, on 24 October 2011, again sacked 
the government, this time that of Ma’rouf Bakhit. Awn Khasawneh, a 
senior judge of the International Court of Justice at the Hague, was 
entrusted to placate protesters and lead a new reforming government 
(King names The Hague judge as new prime minister, 2011). 
Khasawneh appeared to take the job very seriously and led a new type 
of reforming government: technocrat government. He also reopened 
dialogue with Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood, one of the largest groups 
of opposition forces that took to the streets during the 2011–12 
Jordanian protests (Satkowski, 2011, para. 3). However, after a few 
months in office, Khasawneh abruptly resigned, on 26 April 2012. It was 
argued that he had had many confrontations and disagreements with 
powerful security forces and the anti-reform elite (Deasy, 2012). 
Khasawneh was then replaced by Fayez Tarawneh, a conservative 
politician and a former prime minister of Jordan (between 1998 and 
1999). Tarawneh led a short-lived caretaker government from May 
2012 to October 2012.  
 
The King then appointed Abdullah Ensour to lead a new, reforming 
government. Ensour was a respected independent politician. He was an 
economist, who had previously worked for the IMF and the World Bank. 
He had held many ministerial portfolios in the past. He had been one of 
the most vocal opponents of the government’s inertia towards fighting 
corruption when he was a member of Jordan’s Parliament in 1989, 
1992, and 2010 (Jordan’s parliament chooses PM for the first time, 
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2013, para. 2). I argue that the appointment of Ensour was a pragmatic 
move by the King to stave off an Arab Spring scenario in Jordan that 
could have led to regime change, like those experienced in Tunisia, 
Egypt and Libya.  
 
For the first time in the country’s political history, the appointment of the 
prime minister came as a result of negotiations between the King and 
the House of Parliament. Ensour was also set to remain in office for 
four years, the longest period for a prime minister in office since the 
establishment of Transjordan in 1921. However, the appointment of 
Abdullah Ensour was shortly denounced by the majority of people who 
took to the streets, and many young people in Jordanian social media 
spaces (O’Toole, 2014). The government of Ensour re-struck deals with 
the IMF and increased the government’s neoliberal policies, resulting in 
tougher austerity measures. The government implemented a wide 
range of austerity policies as a tool to cut government spending and 
reduce the country’s fiscal deficit and insecurity. The government of 
Ensour resorted to increasing taxation to comply with IMF requirements 
about economic restructuring and reform. Thus, protestors were not 
placated even during this more politically stable period.    
 
Table 3 below shows the rapid governmental changes in Jordan 
between 2011 and 2018, a period that was marked by the largest street 
protests in the country’s history. Political scientists such as Sean Yom 
argue that the principle role of prime ministers in Jordan is structurally 
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weak. In a newspaper article ‘Jordan’s protests are a ritual not a 
revolution’ (2018), Yom argues that “the resignation of any country’s 
premier is newsworthy, but in Jordan it happens frequently because the 
true role of prime ministers is to implement policies while serving as 
shock absorbers for popular anger” (Yom, 2018, para. 11). This 
interpretation of the role suggests that prime ministers in Jordan have 
little power in reality. The nature of satirical comedy in such a volatile 
political context can itself be considered farcical, because the truth is to 
some extent more unlikely or ridiculous than any satirical scene. Prime 
ministers are changed so quickly and readily to the point that they 
change (metaphorically) quicker than Google logos, it seems!   
 
Table 3: Governmental changes in Jordan since 2011 
Prime Minister  Duration in office  
Samir Rifa’i  October 2010–February 2011  
Ma’rouf Bakhit  February 2011–October 2011  
Awn Khasawneh  October 2011–May 2012  
Fayez Tarawneh May 2012–October 2012  
Abdullah Ensour  October 2012–June 2016 
Hani Al-Mulki                      June 2016–June 2018  
Omar Razzaz    June 2018–present  
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Ryan (2011b) compared the 2011–12 Jordanian protests to those of 
1989 that led to political opening and liberalisation (Ryan, 2011b, p. 
565). He argues that both protests were driven by price increases and 
increasing government austerity measures taken by the two Rifa’i 
governments. (In 1989, the government was led by Zaid Rifa’i, and in 
2010, it was led by Samir Rifa’i, son of Zaid Rifa’i). Although the 1989 
and 2011 protests differ significantly, I argue that the protests 
themselves were very similar: to release tension for the East Bankers. 
King Hussein responded to the 1989 protests by sacking the 
government of Zaid Rifa’i, lifting martial law, loosening restrictions on 
media and freedom of speech, and most importantly, launching the first 
round of parliamentary elections in 1989. Likewise, King Abdullah 
responded to the 2011 protests by dismissing the government of Samir 
Rifa’i, and initiating a more comprehensive reform programme that 
aimed to implement a system of checks and balances in the country.   
 
In total, the 2011–12 protests remain the most widespread and vigorous 
wave of ‘carnivalesque’ resistance in modern Jordan. Despite its 
significance, the Arab Spring in Jordan resulted in little political change, 
but it did bring about significant social changes that continue to 
challenge the government’s political authority. Jordan remains, 
however, a would-be constitutional monarchy and all the reform 
programmes initiated so far have had little impact on everyday political 
realities. The Jordanian government started reforming the regime in 
2012, but then halted its reforms. The controversial 2016 changes to 
Chapter 2 Jordan and the Arab Spring      139 
 
 
 
the Constitution reaffirmed the King’s sole power over the military, 
parliament and the overall performance of government. The Jordanian 
regime remains, as Curtis Ryan (2018) describes it, a “hybrid regime” 
that is neither fully democratic nor fully authoritarian (Ryan, 2018a, p. 
15). In Bakhtinian terms, political humour in Jordanian streets and in 
particular in social media spaces after the Arab Spring has been used 
as a counter-political force and tool for popular resistance against the 
regime’s powerful stance, the government’s weak role, and against the 
function of the parliament as a rubber stamp for the government.       
2.6.2 The 2018 protests    
The 2018 Jordanian protests were a series of demonstrations that 
began on 30 May 2018, called ‘a single-day strike’ (Ryan, 2018b, para. 
2). Although the 2018 protests took after the 2011–12 protests, they 
were largely influenced by the new tax bill and increased government 
austerity measures backed by the IMF. The 2018 Jordanian protests 
were organised by more than 30 trade unions and professional 
associations after the government of Hani Al-Mulki forwarded the new 
tax bill to the House of Parliament for enacting.  
 
In a newspaper article ‘Why Jordanians are protesting’ (2018b), Ryan 
describes the economic crisis and hardship in Jordan by asserting that 
“the economic crisis in Jordan is severe, and national debt is almost as 
large as GDP [Gross Domestic Product]. Amman is routinely ranked as 
one of the most expensive cities to live in the entire region, even though 
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Jordan is not a wealthy oil state. This makes day-to-day living for most 
Jordanians a real challenge” (Ryan, 2018b, June 4, para. 8). This 
explanation suggests the significance of the economic factor in 
influencing the 2018 protests.  
 
Former Prime Minister Hani Al-Mulki’s motive for enacting the IMF 
economic restructuring programmes was the fact that “Jordan was 
headed toward insolvency” (Sowell, 2018). In a televised interview on 
Jordan Television on 14 February 2018, Al-Mulki officially declared 
Jordan’s economy weak, and explained how his predecessors had 
endangered the country’s economy and brought it to the brink of 
bankruptcy. He also pointed out that his government would manage to 
“get out of the bottleneck by 2019.” Without tax reform and further 
austerity measures, he asserted, Jordan would suffer a debt crisis that 
could destroy the country (Prime Ministry of Jordan, 2018, 19:09). The 
Prime Minister’s declaration suggests Jordan’s economic difficulty 
stems from inadequate former government policies towards genuine 
economic reform.     
 
Ryan (2018b) identified the motives for the 2018 Jordanian protests and 
related them to shifts in regional alliances. He argues that, “the 
appearance of a U.S.-Saudi-Israel axis has at least partially 
marginalized Jordan, forcing the state to scramble to establish more 
avenues of external support.” As a result, Jordan was obliged to 
implement “domestic taxation as an essential source of revenue” (Ryan, 
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2018b, para. 11). The main impetus behind the 2018 Jordanian 
protests, as Ryan highlighted, was the economic austerity measures, 
introduced after the government re-struck loans with the IMF in late 
2016. Austerity was reflected in the cuts in subsidies and increases in 
the prices of food, fuel and electricity from 2017. These factors led to 
protests against the controversial new tax bill by Jordanian young 
people in several towns and cities nationwide.  
 
Unlike most of the previous protests that had marched for reform by 
political parties, there was something special about the 2018 Jordanian 
protests: first, the way they were organised as sit-ins in the vicinity of 
the government house, and second, the way they were spontaneous 
and unpredictable and led by young people and low-wage earners. The 
2018 protests began as a rejection of the new tax bill that the 
government of Al-Mulki was planning to introduce, but the protests 
developed into something bigger than this sole demand, calling for a 
change in the whole style of government (nahij). The young people 
were particularly protesting against the government’s economic 
approach and methodology that had tended (and continues) to resort to 
ordinary people’s pockets, not the political elites, to reduce the 
government’s fiscal deficit and insecurity.  
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Unlike the 2011–12 protests, the 2018 Jordanian protests gathered 
many people from all levels of society, and from several urban and rural 
areas in Jordan. The protests were largely peaceful and staged at night 
because they occurred during the holy month of Ramadan when 
everyone goes to prayers in the evening. The protests continued to the 
early hours of the next morning. According to Ryan (2018b), the 2018 
protests were not rooted in “older or traditional sources of opposition, 
such as leftist parties or the Muslim Brotherhood” (Ryan, 2018b, para. 
2). The broader nature of the 2018 Jordanian protests matters for the 
analysis of Jordanian humour after the Arab Spring because the 
protests were diverse. The use of real public space (public squares) 
and virtual space (Jordanian social media spaces) was highly 
significant.    
 
The street protests and young people’s ‘protest performance’ in 
Jordanian social media spaces have produced many instances where 
Bakhtin’s ideas about carnival are relevant. For example, young people 
in Jordanian streets and social media spaces have used humour as a 
counter-narrative to power and tool for popular resistance against the 
government. The protests in streets have used various forms of 
humorous placards (in real space) and memes (in virtual space) that 
make Bakhtin’s ideas about the carnivalesque highly relevant, in terms 
of using humour and satire against power, and for showing popular 
resistance.  
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The 2018 protests were further influenced by the government 
increasing the prices of fuel and electricity on 31 May 2018. This led to 
the rapid escalation of protests. The protestors arranged sit-ins and 
gathered at the Fourth Circle where the Government House (Office of 
the Prime Minister) is located. (In this case, the Fourth Circle can be 
linked to Bakhtin’s carnival square). The protests demanded the 
overthrowing of the government of Mulik, as well as the withdrawal of 
the controversial new tax bill that aimed to enforce new taxes on the 
middle and poorer classes.  
 
King Abdullah responded to public demands as articulated by the 2018 
protestors initially by freezing the price hikes and then by dismissing the 
unpopular government of Hani Al-Mulki, on 4 June 2018. Omar Razzaz, 
Mulki’s Education Minister, was then entrusted to lead a new, reforming 
government and re-open dialogue for the amendments to the 
controversial tax bill. However, little has changed, and an only slightly 
modified version of the controversial tax bill was issued on 18 
November 2018. So, there is a kind of endless cycle of somewhat 
carnivalesque protest causing prime ministers to be dismissed, followed 
by new appointments that make minimal changes that result in further 
protests. The apparent futility of protest thus calls into question its 
purpose.    
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In conclusion, the timing and place where protests in Jordan have taken 
place are important if analysed alongside Bakhtin’s ideas about the 
carnival and the carnivalesque. The 2011–12 Jordanian protests 
occurred on Fridays after afternoon prayer. Friday Prayer is one of the 
important weekly prayers that gets people together (social cohesion). 
The 2018 Jordanian protests, however, occurred in the holy month of 
Ramadan, the Islamic spiritual time for fasting, reflection and social 
connections. The timing of the Jordanian protests is significant because 
it takes place at the time of spiritual reassessment and emotional 
prayers. The 2018 protests were staged at night, a time that can be 
considered carnivalesque, when the usual day routines are not applied. 
Taken together, the 2011 and 2018 protests produced various 
carnivalesque acts that aimed to challenge state-led reform and its 
processes, and the overall power of the government. At the time of 
writing this thesis, protests continue to be held on each Thursday (the 
last working day in Jordan) near the vicinity of the Prime Ministry Office 
in the Jordanian capital Amman.            
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2.7. Conclusion  
This chapter has examined the political and geo-cultural context of 
Jordan, which is key to understanding contemporary Jordanian political 
humour and satire, including from a Bakhtinian perspective. It has 
presented some background information about the political history of 
Jordan, notably its creation by the British fiat in 1921, the regime’s 
resilience, and Jordan before, during and after the 2011 Arab Spring 
revolutions. This chapter has identified the key political issues in Jordan 
that are most linked to (and the root cause of) Jordanian political 
humour and satire. Although these issues are the most prominent in 
Jordan and are expressed in specific ways as a result of the Jordanian 
context, they are shared across the region, or even universal.  
 
Furthermore, this chapter has investigated how Bakhtin’s carnival 
(despite not being perfectively descriptive of Jordan and the Arab 
Spring) is very relevant to understand the post-1989 politics, and more 
the new shifting political environments as instigated by the 2011 Arab 
Spring revolutions. The difference in the cultural-political context 
between Jordan and the Soviet Union matters and probably affects the 
application of Bakhtinian carnival; nonetheless, carnival is still highly 
relevant due to its relationship with regime cultural politics and the role 
of disaffected public in their mobilisation against political power and 
repression.  
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To further investigate the context of this research and its key 
contribution, this chapter has examined the regime’s resilience, 
ethnicity and identity politics, gerrymandering politics, elections and 
Jordan’s struggles with economic and political reform programmes. 
Most importantly, it has addressed the ‘façade reform’ that has taken 
place in Jordan since the 1989 political opening, and why Jordanians 
have used humour to talk about the negligible impact of government 
reform. Jordan, as a small country located at the heart of the Middle 
East, has been selected as a site for the study of political humour and 
satire not least because unlike other countries in the Middle East, 
Jordan has experienced a sharp rise in the production of political 
humour and satire since the 2011 Arab Spring revolutions.  
 
The following chapter examines the relevance and some of the 
limitations of an application of a Bakhtinian lens by highlighting the 
social and political contexts that have affected the evolution of 
Jordanian political humour from the 1989 political opening to the start of 
the Arab Spring from 2011. It focuses on the way in which Jordanian 
political humour has become more subversive (although they are still 
some redlines) since the 2011 Arab Spring, and how it has 
demonstrated some aspects of Bakhtinian ideas in relation to the 
carnivalesque themes of degradation, the grotesque, and subversion of 
political power. Bakhtin and the carnivalesque have therefore become 
more relevant after 2011, as the next chapter shows in greater detail.   
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3 Development of Jordanian political 
humour, 1989–2011    
3.1 Introduction  
In his book Rabelais and his world (1984a), Bakhtin makes a 
generalised point and claim about his theory of carnival and the 
carnivalesque. He expounds that “in the Middle Ages, folk humor [the 
carnivalesque] existed and developed outside the official sphere of high 
ideology and literature, but precisely because of its unofficial existence, 
it was marked by exceptional radicalism, freedom, and ruthlessness” 
(Bakhtin, 1984a, p. 71). By doing this, Bakhtin focused on the 
carnivalesque as a particular social and political genre that occurs 
predominantly in carnivalesque cultural sites, such as carnivals, outside 
the official world and its ideology.  
 
Despite the significance of his analysis of carnival and the 
carnivalesque, Bakhtin did not or probably could not (because of the 
oppressive and dangerous regime in which he lived) have really taken 
into account how humour is exercised in a culture and how a political 
context could influence the expression of certain types of humour. He 
also seems to have overlooked (or not targeted): (1) how humour 
changes with social and political developments, (2) how wider regional 
and international pressures provide space for new forms of humour, 
and (3) what happens to humour over the longer term once those new 
spaces have been established. Hence, he argued for it as being 
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ephemeral (Bakhtin, 1984a, pp. 89–91). To identify these omissions 
and oversights is not to criticise Bakhtin directly. It is acknowledged, of 
course, that to consider such factors was neither his intention nor in 
some cases indeed even possible, given that his theories were 
developed in very different global and regional political contexts. 
Nonetheless, all these areas of contention are key challenges to the 
application of Bakhtin’s theory of carnival and the carnivalesque in a 
context of a semi-democratic and semi-authoritarian country like 
Jordan.                  
 
In this chapter, I provide an overall account of Jordanian political 
humour and satire from three historical moments: Jordan’s political 
opening from 1989, the Gulf War (1990–91), and more recently the 
Arab Spring since 2011. I discuss in detail the socio-political and 
cultural contexts that influenced the development of Jordanian political 
humour and satire from 1989 to the present date. I then discuss the 
implications of the 2011 Arab Spring regarding the use of subversive 
humour and satire that challenge the Jordanian government in 
Jordanian social media spaces.         
 
The discussion in this chapter consists of four sections. In the first 
section, I analyse the relationship between humour and Jordanian 
culture and focus on why Jordanians have conventionally been having 
an aversion to humour and laughter. I refer to the stereotypical idea of 
Jordanians’ humourlessness as a tool to discuss the links between the 
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imposition of strict cultural traditions and people’s aversion to humour 
and laughter. I focus most importantly on how Jordan’s difficult 
economic conditions and economic liberalisation from 1989 have 
produced more humour and ultimately made Jordanians funnier.  
 
In the second section, I review the early sources of Jordanian political 
humour and then focus, in relation to themes of progression and 
modernity, on the development of Jordanian situational comedies as a 
distinctive TV genre that poked fun at the then economically and 
socially underdeveloped Jordanian society during the 1980s. In this 
section, I argue that the Jordanian humour scene has been over-
painted with an entirely new kind of humour: political humour, after the 
country’s political opening from 1989. This period of political 
democratisation witnessed a significant increase in the role of political 
humour and satire as a tool of resistance against the government and 
its rhetoric about economic reform and economic liberalisation.  
 
In the third section, I examine the emergence and development of 
Jordanian political humour during and after the country’s political 
opening from 1989 and the Gulf War. I argue that jokes after the Gulf 
War provided Jordanians with a source of pressure relief from the Iraqi 
failure and defeat and a platform for socio-political commentary on the 
global and regional powers, and most noticeably on Jordan’s economic 
conditions and opportunities after the 1989 political opening. To explain 
how ethnic joking was relevant to pre-2011 Jordanian society, I 
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demonstrate how earlier joking before 1989 was less ‘carnivalesque’ 
and did not target the government, while joking after 1989 has become 
more carnivalesque and featured the emergence of carnival joking that 
mocks and criticises power and the government. The emergence of 
carnival joking after 1989 has provided an element to the application of 
Bakhtin’s ideas about carnival and the carnivalesque in Jordanian 
society after the country’s political opening and the Gulf War.  
 
In the final section of this chapter, I examine the recent evolution and 
significant development of Jordanian political humour after the 2011 
Arab Spring and the 2011–12 Jordanian protests that demanded a set 
of substantive reforms of the regime. I analyse the shifts in political and 
cultural forces that have contributed to social expectations, taste and 
tolerance of political humour and satire in wider Jordanian society in 
social media spaces. I argue that humour and laughter has become a 
staple of Jordanian culture in the streets but is now predominantly 
located in social media spaces, such as Facebook, Twitter and 
YouTube.  
 
The post Arab Spring period in Jordan, as the last section will show, 
has marked a significant shift in the use of subversive humour as a tool 
for counter-political expression and resistance against the government 
and the establishment. The use of subversive humour that has 
challenged the government in Jordanian social media spaces indicates 
how political humour after the Arab Spring has provided a 
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carnivalesque mood of resistance. It has utilised carnivalesque themes 
of degradation, the grotesque and subversion of political power and 
authority. However, the effect of this carnivalesque political humour and 
satire on real-world Jordanian politics has (so far) been minimal and 
ephemeral.     
3.2 Are Jordanians humourless?    
Humour seemed not to be a part of Jordan’s early political history and 
resistance. Jordanians have been stereotypically known for being po-
faced and unable to produce humour and laughter. In her article 
‘Performativity and public space: Interventions as performative gestures 
for political engagement in Jordan’ (2015), Samah Hijawi argues that 
Jordanians have long maintained the image of seriousness and 
machismo that has ultimately helped to define their own frown and 
humourlessness as defining national characteristics. She asserts that 
“the mechanisms and feeling that ‘big brother is watching you’ is in fact 
quite effective in regulating both the private and public space and helps 
impose a self-policing system by the inhabitants themselves” (Hijawi, 
2015, para. 1). It is observable therefore that early Jordanian culture 
was not explicit with humour because it was more a culture of 
‘seriousness’ (sternness) with a strong inclination to accept 
conventional manners and adhere to strict cultural traditions and 
established norms.  
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In early Jordanian culture, laughter was equated with social informality, 
improperness and immaturity. Humour in early Jordanian culture has 
been given little respect, due to what I shall call three cultural reasons. 
First, the Jordanian cultural tradition has been influenced by nomadic 
and tribal lifestyles and behaviours. This popular tendency was linked to 
adherence to strict and proper social manners, and interpersonal 
interactions occurred in a serious and humourless tone. Second, 
humour has been often equated with social informality, improperness 
and immaturity. This made an inclination towards humour as socially 
unethical and sometimes awkward. Third, Jordanian people have been 
mostly characterised by their aversion to humour and laughter, and 
satire (as a form for social critique or commentary) has been unpopular. 
One well-known Jordanian proverb ‘no-one’s face smiles even to a hot 
loaf of bread,’ is often used to describe people’s disapproval of jokes 
and joke-telling in many social contexts (Al-Khatib, 1999, p. 267). It is 
also a way to metaphorically describe ordinary people’s faces, which 
sometimes look stern and have little appreciation for humour and 
laughter in some social spaces and settings.    
 
In his book Arab political humour (1985), the Iraqi writer and satirist 
Khalid Kishtainy addressed the stereotypical and widely held negative 
image about Arabs in the minds of westerners. He argued that “despite 
a rich and varied literature, the Arabs are not so readily associated in 
the minds of westerners with humour or wit, which usually makes up a 
sizable chunk of any nation’s literature and oral folklore. Indeed, one 
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can even perceive that the opposite, i.e. temper, ill-humour, 
melancholy, gloom, stern looks, etc. is a generally accepted picture with 
the Arab character” (Kishtainy, 1985, p. 11). Kishtainy’s argument is 
notable here because it emphasises the role of stereotypes, which tend 
to neglect important issues, such as ‘objective truth,’ historical reality 
and literary legacy, when the superior people make jokes, stereotypes 
and prejudices against the inferior. 
 
Humourlessness in Jordanian culture can arguably be linked to several 
cultural variables concerning dignity and manhood (masculinity) that 
Jordanian males are typically trying to assert. This is apparent in 
Hijawi’s (2015) claim about the role of machismo, which seems to have 
contributed to the overall stereotypical picture of Jordanians being 
frowning and humourlessness, in Jordanian culture. For example, some 
Jordanian male and proper names convey Jordanians’ culture of 
seriousness and inclination towards accepting conventional manners 
and strict cultural traditions. Popular nomadic proper names, such as 
Za’el [literally ‘angry’], Muhawesh [literally ‘troublemaker’], Udwan 
[literally ‘hostile’] and Miteb [literally ‘always tired’], demonstrate the 
idea of strict Jordanian culture and the politics of naming people in the 
Jordanian tribal culture and nomadic traditions. This notion about the 
politics of naming people in Arab culture is noted in Kishtainy’s (1985) 
argument about the limited transferability of Arab popular humour and 
culture. He argues that “To the Arabs, a true Arab gentleman is one 
who gets his money without ever working for it. Arabs give themselves 
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names like Stone, Hill, Sword and Lion, but never Smith, Tailor, Mason, 
Silverman or Carpenter” (Kishtainy, 1985, p. 14). This suggests, 
according to Kishtainy, the cultural idea about aspiration and poetry in 
naming some people in the Arab world.     
 
In contemporary Jordanian urbanite modern culture, one can easily 
observe that the use of some nomadic names is one of the most 
satirised things among culturally educated people, because these 
names provide an easy way for humour and laughter to proliferate. 
Furthermore, other proper names that are primarily used for food and 
culinary arts are also among the butt of humour in Jordan’s urbanite 
culture. Some Jordanian food names, such as Mansaf (traditional 
Jordanian dish that is made of rice, meat and fermented yogurt) and 
Maqluba (a traditional Jordanian dish that includes rice, meat and fried 
vegetables) give a clear indication that could define Jordanian culture 
as a culture of seriousness and sternness. To explain, the urbanites in 
Jordan often make humour and jokes about the reasons for naming 
food in Jordan. They often relate and translate the word ‘Mansaf’ to 
‘invasion,’ given people’s rush and speed in finishing the meal in no 
time, and ‘Maqluba,’ to ‘upside-down,’ given the flipping of the dish 
when served.  
 
 
Other examples of Jordanians’ humourlessness rest on the people’s 
aversion to humour and laughter in some instances of interpersonal 
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communications. There, we might think of several popular phrases and 
their potential responses among Jordanians to see how ordinary 
Jordanians have been conventionally grown up lacking a general sense 
of humour as a way to reflect Jordanity (the original Jordanian culture 
and people). These phrases include but are not limited to: ‘Only in 
Jordan if you smile at a stranger’s face, he might ask you ‘are you all 
right, man,’ and if you smile at your brother’s face, he might ask you 
“what’s wrong with you, you idiot,’ and if you smile at your father’s face, 
he might ask you ‘what have you done behind my back? Confess now, 
son.’ From 2011, these phrases have been widely shared in Jordanian 
social media spaces to mockingly explain Jordanians’ past aversion to 
and reception of humour and satire in social spaces.    
 
The other factor that seems to have influenced Jordanians’ aversion to 
humour and laughter was the implementation of almost permanent de 
facto martial law (in effect from 1957 to 1989) to control public order 
and repress any attempts to replace the Hashemite regime. However, 
since Jordanian political opening and economic liberalisation, from 
1989, a growing number of Jordanians have used humour as a tool of 
resistance: to mock and lampoon the government and its 
institutionalised discourse about economic reform and liberalisation. 
That change in trajectory has also been accompanied by a growing 
theme of self-deprecation about Jordanians’ past aversion to humour 
and jokes.  
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I argue that the difficult economic conditions and increasing pressures 
after the 1989 political opening have produced more humour and 
carnivalesque politics against power and the government. These 
economic problems and hardships have challenged the stereotypical 
notion of Jordanians being humourless and po-faced. However, it was 
not until 2011 that a larger number of ordinary Jordanians began more 
fully to engage with carnivalesque subversive humour and satire, 
thanks in large part to the revolutionary moment of the Arab Spring and 
the development of social media technology, which has offered an 
alternative and independent platform for people to make fun about 
themselves and about people in power. In conclusion, Jordanians 
(before 1989) were just like Bakhtin (in the sense of living in an 
oppressive regime), not least because they had arguably lived under 
almost permanent de facto ‘martial law,’ which had led to their aversion 
to humour and laughter. They could not engage (perhaps because of 
the implementation of martial law and the already strict and cultural 
traditions) with humour and laughter for the fear of breaking the already 
established social and political norms and orders.        
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3.3 Political humour before 1989         
Early Jordanian culture and literature were not explicit with transparent 
humour, but rather implicit with cynicism and socio-political grievances. 
In his book The poverty of philosophy: Exercises on Jordanian satirical 
writings (2006), Jordanian literary critic Ahmad Abu Khalil provides 
evidence that the genre of ‘politically satirical writing’ existed in the 
cultural life of Jordanians after the establishment of Transjordan by the 
British in 1921. Abu Kakhil (2006) argues that the then famous 
nationalist poet of Transjordan (later Jordan), Mustafa Wahbi Al-Tal 
(1897–1949), was considered by many contemporaries to be a ‘cynical 
poet.’ Al-Tal’s poetry was infused with complaints and grievances about 
social life and norms, particularly in relation to social injustices and the 
exclusion experienced by a few marginalised groups in Jordan, such as 
the Ghajar (Gypsies). Writing concerned with politics and social 
injustice seems thus to have had a long tradition in Jordan before the 
1989 political opening.    
 
In its earlier forms, however, as in Al-Tal’s poetry, Jordanian writing 
seems not to have used humour and satire per se. There seemed to be 
no Jordanian satirical literature at the time of Transjordan (1921–46) 
when the country was still under British administration. In his analysis of 
cultural life and media productions during the period of Transjordan, 
Abu Khalil (2006) demonstrates that although media freedom during the 
1940s and 1950s gave rise to a proliferation of some alternative media 
outlets, such as tabloid and weekly magazines, humour had never been 
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popular. Some of the then prominent journalists, such as Minawer 
Owais, Lutfi Malhas and Hashim Sabi’, had not utilised any techniques 
of humour and satire. Rather, they were more identified with their 
cynicism and critical reflections on social and political structures.  
 
Without humour, cynicism (alone) cannot be considered satire and its 
users are not classified as ‘humourists.’ This evidence might indicate 
that because the people of Jordan were not in their nature 
‘carnivalesque’ or satirical, there was no literature of this kind during the 
period of Transjordan. Rather, the Arabs, including the people of 
Jordan, were perhaps more inclined and interested to the growing body 
of resistance literature that emerged against western imperialism and 
more specifically against the Israeli occupation of Palestine, from 1948. 
Humour seemed therefore not to be a part of political resistance at this 
time.     
 
Jordanian political humour that challenged power was not produced 
until the early 1960s. That period of Jordan’s political history witnessed 
the first formation of Wasfi Al-Tal’s reforming government, on 27 March 
1963. Prime Minister Wasfi was the son of Mustafa Wahbi Al-Tal, the 
famous Transjordanian cynical poet. Wasfi Al-Tal’s government was 
received very positively among Jordanians because it implemented 
King Hussein’s vision of Jordan as a “model homeland” (Susser, 1994, 
p. 36). King Hussein’s then vision focused on the adoption of far-
reaching economic and political reform programmes, decentralisation 
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and media freedom that allowed the government to tolerate feedback 
and criticism from local media alternative outlets, such as weekly 
newspapers.  
 
The opinion articles of Fakhri Qu’war, published at that period of 
Jordan’s history in the Amman Evening Newspaper during the early 
1960s, can be considered one of the earliest examples of Jordanian 
political humour that included light criticism of the government and the 
establishment. That form of political satire existed in a context of socio-
political commentary and critical reflections rather than directly 
opposing, mocking or attacking the political power of the government 
and the King. Qu’war’s articles used to direct ‘mild’ but ‘weightier’ 
criticism towards the government using a limited element of political 
satire and mockery. It was not until 1982 that Qu’war first published his 
humorous work Diaries of a happy man, which was later adapted into a 
soap opera comedy broadcast on Jordanian state-owned radio. That 
form of radio drama depicted the life journey of an indigenous person 
named Farhan from his early childhood to his admission to a psychiatric 
hospital. It also sheds light on his naivety and his acts of resistance 
against marginalisation. The early works of Quwar in humorous 
literature suggest how political humour and satire existed in a form of 
social commentary and mockery in relation to modernity. It also acted 
as a springboard for the dramatisation of Jordanian humour and satire 
on radio and later on television.  
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During the early 1980s, the Jordan Radio and Television Corporation 
(the state-owned radio and television network) produced two influential 
situational comedies (sitcoms) that I argue have influenced the 
development of Jordanians’ overall sense of humour and use of satire 
in relation to power and domination. The first was Haret Abu Awad (The 
neighbourhood of Abu Awad), broadcast from 1981. It tackled the 
customs, culture and social problems of Jordanian rural society in a 
very subtle and comic way that highlighted indirectly the tensions 
between urbanites and rural dwellers. The second was Al-’lem Noor 
(Knowledge is light), broadcast from 1984. This sitcom was heavily 
influenced by the then famous British sitcom Mind your language, 
broadcast from 1977. For many decades, those two Jordanian sitcoms 
have resonated greatly in Jordanian collective identity and achieved 
popularity among many Jordanians.  
 
For example, Haret Abu Awad narrated the story of the family of Abu 
Awad (a typical Jordanian father) and his neighbours in a very comic 
way that highlighted social classes and the greed of urbanites 
compared to the naivety of rural dwellers. It was also intended to make 
people laugh about the life in the Jordanian countryside where the 
majority of Transjordanian nationals live. However, Al-’lem Noor 
focused on the role of state and non-government organisations in 
fighting illiteracy in Jordan: a group of elderly people are summoned to 
attend evening classes and learn basic Arabic language and grammar. 
The series was notable for its inclusion of all the dialects of Jordan: 
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urban dialects, which are more influenced by Palestinian Arabic, and 
rural and nomadic dialects, which are the original dialects of 
Transjordanian nationals in the steppe and the hinterlands. The class 
was taught by young and beautiful Miss Warda, portrayed by Jordan’s 
most famous actress Abeer Issa, who was employed by the Ministry of 
Education to teach the elderly students. Humour seemed to be a 
growing part of Jordanian social life and society at this time.     
 
Comedic media and satirical television productions in Jordan in the 
1980s were growing faster than in the 1960s. The expansion and 
transmission in full colour of Jordan Television was among the most 
important factors for the development of Jordanians’ engagement with a 
TV sitcom. Therefore, the style, and targets of that situational comedy 
became embedded and perhaps normalised. The development of 
Jordanian sitcoms made acceptable certain formerly taboo kinds of 
language and behaviours about ‘the other’ and in relation to 
government and power relations, especially in the late 1980s. During 
this era, Jordanian political humour was not only confined to broadcast 
on television but also became available in newspaper articles and 
columns.                            
 
Jordanian literary critics, such as Iyad Nassar (2009), consider 
columnist Mohamed Tomalieh (1957–2008) to have influenced the 
development of the genre of journalistic, politically satirical writing in 
Jordan from the mid-1980s onwards. Tomalieh was known for his use 
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of colloquial language and clichés that were new to the techniques and 
style of formal writing used in newspapers and articles up until that 
time. He was a Jordanian of Palestinian origin who had lived in refugee 
camps in Jordan. He used to work for Ad-Dustour (a pro-government 
daily newspaper) under a daily and mildly politicised ‘satirical’ 
commentary opinion column entitled Shahed Ayan (Eyewitness). His 
articles provided socio-political commentary on life in Jordan using 
cynicism and self-deprecatory humour. In one commentary article, he 
considered himself as a “bridegroom who went on his honeymoon on 
his own, and a soldier who died as a result of his last bullet that 
celebrated a cease-fire” (as cited by Nasser, 2009, para. 6). His articles 
highlighted more the culture of cynicism and melancholy experienced at 
many Palestinian refugee camps in Jordan. This development in 
Jordanian humour scene was a result of the combination of many 
socio-political and cultural factors discussed above.          
 
In examining some of Tomalieh’s journalistic articles, I have observed 
that some of his cynicism should be understood in the context of the 
highly controversial question of identity politics and the idea of 
marginalisation of poorer sections of Jordanian society, such as 
Palestinian refugees. Some of his satirical articles, such as ‘The third 
bullet’ (published in his book Shahed Ayan (Eyewitness), 2007, p. 84), 
focused on the rising tensions between Jordanians and Jordanians of 
Palestinian origin, including the hard lives of some marginalised 
Palestinians in refugee camps in Jordan. Addressing this important 
Chapter 3 Development of Jordanian political humour, 1989–2011          163 
 
 
 
socio-political phenomenon in his vignettes, Annani (2006) argues that 
Tomalieh used to poke fun at his ‘double identity disorder’ (Annani, 
2006, para. 6). He demonstrates that Tomalieh cynically viewed himself 
as ‘Jordanian of Palestinian origin,’ based on his difficult living 
experiences in one Palestinian refugee camp in Amman, and as 
‘Palestinian of Jordanian origin,’ because his family had emigrated from 
the town of Ramla in Palestine, which fell under Jordanian rule following 
the outcomes of the 1948 Arab war with Israel.  
 
The nature and especially the targets of Tomalieh’s writing were 
significant for the development of Jordanian political humour in during 
the late 1980s. This is because he focused more on the role of socio-
political agents in the formation of political divisions and alliances 
between Jordanians, Jordanians of Palestinian origin, and Palestinians 
in refugee camps. Instead of engaging in regime-based cultural politics, 
many Palestinians in Jordan have targeted the government and other 
parts of the regime in order to promote their own political interests. 
These resistance movements can be best seen through the 
government-opposing actions and dissenting voices of Jordanians of 
Palestinian origin and Palestinians in refugee camps. Jordanian humour 
seemed to have grown as a tool for criticism against the government, 
but this development was not accelerated until 1989 when Jordan 
launched its political opening and economic liberalisation.                       
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3.4 Political humour after 1989  
In this section, I analyse how Jordanian political humour after the 
country’s political opening functioned as a tool to mock the government. 
I also analyse how the Gulf War jokes functioned as a tool to promote 
national unity and solidarity among Jordanians against pressures from 
outside. These jokes provided Jordanians with a source of relief from 
the Iraqi failure and defeat. They also provided a medium for socio-
political commentary on the regional and global powers that took part in 
the war, including the United States, France, Saudi Arabia and Iraq. To 
analyse the functions of humour in post-1989 politics and the Gulf War, 
I refer first to the socio-political and economic changes and 
liberalisation that took place after Jordan’s 1989 political opening that 
promoted freedom of speech and expression and the relaxation of state 
censorship on media production. I also refer to the implications of the 
Gulf War on the generation and development of political humour and 
ethnic jokes in Jordan after 1989.  
 
After the 1989 protests, Jordan witnessed a vital democratic transition 
that started with nationwide protests against the unpopular government 
of Zaid Rifa’i over price increases and cuts to food subsidies to meet 
the government’s austerity plan, as required by the IMF. In that year, 
Jordan experienced what was known as a ‘political opening,’ 
comprising the resumption of parliamentary elections and the cessation 
of martial law, which had been officially declared in 1967 after the loss 
of the West Bank to Israel. This watershed moment in Jordan’s political 
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history witnessed the legalisation of freedom of speech, promoted 
alternative media outlets, and re-granted the establishment of political 
life and parties, which had been suspended after the dismissal of 
Suleiman Nabulsi’s government, the first elected government in 1957.  
 
In addition to the 1989 political opening, the 1993 Press and Publication 
Law (PPL) promoted, to a great extent, a widespread increase in media 
freedom and freedom of speech and expression in Jordan. From that 
year (1993), Jordan experienced a steady rise in alternative media (as 
well as the emergence of political opposition voices), including, but not 
limited to, the rise of tabloid journalism and satirical journals such as 
The Shihan that were critical of mainstream government discourses and 
senior government officials. The rise of Shihan (a tabloid weekly 
newspaper) in the early 1990s is a perfect example to reflect on this 
socio-political change and to think of Jordanians’ reception of political 
humour and satire after the country’s political opening and the 
relaxation of martial law from 1989.   
 
This period also resulted in the growth, proliferation and wider 
circulation of Gulf War jokes in Jordanian streets from 1990. In their 
analysis of Gulf War jokes in Jordanian streets, Farghal and Shakir 
(1993, p. 15) argue that these represented a new genre of political 
humour and satire in Jordan, targeting the structure of political powers 
and conflicts in the Middle East. At that time, Jordanian political humour 
promoted the supremacy of the Iraqi arsenal, despite their military 
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defeat and loss in the war. It enabled Jordanians metaphorically to 
convert the Iraqi military defeat into a ‘psychological victory’ that 
celebrated the Iraqi military.  
 
To explain Jordanians’ peculiar attitudes towards the Iraqis, consider 
the following four war jokes that were popular during and after the Gulf 
War. The humour of the first joke resides in the double meaning of 
Arabic word yaftah as both ‘conquer’ and ‘deflower.’ It reads: Saddam 
Hussein's secretary applied for a four-day leave to get married. 
However, Saddam granted her only a four-hour leave. When she 
complained about this, Saddam responded, “I conquered (fataht) 
Kuwait in four hours, can’t the groom deflower (yaftah) you in four 
hours?” (Farghal & Shakir, 1993, p. 16).  
 
The second and third jokes are about the alleged supremacy of Iraqi 
missiles over the U.S. They show the ineffectiveness of the American 
Patriot missiles as inaccurate and therefore inefficient compare with the 
more ‘advanced’ Iraqi weapons and missiles. The second joke reads: 
An Al-Hussein missile (Iraqi) and a Patriot missile (American) met over 
Tel Aviv. The Al-Hussein asked the Patriot whether he knew where the 
Ministry of Defence was. The Patriot answered: “No.” Then the Al-
Hussein responded: “Then follow me” (Farghal & Shakir, 1993, p. 19). 
The third joke reads: One of the Arab Gulf sheikhs suffered from a 
nightmare in which he shouted names like Al-Hussein (Iraqi missile), Al-
Abbas (Iraqi missile) and Sadam (President of Iraq). He was taken to a 
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doctor, who, after examining him, prescribed a Patriot missile as a 
suppository (Farghal & Shakir, 1993, p. 19).  
 
The last joke highlights a stereotypical perception held about the 
French in Jordanian culture (the Iraqis are over sexual, and the French 
are sexy). It reads: During Saddam’s inspection of his forces in Kuwait, 
he noticed that the members of one of the military units there were 
nude. When he asked them about this, they told him that they were 
expecting French paratroopers (Farghal & Shakir, 1993, p. 21). 
Collectively, these examples demonstrate the role of stereotyping in the 
generation of political humour and satire during the warfare. They also 
highlight differences between socio-cultural groups and ethnicities for 
the purposes of achieving national unity and solidarity against 
pressures from outside.  
 
Jordanians have been (and are still) very sympathetic to Iraq and 
Saddam because the image of Saddam prototypically symbolised Pan-
Arabism and the Arab nationalism that promoted the unity of Arabs 
against western imperialism and other external regional powers. Jordan 
(and then King Hussein) was a key ally of Ba’athist Iraq against the 
expansion of Iranian influence and Shia Islam in the region. The King 
supported Saddam unconditionally during the Iraq-Iran War in the 
1980s in order to stem Iranian influence in the Middle East. 
Furthermore, Jordan and Iraq have maintained historically close 
relations with frequent attempts to unify the two states when Iraq was 
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ruled by the Hashemite family, better known as the Hashemite Kingdom 
of Iraq (1921–58). These historical moments show how the Jordanian 
government and people have inclined towards support of Pan-Arabism 
and the celebration of Saddam and Iraq against western imperialism.                        
 
It can be argued that Jordanian political humour and satire during and 
after the Gulf War can be more related to the release theory of humour, 
helping Jordanians to cope with or release frustration and anger about 
the Iraqi failure and defeat during the war. However, the Jordanian 
socio-political context and political transition during the 1990s provides 
a better explanation for the proliferation of Gulf War jokes and reception 
of humour in wider Jordanian society. This idea about how social and 
political developments influence the circulation of political humour and 
satire shows one of the points of weaknesses of Bakhtin’s theory of 
carnival and the carnivalesque, which views humour as a product that 
results from the temporary overturning of social and political hierarchies 
in an otherwise unchanging wider context.  
 
In addition to the wider circulation of Gulf War jokes, Jordan was among 
the first Arab countries allowing sensitive political topics to be 
addressed on stage. After fleeing from Kuwait during the Gulf War, 
Jordanian stand-up comedians Nabil Sawalha and Hisham Yanis 
returned to Jordan and established the first politically satirical theatre in 
the capital city Amman, at the Concord Theatre in 1991. They were 
theatrically professional, enthusiastic and very energetic personalities. 
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They achieved fame and audience engagement through their perfect 
imitations and personifications of several Arab rulers, and their very 
comic treatment of highly sensitive political topics on the stage.   
 
In one politically satirical play Welcome to an Arab summit (1993), the 
two actors, as Peter Ford (1993) described them in his 1993 newspaper 
article ‘Jordan political satire packs ‘em in with lampooning of Arab 
leaders’ (1993), “bound onto [the] stage as if they have just been freed 
from captivity” (Ford, 1993, para. 1). The actors’ rush and bounding 
onto the stage suggest (perhaps) that the Jordanian political theatre 
emerged as a tool to celebrate the end of state censorship and the 
relaxation of laws concerning freedom of speech and expression in 
Jordan after the 1989 political opening. It can be argued that the 
Jordanian regime and society shifted its tolerance of political humour 
and satire after King Hussein of Jordan attended and seemed to enjoy 
one of the plays. The attendance helped to end government restrictions 
and end state censorship on political humour and satire in public 
domains.  
 
In favour of the new liberalism, Hisham Yanis made a light-hearted 
observation, saying “For the first time in 30 years, we are making a 
profit with a theatre play;” he also pointed out humorously that “We 
can’t afford to go back to dictatorship” (cited by Ford, 1993, para. 31). 
Yanis’s comment is interesting here because he chose to use ‘we,’ a 
seemingly innocuous first-person plural pronoun, but a politically loaded 
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term because it potentially also refers to ‘we’ (the people of Jordan). It 
is even more interesting that he made a self-deprecating joke about 
theatre being normally very unpopular. He mocked the very genre in 
which he was succeeding. This level of meta-awareness combined with 
self-deprecation (i.e. awareness of the limitations and perhaps futility of 
one’s own efforts) seems to represent a highly sophisticated level of 
political humour and satire on stage. Therefore, he not only 
encapsulated (by talking openly about the political past and future of 
Jordan) the new freedom of speech, but also the growing sophistication 
of Jordanian political humour, as well as the growing theme of self-
deprecation in Jordanian society after the 1989 political opening.                   
 
During the early 1990s, the duo (Nabil Sawalha and Hisham Yanis) 
staged several influential, politically satirical plays that became the 
cornerstone for the development of the art of political theatre and comic 
production in Jordan, as well as in the wider region. These included 
Ahlan huqooq insan Arabi (Welcome to the rights of Arab citizenry), 
Ahlan barlaman wa mezaniyah (Welcome to parliament and 
government budget), Ahlan mu’tamar qimah Arabi (Welcome to an Arab 
summit), Ahlan tatbey’ (Welcome to the normalisation of relations with 
Israel) and Ahlan nizam ‘alamy jadeed (Welcome to a new world order). 
The choice for titles in these series of politically satirical plays (all 
starting with ‘welcome’) is notable and ironic in Jordanian culture.  
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These political plays were highly satirical in terms of their use of pun 
and hyperbole as methods of political analysis. They demonstrated a 
new genre of Jordanian political humour and satire that perhaps helped 
to release the tensions of Jordanians. It also functioned as a method of 
political analysis and as a transient tool for political resistance, but of a 
kind that did not provoke any changes on everyday political realities. 
There were thus close in nature to aspects of Bakhtin’s carnival, without 
being overtly confrontational. The plays also functioned as a trigger for 
the promotion of two types of political humour in Jordan after the Gulf 
War: affectionate satire towards Arab leaders, and another form of 
antagonistic humour against the Americans and their allies in the region 
(Egypt and Saudi Arabia).     
 
In addition to lampooning Jordanian government figures, the duo were 
most famous for their perfect mimicry of the then Arab leaders, such as 
King Hussein of Jordan, Saddam Hussein of Iraq, Hosni Mubarak of 
Egypt and Yasir Arafat of Palestine. These imitations were not by and 
large considered derogatory and offensive, according to Jordanian 
social norms. Rather, they helped to establish a peculiar type of 
‘affectionate satire’ that ultimately defended power rather than attacking 
it. Both Nabil Sawalha and Hisham Yanis showed their full respect to 
the characters they impersonated on stage, without overstepping social 
and political boundaries. For example, in one showing of the political 
play, ‘Welcome to the rights of Arab citizenry,’ Hisham Yanis mimicked 
King Hussein’s husky voice and appearance in the King’s presence 
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(Jordan comic feared pokey, 1997). The King’s reaction was lenient and 
very tolerant. He clapped and laughed (Jordan comic feared pokey, 
1997, para. 5). The King’s reaction could be interpreted as a sign of the 
state’s growing tolerance of political humour, satire and comedy after 
the 1989 political opening and economic liberalisation. This moment 
also strongly influenced later developments of media freedom in 
relation to lessening state censorship on media and comic productions, 
as well as the promotion of freedom of speech and expression in public 
spaces. Figure 2 below shows a still image from the politically satirical 
play (Welcome to the normalisation of relations with Israel), where in 
1994 Yanis impersonated and dressed as King Hussein of Jordan 
(Jordanian history, 2018).    
                
 
Figure 2. A still of Jordanian comedian Hisham Yanis impersonating 
and dressed like King Hussein of Jordan [Video file], 1994 
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In an interview with Abu Dubai-based English newspaper The National 
in 2011, Jordanian veteran comedian Nabil Sawalha described his 
politically satirical theatre during the 1990s as a way to burnish the 
halos and sanctity that surrounded the regimes and the establishments 
in Arab countries (Naylor, 2011, para. 6). That form of political humour 
had for most of the time maintained a respectful stance that functioned 
as an affectionate satire alongside political authority. It can be argued 
that political humour and ethnic jokes that emerged in Jordan after the 
1989 political opening provided a ‘safe haven’ for expressing 
commentary on sensitive social and political issues, rather than actively 
degrading politicians and other authority figures. Sawalha and Yanis’s 
1990s comedy skits stopped short of such degradation, but instead 
functioned as a springboard for the rise of the cultural art of mockery 
and lampooning the government and the establishment in Jordan, albeit 
in a very respectful way.         
 
Alongside the bloom of politically satirical theatre as instigated by Nabil 
Sawalha and Hisham Yanis, Jordan’s socio-political satirist Yousef 
Ghishan established in 1996 the first Jordanian photojournalistic and 
politically satirical newspaper (Abd Rabbo). In an interview with 7iber 
(on online Jordanian independent magazine) in 2017, Ghishan, the 
newspaper’s editor-in-chief, pointed out that his Abd Rabbo was the 
first Jordanian politically satirical newspaper that was issued regularly 
(Jibril, 2017, para. 9). The newspaper was popular for its use of 
grotesque and thus carnivalesque composite photos (a new satirical 
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genre which was fashionable at that time). The photos were used in a 
way to challenge the authority of government officials and the 
establishment, including the power of the Prime Minister, senior 
government officials and members of the House of Parliament. Once, 
Ghishan lampooned, albeit in a very respectful way, the official 
Jordanian government position towards the American bombing of Iraq 
in 1998, a position that did not go beyond ‘expressing condemnation 
and concerns.’ He argued that this type of government political 
articulation is one of the most popular elements of discourse not only in 
Jordan but also in many Arab governments’ official statements. This 
example shows an extension to the peculiar Jordanian type of 
‘affectionate satire’ in print media. Despite its popularity among the 
Jordanian readership, the newspaper soon ceased publication following 
amendments to the PPL between 1997 and 1998. The amendments 
made to the 1998 PPL largely censored media freedom and allowed the 
government to regulate all media productions and begin a crackdown 
on opposition.  
 
During Abdul Karim Al-Kabariti’s tenure as Prime Minister (February 
1996 to March 1997), Jordanian political humour emerged as a tool to 
poke fun at the government’s economic reform and the IMF 
requirements, which stipulated measures for economic corrections, and 
significant cuts in government expenditures. These measures caused 
controversy after the government’s decision to lift subsidies on food, 
including bread. For example, at that time, Jordan’s Prime Minister 
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Kabariti declared, in a public press conference, the new government 
economic strategy that aimed to compensate the poor by saying ad-daf’ 
qabel al-raf’), which can be literally translated into ‘paying [the people] 
before raising [the prices].’ This government articulation about 
prospective economic reform was quickly changed by many ordinary 
Jordanians in the streets into mockery of the entire government’s 
economic plan and reform.  
 
The phraseology was grotesquely interpreted as “the government want 
to fuck us [the people]” (Farghal, 2008, para. 8; Badarneh, 2011, p. 
319). The interpretation of the Prime Minister’s phraseology was rude 
and brutal because it resonated in style with a sexual act of penetration 
where the government is striking a deal with a prostitute, who is 
depicted here as ‘the Jordanian people.’ It can be argued that this 
representation of the government as a ‘sexual actor’ in the political 
scene was unprecedented in the history of Jordanian political humour 
and satire. It was influenced by various social and political 
developments and emerged from and in response to the 1989 political 
opening and economic liberalisation that negatively impacted the lives 
of many Jordanians. It showed not only how Jordanians were poking 
fun at the government, but also how they had started to use grotesque 
metaphors, imageries and sexual analogies - carnivalesque behaviours 
- in political humour after the political opening and the Gulf War.                     
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By the beginning of the twenty-first century, the production of political 
humour and satire in Jordan retreated due to renewed censorship and 
the impact of the 1998 PPL on freedom of speech and expression. 
However, a few years after King Abdullah ascended to the throne in 
1999, he relaxed state censorship on media and freedom of speech 
and expression. In 2005, he launched an initiative - freedom that 
touches the sky - to promote freedom of speech and expression among 
Jordanians. It can be argued that the 2005 royal initiative resulted in 
another rise of Jordanian political humour and the renewed use of 
grotesque socio-political commentary and satire as a tool to target the 
government, but not the King and royal family.  
 
This period was notable because it witnessed the emergence of 
satirical columns even in Jordanian state media newspapers as a 
method of political analysis and for providing social and political 
commentary about the actions of the government. For example, 
Sawaleif (Parables), a satirical column by Ahmad Hassan Al-Zou’bi, 
started to appear in the government-owned newspaper Al Ra’i (The 
Opinion) from 2007. At that period, Al-Zou’bi rose to prominence and 
became one of the most famous Jordanian social and political satirists. 
Throughout the discussion in chapters 4 & 5, I will frequently refer to Al-
Zou’bi’s works about political humour after the Arab Spring, in greater 
depth and detail.    
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Inside the context of Jordan after the 1989 political opening, there has 
been a rise in various forms of popular culture using humour as a voice 
of cultural resistance and marginalisation. The earlier practices in 
Jordanian political humour and satire in this period highlighted the 
significance of using humour as a tool for releasing tensions (safety 
valve) and a recourse for expressing taboos in Jordanian society, 
whether political, religious or sexual, as evident in the Gulf War jokes, 
Nabil Sawalha and Hisham Yanis’ politically satirical theatre and Yousef 
Gishan’s first politically satirical magazine. These key areas are clearly 
challenging to the application of Bakhtin’s ideas about carnival and the 
carnivalesque because they show how humour, which was exercised 
during and after social and political developments, is different from or 
counter to Bakhtin’s ideas of carnival because Jordan in the last few 
decades is not like the Soviet Union in the mid-20th century under Stalin 
(see Table 2, p. 118). Although Bakhtin did understand and 
acknowledge the political structure of medieval Europe, he did not 
target how humour is exercised in a culture and how a political context 
could influence the expression of certain types of humour against 
power. This is perhaps because he lived under an oppressive and 
dangerous regime. However, his ideas about carnival are highly 
relevant to Jordan. For example, the theatre of Sawalha and Yanis was 
rather similar to Bakhtin’s carnival in one respect at least: it was joyous 
and fleeting.    
 
 
Chapter 3 Development of Jordanian political humour, 1989–2011          178 
 
 
 
These elements of political humour in Jordanian humour before the 
start of the revolutionary moment of the Arab Spring were, however, not 
at all subversive. Rather, they maintained, sometimes, a very respectful 
stance that defended power rather than attacking it (in this case Hisham 
Yanis’ imitation of King Hussein’s appearance and his husky voice). 
However, the use of bodily images and especially sexual analogy (in 
this case the popular idea that the government wants to ‘fuck us’) have 
made the application of Bakhtin’s theory of carnival and the 
carnivalesque relevant for the discussion of political humour and satire 
in Jordan after the 1989 political opening and the Gulf War. In some 
respects, Jordanian political humour before the Arab Spring was less 
engaged with the themes of degradation, the grotesque and subversion 
of political power and authority. However, with the start of the Arab 
Spring and emergence of social media technology from 2011, carnival 
joking has developed exponentially in Jordan. Carnivalesque humour 
has been predominantly disseminated on social media platforms, such 
as Facebook, Twitter and YouTube, to poke fun at the government, as 
the discussion in the following section shows.              
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3.5 Political humour from 2011 
In this last section of the chapter, I suggest there has been a notable 
evolution of Jordanian political humour that started with the 2011 Arab 
Spring revolutions and that is ongoing. I argue that the emergence of 
social media has played a key role in this phase of the development of 
Jordanian political humour. It has made it more carnivalesque and 
subversive. This is due to the nature of the social media spaces as 
independent and user-oriented free platforms that function away from 
the direct government control and censorship.  
 
Examples of carnivalesque Jordanian political humour and satire 
disseminated since 2011 in Jordanian social media spaces have 
included animated cartoons, politically satirical programmes and plays, 
satirical parables and anecdotes, sketch comedies, radio comedies and 
many internet memes. Some of these new genres of political humour in 
Jordanian social media spaces have provided a mood of resistance to 
the government and the establishment, using degradation, the 
grotesque and the temporary subversion of political power and 
authority. That is more apparently carnivalesque than the previous 
phase in the development of political humour in the post- 1989 political 
context. In this section, I argue that the evolutionary moment of the 
Arab Spring and the advancement of social media technologies have 
together changed forms of online expression and changed Jordanian 
people’s attitudes towards the government and dominant powers. 
These attitudes are liberal and anti-government. 
Chapter 3 Development of Jordanian political humour, 1989–2011          180 
 
 
 
Political humour in Jordan witnessed a major ‘breakthrough’ after the 
Arab Spring, thanks in large part to social media platforms, such as 
Facebook, Twitter and YouTube. Because of the counter-political 
culture of the Arab Spring and nature of social media spaces, Jordanian 
political humour and satire has grown both quantitatively and 
qualitatively since 2011 as a counter-political force and tool for popular 
resistance against power and the government. Social media spaces 
have provided platforms, notably free from government monitoring and 
censorship for carnivalesque political humour to proliferate and circulate 
repeatedly without adhering to the principles instigated by the state in 
relation to freedom of speech and expression.  
 
Carnivalesque politics and humour used in Jordanian social media 
spaces have demonstrated since 2011 a strong element of 
carnivalesque political humour and satire, using digital activism and 
individualised voices, which have ultimately helped to create collective 
voices against power and authority. This form of online humour and 
satire has, mainly, challenged the government’s rhetoric about 
economic and political reform and its processes, from 2011. As a result, 
carnivalesque humour has become a staple of Jordanian culture after 
the Arab Spring. This is apparent in the Jordanian people’s 
performance and activities online, as well as the comments in 
Jordanian social media spaces. This is largely due to developments in 
modern digital technology and use of social media as places for not 
only socialising, but also (frequently) as platforms for influencing 
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resistance, political communication and political participation against 
the actions of the government.    
 
Inside the context of social media space, many young Jordanian people 
have used their social media accounts as a platform for influencing 
counter-narrative against the government and to promote calls for the 
reform of the government and the regime by returning to constitutional 
monarchy, as stipulated in the 1952 Constitution. Some of the leading 
Jordanian humourists and political activists have also taken to social 
media spaces their resistant actions to power and the government. 
These include but are not limited to Ahmad Hassan Al-Zou’bi, Omar 
Abdallat, Emad Hajjaj, Osama Hajjaj, Maen Qatamin and Musa Hijazin. 
These people have used their social media spaces to express their 
opposition opinions to their public, to disseminate their works and 
sometimes to support or initiate strike actions against the government 
through the use of hashtags, in order to try to achieve improvements for 
the society.  
               
The use of humour and satire in Jordanian social media spaces has 
infused Jordanian political humour after the Arab Spring with a 
‘carnivalesque’ mode of resistance against power and government. 
Such humour has tended to be more subversive and less respectful 
than the above-analysed, earlier forms of political humour and satire in 
the twenty-three years after the 1989 political opening. It has sought to 
express young people’s dissenting views, despair and frustration about 
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the effect of government policies on reforms. Post Arab Spring political 
humour in Jordanian social media spaces has utilised more 
carnivalesque themes: degradation, grotesque and temporary and 
imaginary subversion of political power and authority. 
 
First, Jordan’s most famous political satirist and activist Ahmad Hassan 
Al-Zou’bi is a perfect example to reflect on the rise of subversive 
humour and satire as a tool for resistance against power and 
government. Al-Zou’bi is a social and political satirist who has 
developed his politically satirical profession since the Arab Spring. At 
the start of the Arab Spring in 2011, he wrote an influential, politically 
satirical play Al-an Fahemtukum (Now I Understand You), in order to 
talk about Jordan’s economic and political woes as well as the country’s 
political uncertainty and unrest after the Arab Spring. The title for this 
play was inspired by the Tunisian President Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali’s 
famously cynical quote when he proclaimed, in what turned out to be 
his last televised speech, that he had listened to the people of Tunisia 
and their demands and was ready to make concessions. The play 
achieved great popularity amongst many Jordanians and in late 2011 
King Abdullah himself attended and apparently enjoyed the play (Brand 
& Hammad, 2012, para. 2). The play portrays the hard life of Abu 
Saqer, a retired combatant from the army who behaves towards others 
with a strict, military style that evokes humour and laughter. Abu Saqer, 
played by veteran comedian Musa Hijazin, is presented as a Jordanian 
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father whose family decides to rebel against his ‘dictatorship’ and strict 
family rules.  
 
Al-Zou’bi’s (2011) politically satirical play marked a significant shift in 
the use of subversive humour and satire as a tool to express dissent 
and frustration. It also uses humour as a form of resistance to mock the 
government and the process by which Jordan’s prime ministers, 
government officials and ministers are chosen for their portfolios. The 
play includes a considerable number of potent scenes that ‘cross red 
lines’ by addressing themes such as land acquisition by the regime and 
the disappointing outcomes of the 2011 National Dialogue Committee 
that launched what were viewed as ‘cosmetic’ reform programmes that 
did not result in any substantial reforms to the actual political reality.  
 
The play cleverly disguises these domestic political themes by turning 
them into family issues where Abu Saqer (the protagonist) is presented 
as a ‘dictator’ and his family (the people of the country) decides to rebel 
against his authoritarian rule. The play achieved more than 4,497,758 
views on YouTube at the time of writing this thesis. The success of the 
play shows not only evolution in public taste for humour and satire, but 
also how the Jordanian regime has tolerated the rise of political 
humour, perhaps as a means for releasing the tensions of many 
Jordanian young people who took to the streets during the 2011–12 
protests to demand change.  
 
Chapter 3 Development of Jordanian political humour, 1989–2011          184 
 
 
 
Al-Zou’bi’s satirical productions have so far included one politically 
satirical play, hundreds of politically satirical articles and many comedy 
shows, including Man-saf Baladi (malapropism of Mansaf), Ramadan 
Parables and recently Watan 3D on London-based Al Arabi TV. 
Jordanian political humour after the Arab Spring has included other 
satirical and media productions that have poked fun and created 
laughter among Jordanians in social media spaces. Other popular 
Jordanian comedy shows and programmes that contributed to the rise 
of humour and subversive satire in Jordanian social media spaces have 
included Mohammed Laham’s Nukat Shawar’ (street jokes) on Roya 
TV, Kamel Nusairat’s politically satirical play La Sharqia wala Gharbiah 
(Neither east nor west), Nahfat Som’a wa Abu Saqer (The wits of 
Som’a and Abu Saqer), Sawaleif Ramadan (Satirical parables), Ahmad 
Hassan Al-Zou’bi and Musa Hijazin’s radio comedy Khaliha ala Allah 
(Leave it to God) on Rotana Radio, and hundreds of thousands of 
composite photos shared by disaffected young people in Jordanian 
social media spaces about the government and the parliament.  
 
Second, the Jordanian cartoonist Osama Hajjaj is another example to 
reflect on the use in social media spaces of subversive humour and 
satire against the government. In 2012, he posted in his social media 
accounts on Facebook and Twitter a notably carnivalesque political 
cartoon that grotesquely ridiculed the government of Fayez Tarawneh. 
The political cartoon mocked Prime Minister Tarawneh, who was on a 
mission to oversee the 2013 parliamentary elections and install a 
Chapter 3 Development of Jordanian political humour, 1989–2011          185 
 
 
 
successor. The cartoon, shown below in Figure 3, depicts Tarawneh as 
a ‘blacksmith’ in charge of making a prime minister for Jordan.  
 
Abu Saqer, a Jordanian comic character played by veteran comedian 
Musa Hijazin on television, approaches Tarawneh and asks him for 
more special requirements that would be highly appreciated if included 
in the character of Jordan’s future prime minister. Hijazin says in the 
speech balloon “Please Tarawneh, we need him as tall as Bakhit, his 
eyes as Abdullah Ensour’s, his head as Faisal Fayez’s, his hair as 
Kabariti’s and his lips as Khasawneh’s.” It should be noted that all the 
names mentioned in the cartoon are those of Jordanian former prime 
ministers who were the subject of heated debate over economic and 
political reforms during their tenures. The humour in this cartoon below 
resides on the depiction of the prime minister as a ‘blacksmith.’ Such 
depiction is highly carnivalesque because it helps to challenge the lofty 
image of the prime minister through degradation. Tarawneh (then prime 
minister) is presented as a blacksmith, and the ‘new’ prime minister 
(which Tarawneh is making) is constructed as an ‘iron man’ whose 
mission perhaps is to suppress the protests.  
 
The cartoon was particularly funny for many Jordanians in social media 
spaces because the ‘new’ prime minister should be (according to Abu 
Saqer) a mix and match of the previous prime ministers. It also 
emphasises the widely held belief among Jordanians that the ‘new’ 
prime minister for Jordan is often restored or appointed from previous 
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prime ministers. This regime strategy of recycling and shifting of 
government officials has been the norm in Jordan politics since the 
establishment of the state in 1921. Tarawneh ultimately re-installed 
Ensour to lead the government from October 2012 to June 2016.  
 
The re-appointment of Ensour caused major frustration and 
disappointment for many Jordanians in social media spaces, at a 
revolutionary period that witnessed (in other Arab countries) major 
regime changes, and implementation of new reform programmes. It 
sparked controversy and an unprecedented number of productions of 
carnivalesque political humour and satire against the government in 
Jordanian social media spaces, as chapter 5 of this thesis will show in 
greater depth and detail. It influenced other politically satirical 
productions, such as the internet memes created after the government 
of Ensour implemented austerity measures and increased the prices of 
food, electricity and fuel as part of meeting IMF requirements for 
economic reform and restructuring.            
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Figure 3. Prime Minister Fayez Tarawneh is constructing a ‘new’ prime 
minister for Jordan [Cartoon], Osama Hajjaj, 2012 
 
Third, the rise of Kharabeesh (scribbles) is another hallmark in the 
development of online Jordanian social and political humour after the 
Arab Spring. Kharabeesh is an online Jordanian company that has 
produced many animated cartoons and satirical content tackling 
domestic political issues in Jordan since the 2011 Arab Spring. For 
example, N2O comedy, produced by Kharabeesh in 2011, featured 
notable Jordanian stand-up comedians, such as veteran political 
comedian Nabil Sawalha and emerging stand-up comedian Rajae 
Qawas. The company has also broadcast other important works of 
Ahmad Hassan Al-Zou’bi, including Muni’ fi Es-Seen (Prohibited From 
Being Broadcast in China) and Fatawa Siyassiah (Political Fatwas). At 
the time of writing this thesis, Kharabeesh was followed by more than 
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4,442,664 on Facebook and with 994,469 subscribers on its YouTube 
channel. The rise of Kharabeesh since 2011 gives a clear indication of 
the evolution in Jordanian taste and public engagement with humour 
and satire in social media spaces.  
 
Fourth, the establishment of Jordanian Roya (a private TV channel) in 
2011 gave rise to a new form of liberal media that is different from the 
state-run media outlets. The channel is liked on Facebook by more than 
4,730,465 and is followed by 5,100,802 people. Roya television has 
been highly critical of government discourse and of domestic politics. 
From 2011, it has broadcast a wide range of programmes, including talk 
shows, news bulletins and a considerable number of entertainment and 
comedy shows that have influenced the growth and development of 
online Jordanian humour and satire.  
 
One of the shows which achieved wide popularity among Jordanian 
young people in social media space was Mohammad Laham’s Nukat 
Shawar’ (street jokes). The programme ran from 2011 to 2016. One of 
the most viewed episodes on YouTube was Sabaya 2 (2013), in which 
the presenter asked several female university students about their 
favourite jokes. This episode achieved more than 2,284,579 views on 
YouTube at the time of writing this research (StreetJks, 2013). The 
programme had also featured a wide range of social jokes told in 
Jordanian streets, including jokes about stupidity and naivety, and other 
jokes that are primarily derived from the elements of incongruity and 
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irony. In every episode, Laham (the presenter) visited a Jordanian city 
and asked its inhabitants (usually young people) if they have a joke and 
would like to share it on television. The success of Laham’s street jokes 
is another example to reflect Jordanians’ growing appreciation and 
reception of humour after the Arab Spring, and the developments in 
social media technology.      
 
In post Arab Spring Jordan, humour and satire has a variety of 
functions. It functions as a method of political analysis, and a tool for 
popular resistance and the expression of subversion in social media 
spaces. It has also become a tool for resistance and counter-political 
force (illustrated here with Ahmad Hassan Al-Zou’bi’s politically satirical 
play Al-an Fahemtukum and Osama Hajjaj’s political cartoon in Figure 3 
above). These instances of carnivalesque political humour support the 
usefulness of a Bakhtinian lens, and at the same time, challenge the 
application of Bakhtin because they arise from large scale socio-cultural 
shifts, from dynamism (unlike Bakhtinian carnival). These instances 
emphasise how humour changes with social and political 
developments, and how a political context, such as the Arab Spring, 
can influence the expression certain types of humour against power 
and authority. Nonetheless, Bakhtin’s conception of the carnivalesque 
helps us to think about how humour functions outside the realm of 
power and authority, and how humour can function as a counter-
political force and tool for resistance against power and the 
government.  
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Bakhtin’s theory about carnival is static because it ‘ignores’ social and 
political developments. These omissions and oversights are perhaps 
because he was looking back in time (16th century France). He was 
trying to analyse literature (the works of François Rabelais), not history 
or politics per se. His own political environment felt static and 
unchangeable (life under Stalin’s autocratic rule). To identify these 
omissions, as chapters 4 & 5 will show, is not (of course) to critique 
Bakhtin because he seems not to have considered socio-political 
dynamics, but to consider the development and expansion of his theory 
of carnival and the carnivalesque to understand modern-day carnivals 
in social media spaces.              
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3.6 Conclusion  
This chapter has traced the development of Jordanian political humour 
from the late twentieth century to the present, and then showed that 
some (not all) of it can be considered ‘carnivalesque.’ It has provided a 
detailed analysis of the socio-political and cultural contexts that have 
influenced the development of Jordanian political humour from Jordan’s 
political opening in 1989, through the period of the Gulf War, and finally 
to the start of the Arab Spring, from 2011. It has also analysed how 
humour after 1989 has been used as a tool to satirise and lampoon the 
government and its institutionalised discourse.  
 
I have argued in this chapter that ethnic humour, where the urbanites in 
the capital city Amman make jokes about the people who live in the 
steppe and the hinterlands, is an older type of Jordanian political 
humour and satire. Jordanian ethnic humour is (and always has been) 
‘political’ because it concerns power between different groups. It is used 
by a more empowered (or wealthier or better educated) group to create 
a collective sense of superiority over the ‘other.’ It is important for this 
thesis on Jordanian political humour in the sense that the street 
protests and resistance since 2011 have enabled the dis-or less 
empowered rural people in the Jordanian hinterlands to develop a 
counter-superiority tendency and laugh at the powerful in urban 
centres. The rise of initially gentle and later more subversive political 
humour has, in other words, also permitted the previous ‘victims’ of an 
earlier-established kind of humour (ethnic humour) to ‘shout back’ in a 
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larger and only recently politicised arena at the very powers that used 
(and use) humour to ridicule them in what was formerly a more 
restricted cultural arena. The expansion, literal and metaphorical, of the 
Jordanian comedic arena – its size and scope – seems to underpin and 
at least partially explain the trajectory of political humour and humour 
more generally in Jordan in the last thirty years.            
 
The last section of this chapter explained how the growth of social 
media use in Jordan has created a vast new and ubiquitous space, the 
real-world part of the ‘arena’ mentioned above, for carnivalesque 
political humour that has targeted the government and the weak 
function of Jordan’s parliament as a rubber stamp for the government. 
This chapter demonstrated that Jordanian political humour before the 
Arab Spring and the rise of social media technology was less engaged 
with carnivalesque themes of degradation, the grotesque and the 
temporary and imaginary subversion of political power and authority. 
Before the start of the Arab Spring in 2011, political humour maintained 
a more respectful stance and a tendency to what I have called 
‘affectionate satire’ that ultimately defended power rather than attacking 
it.  
 
In discussing the significance of the implications of the 2011 Arab 
Spring and social media spaces on the development of Jordanian 
political humour and satire, I have demonstrated how carnivalesque 
humour has become a staple of Jordanian culture after the Arab Spring. 
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I have indicated how Jordanian political humour in social media spaces 
has provided an alternative platform, free from government monitoring 
and censorship, for the promotion of socio-political commentary and 
counter-political expression and resistance against the government and 
the establishment. I have found that Jordanian political humour after the 
Arab Spring has created a carnivalesque mood of resistance that has 
utilised and engaged with the carnivalesque themes of degradation, the 
grotesque and the temporary and imaginary subversion of political 
power in social media spaces. The next two chapters will present and 
analyse more examples of these kinds of themes, as a focus on the 
empirical reality of specific examples. Jordanian political humour and 
satire has become more subversive after the Arab Spring. This is due in 
part to the counter-political culture of the Arab Spring, and in large part 
to the nature of social media spaces as free, independent and hard-to-
censor social platforms.   
 
In the next two chapters, I more closely examine politics in Jordanian 
social media spaces in the light of the application of Mikhail Bakhtin’s 
theory of carnival and the carnivalesque. I argue that Bakhtin’s 
‘marketplace’ has become the social media space, and much less the 
streets and conventional public spaces. I draw on examples on acts of 
resistance, digital activism and online collective voices, such as 
hashtags, that users of Jordanian social media spaces have used to 
rally against the government. In chapters 4 & 5, I provide more detailed 
information and discussion about Bakhtin’s theory of carnival and the 
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carnivalesque and its relevance to Jordanian political humour shared in 
social media spaces. The interesting thing to conclude here is that 
ethnic jokes have become less apparent in Jordanian social media 
spaces after the Arab Spring. As argued above, they may have 
diminished because the newly-enlarged comedic arena, which now 
embraces national politics and (most of) its actors, has made them less 
effective, because former victims of ethnic jokes find themselves newly 
empowered by culture and technology to ‘joke truth back to power’. 
Carnivalesque political humour has become more engaged with acts of 
popular resistance against power and government in Jordan since 
2011. It has after the Arab Spring offered therefore a platform, an 
arena, for expressing taboos, whether political, religious or sexual, in 
Jordanian political humour. This arena both like and unlike Bakhtin’s 
carnival square, as the next two chapters will, in detail, show.                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4 Jordanian politics in social media 
spaces   
4.1 Introduction  
In this chapter, I explore Bakhtin’s theory of carnival and the 
carnivalesque as a framework for thinking about Jordanian politics and 
political humour in Jordanian social media spaces. In his book Rabelais 
and his world (1984a), Bakhtin emphasises the significant role of the 
streets and physical public spaces in his theory of carnival and the 
carnivalesque. He argues that all the “feasts of fools” during the Middle 
Ages, after they had been banned from being held in the churches, 
continued to “exist [in larger amounts] in the streets and in taverns, 
where they were absorbed into carnival merriment and amusements” 
(Bakhtin, 1984a, p. 74). In the socio-political context of Jordan after the 
Arab Spring and the exponential growth in the use of social media 
spaces, I argue that social media spaces have become the new 
‘carnival squares’, replacing to a large extent the streets and 
conventional public spaces. Many people in Jordanian social media 
spaces have enthusiastically used (and continue to use) social media 
platforms such as Facebook, Twitter and YouTube for socialising, and 
most importantly in the context of this thesis as places for political 
mobilisation challenging the government’s rhetoric about reform and its 
processes of change.                     
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Taking a series of examples from Jordanian social media spaces, I 
demonstrate that Jordanian social media spaces are in many ways just 
as carnivalesque as the ‘marketplace’ of Bakhtin’s Medieval France, 
characterised by polyphony, the overturning of social hierarchies and 
the presence of dialogism (and monologism) and the grotesque. This 
online carnivalesque political humour and satire challenge social and 
political structures and attempt to undermine the power of government 
and official figures by using ridicule and irony.  
 
As set out in chapter 1, we might think about the use of Facebook 
groups, WhatsApp groups and hashtags on Facebook or Twitter as a 
medium for self-promotion and for creating social groups, collective 
voices and solidarity among carnival-goers online. Although modern-
day carnivals in social media spaces are about individual presence and 
expression, the mode of carnivals has tended to emphasise social and 
community participation. (The audience is now the act.) This brings into 
the discussion the significance of Freud when we think about Jordanian 
politics in social media spaces. Bakhtin is useful when we talk about 
collective groups and resistance and Freud is useful when we talk 
about individual voices and reactions (often behind pseudonyms) in 
social media spaces. Social media spaces, I argue, can be considered 
both individual and collective at the same time (we might think of the 
use of a hashtag to show this).   
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In the final section of this chapter, I identify some areas of contention 
and problems in the application of Bakhtin’s theory of carnival and the 
carnivalesque to the Jordanian socio-political context after the Arab 
Spring. These problems include, but are not limited to, (1) Bakhtin’s 
conception of carnival as a utopian experience and an overwhelmingly 
positive act (or performance) that brings people together against power, 
(2) the representation of the population as ‘social groups’ who are 
collectively united and interconnected, (3) the absence of women in the 
carnival square, and (4) the extent to which the carnivalesque can be 
considered as an ‘effective’ counter-political force and tool for popular 
resistance against power and authority.  
4.2 Jordanian street protests 
In the socio-political context of Jordan after the Arab Spring, we might 
think of Bakhtin’s use and elucidation of carnival to mean a literal space 
(an actual town space) or a ‘metaphorical’ space where the ‘square’ just 
means any space in which carnivalesque behaviour happens. As a 
metaphorical carnival place, we might think of the mosque, which for 
many years since the Arab Spring has been used a carnivalesque 
space that allows heteroglossia (the presence of two or more voices) 
that unite and bring Jordanian protesters together, irrespective of their 
class, gender and origin. Jordanian mosques, such as the Grand 
Husseini Mosque in central Amman has been used since the time of the 
Arab Spring as an assembly point after each Friday prayer to express 
views against the government’s rhetoric about economic and political 
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reform and its processes of change. Although religious spaces are 
quintessentially considered monologic, the specific context of the 
mosque in the recent Jordanian protests has demonstrated some of its 
carnivalesque and heteroglossic properties. In Jordan, the mosque is 
not just a place of worship, but rather a primary space for education, 
teaching the Islamic sharia and group meetings, and a place for 
donations and helping the needy during the holy month of Ramadan.  
 
In discussing the Arab-Islamic context, we might think of Friday midday 
prayer (congregational prayer), Hajj (pilgrimage), Eid (festival) and 
Ramadan (the month of fasting and spiritual connection with God) as 
potential ‘carnival times.’ These religious rituals demonstrate some 
elements of Bakhtin’s carnival because these religious celebrations are 
collective activities, filled with an extreme amount of enjoyment, and 
characterised by the overall suspension of normal activities and 
routines. From this perspective, we might think of other carnivalesque 
festive activities at the mosque, such as hosting Iftar (the evening meal 
that breaks fasting during Ramadan), Suhoor (the dawn meal before 
fasting in Ramadan), Tarawih (additional prayers at night time during 
Ramadan), I‘tikaf (the practice of staying at the mosque especially in 
the last ten days of Ramadan). Sometimes, during times of domestic 
unrest and wars, the mosque can be considered as a political space for 
grouping and unifying people against an enemy. It can also be 
considered as a socio-political ‘safety valve’ for everyday life pressures 
built up in other spaces, such as home or the workplace. In the field of 
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community building, the mosque can also reflect a perfect example of 
the ‘third place’ for both men and women to congregate away from 
home (first place) and the workplace (second place). The mosque, in 
the context of the Jordanian socio-political context after the Arab 
Spring, has played an important role in Jordanian street protests 
against power and the government. All Jordanian protests have so far 
occurred after Friday prayers when people have time and place to 
converge together into groups and take into the streets.  
 
In the Jordanian socio-political context after the Arab Spring, we might 
think of the following physical public squares as occasional ‘carnival 
squares’: first, Gamal Abdel Nasser Square, which is also better known 
among the Jordanian public as Diwar Ad-Dakhiliyyeh (the Ministry of 
Interior's Roundabout); second, the Fourth Circle, which is a metonymy 
for the prime minister’s office and other government institutions; third, 
the Jordan Hospital Plaza, which is located in the vicinity of the prime 
minister’s office in Amman; fourth, and most recently, the vicinity of the 
Royal Hashemite Court, where young Jordanian people have recently 
used this exceptionally ‘private’ space to protest against unemployment 
and marginalisation.  
 
The 2011–12 Jordanian protests occurred after the Friday Prayer at 
Diwar Ad-Dakhiliyyeh, while the 2018 protests were staged at night 
during the holy month of Ramadan at the Fourth Circle. After the 
government banned protests gathered at the Fourth Circle in late 2018, 
Chapter 4 Jordanian politics in social media spaces                                     200 
 
 
 
young Jordanian protesters continue (at the time of writing this thesis) 
to gather in weekends every Thursday evenings and Fridays at the 
Jordan Hospital Plaza near the prime minister’s office at the Fourth 
Circle, to protest against the government’s economic austerity 
measures and its negative impacts on people. From February 2019, 
young Jordanian protesters have taken a big step up from their 
previous series of street protests against the government and 
converged at the vicinity of the Royal Hashemite Court to demand 
employment. This movement has been unprecedented in the political 
history of Jordan.  
 
These four public ‘squares’ were sometimes used by protestors as 
‘carnival sites’ and places for rallies against the government, political 
critique and modes of popular resistance. In these public and private 
squares, protestors who were (are) mostly young people who comprise 
around two-thirds of Jordan’s population) chant anti-government 
slogans and fly high humorous placards to voice their anger over the 
government’s economic reform, and its negative impact on the poor and 
living standards. For example, one much circulated placard shows the 
map of Jordan as a dairy cow with a line that reads ‘Jordan is not a 
dairy cow’. In Bakhtin’s terms, these protestors are ‘social groups’ who 
are collectively unified and united against the government’s rhetoric 
about economic reform and its processes of change.     
 
Chapter 4 Jordanian politics in social media spaces                                     201 
 
 
 
The Arab Spring in Jordan gave rise to a new ‘social group’ involved in 
civil resistance and popular mobilisation that collectively became known 
as the Hirak (the protest movement). The members of this social group 
were commonly referred to as the Harakis (street activists). This social 
group consisted primarily of young Jordanian people from various 
Transjordanian tribes and towns in the hinterlands, such as Madaba 
and At-Tafilah. Those people used to gather at Diwar Ad-Dakhiliyyeh in 
central Amman every weekend in Fridays from 2011 to call for the 
implementation of genuine economic and political reform programmes. 
If compared to the organised political street marches by members of 
Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood (the main opposition party in Jordan, 
with a Palestinian origin and orientation), the Hirak protests were largely 
from Transjordanian nationals and were more spontaneous and reform-
oriented but they lacked effective leadership. The protests held by 
people who took to the streets in Jordan during and after the Arab 
Spring were largely peaceful and non-violent. They have never (so far) 
called for the change of regime or encouraged revolution against the 
Hashemite monarchy. Rather much of the street protests in Jordan 
have called (and continue to call) for economic and political reform and 
against austerity measures backed by the IMF. In the socio-political 
context of Jordan after the Arab Spring, the ‘carnival of protest’ seemed 
to have gained its greater force from social media spaces, and much 
less the streets and conventional public spaces because of constant 
social media connectivity in our social media age.    
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4.3 Jordanian social media activists  
Jordanian social media spaces can be considered in many ways 
‘carnivalesque’, characterised by polyphony, the overturning of social 
hierarchies and the presence of the grotesque. Jordanian social media 
spaces have been used by individual young people and protestors as a 
platform to challenge social and political structures, initiate strike 
actions and, through online satirical activism, undermine government 
control and power. From this perspective, we might therefore think of 
social media spaces, in addition to the streets, as the new ‘carnival 
square’ albeit with some carnivalesque qualities that go (unsurprisingly) 
beyond Bakhtin’s concept of the nature of the carnival in the ‘actual’ 
carnival square in the streets. For many Jordanians after the Arab 
Spring, the mode of protest is now provided by posts, comments and 
hashtag activism on social media platforms, primarily by Facebook, 
Twitter, YouTube and WhatsApp, and much less the streets and 
material public spaces.  
 
During the 2018 protests that led on 4 June 2018 to the overthrow of 
Hani Al-Mulki’s government, some members of the Jordanian online 
community (mainly on Facebook and Twitter) initiated several popular 
satirical hashtags to act against the government, following the proposal 
to implement a new tax bill and increases in the prices of fuel and 
electricity. These popular hashtags on Facebook and Twitter included, 
but are not limited to: #الدوار_الرابع (the fourth circle), #معناش_وبدناش (we do 
not have and we do not want), #مش_ساكتين (we will not be silent), 
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 park it [car] and switch it) صفها_واطفيها# ,(people’s Thursday) خميس_الشعب#
off), #اضراب_االردن (Jordan’s strike), #هاجر_يا_قتيبة (leave the country, 
Qutaiba) and many more. These hashtag activisms can be both 
individual and collective moments of popular resistance against the 
government and its reform programmes. These politically satirical 
hashtags have been very active and used by many individual 
Jordanians on social media platforms as a tool to challenge government 
decisions, express resentment and frustration, and often to poke fun at 
the increasingly neoliberal government policy: price and tax hikes, and 
austerity measures backed by the IMF. Some Jordanian users in social 
media users have been actively engaged with these hashtags to 
increase their online participation and commentary on the government’s 
rhetoric about reform and decisions. Amongst the most prominent 
Jordanian commentators and humourists in social media spaces are Dr 
Maen Qatamin, Ahmad Hassan Al-Zou’bi and Musa Hijazin. Their social 
media spaces and have attracted the attention of tens of thousands of 
Jordanian people on social media platforms since the time of the Arab 
Spring in Jordan.    
4.3.1 Maen Qatamin  
Maen Qatamin (b. 1968–) is a famous Jordanian economic analyst and 
political activist from the Jordanian town At-Tafilah in the south west of 
Jordan. He considers himself as an opponent to the government’s 
economic and administrative approach from 2016. Qatamin completed 
his PhD is investment from the University of Warwick, UK in 1998. He 
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then lived and worked in the United Arab Emirates for many years 
before his return to Jordan in 2014 to serve for a short period of time as 
the private office manager for Prime Minister Abdullah Ensour but 
resigned abruptly the same year.  
 
Qatamin has acquired a certain fame on Jordanian social media spaces 
for his short videos that analyse Jordan’s weak economy and the 
mismanagement of former and incumbent governments on dealing with 
economic reform programmes and protest demands. In one video (see 
the still in Figure 4 below), posted on 16 January 2019, Qatamin 
ridiculed the recent government’s decision that mitigated price 
increases and dropped the prices of more than 60 items that had been 
seen by the government as ‘essentially important for living’ in Jordan. 
By this government decision, he argued that the incumbent government 
of Omar Razzaz (in office since June 2018) deceived the public, 
because the list contains blatantly unnecessary food items, such as 
snakes, turtles, and other luxurious foods.  
 
Qatamin’s style and mode of analysis are based on factual analysis of 
statistics and government-released reports. He uses quite simple 
infographics to convey his message directly to the Jordanian public. 
Many Jordanians on social media spaces often like, comment and 
share Qatamin’s Facebook posts and videos on their social media 
spaces to achieve a maximum impact. This is evident from the number 
of likes, comments, shares and views of Qatamin’s videos (see Figure 4 
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below). Qatamin’s style is noted for its innovation, and it has a strong 
impact on the formation of public opinion in Jordan (as seen from 
people’s interaction with his videos in Jordanian social media spaces). 
He often uses deadpan humour to ridicule the government’s rhetoric 
about economic reform and renaissance after the Arab Spring. In 
Bakhtin’s terms, Qatamin’s videos are ‘carnivalesque’ because they aim 
to attack and expose the shortcomings of established power and 
highlight public attitudes towards that power.  
 
 
Figure 4. A still of Maen Qatamin’s Facebook post ‘Turtles, snakes and 
others’ [Video file], 2019 
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4.3.2 Ahmad Hassan Al-Zou’bi  
Ahmad Hassan Al-Zou’bi (b. 1975–) is a well-known Jordanian social 
and political satirist from the Jordanian town of Ar-Ramtha in the north 
west of Jordan. Al-Zou’bi studied in Jordan and completed his first 
degree in accounting from Jerash Private University in 1998. He rose to 
prominence in 2004 when he started writing for the state-owned 
newspaper Al Ra’I (The Opinion). His political satirical column Sawaleif 
(parables) addresses many social and political problems in a very ironic 
way. Al-Zou’bi is most famous for his politically satirical play Al-an 
Fahemtukum (Now I Understand You, 2011). The play was inspired by 
the Tunisian President Zine El- Abidine Ben Ali’s famously cynical 
quote when he proclaimed, in his last televised speech, that he had 
listened to the people’s public demands and was ready to make 
concessions. The play is available on YouTube and at the time of 
writing in this thesis in 2019 it had been viewed by 4,589,207 people. 
Al-Zou’bi is also famous for his satirical YouTube show Man-saf Baladi 
(malapropism of Mansaf, a traditional Jordanian dish) that resembles in 
style Jon Stewart’s news satire television programme The Daily Show, 
where he often pokes fun at government decisions and officials. Man-
saf Baladi’s Facebook page has, at the time of writing this thesis, 
74,320 followers and 61,024 likes. The popularity of this Facebook 
page tells us about humour and its broader political impacts on 
Jordanian social media spaces after the Arab Spring.  
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In the information provided in his online Sawaleif news website, Al-
Zou’bi states that the purpose of his satirical website is to attempt to 
erase the glorious aura and shadow that surrounds the life of a mas’ul 
(government official) who often sees himself as an idol who is believed 
to be worshipped by people. He continues his description of the website 
as an alternative platform for those people who feel they are 
marginalised and whose voices are not heard by authorities. Such 
description, I argue, demonstrates a carnivalesque theme of 
degradation because it challenges the power of authority and its 
hegemonic discourse. This is evident from the information provided in 
the website under the category “who we are.”  
We began ‘thinking’ about the creation of Sawaleif news 
website in early 2007 as an alternative media against the 
mainstream mass media. We want this website to serve as 
platform that allows satire and criticism as well as a platform 
for the publication of articles that have been banned from 
circulation. We want the website as a ‘resistant’ and 
‘collective’ platform that uses the same language that is being 
consumed by ordinary people in neighbourhoods. We want 
the website to trivialise things and actions in addition to 
eliminate the aura that hedges the life of a mas’ul 
(government official) in Jordan (www.sawaleif.com).  
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4.3.3 Musa Hijazin  
Musa Hijazin (b. 1955–) is a veteran Jordanian comedian and actor 
from the Jordanian town Al-Karak in the south west of Jordan. He 
studied in Egypt and graduated with a first degree in music from the 
University of Helwan in late 1970s. Hijazin started his professional 
career in music and acting in the early 1980s and was noted for his two 
comic characters: Som’a and Abu Saqer (the father of Saqer). Abu 
Saqer is a fictional character and is presented as a retired combatant 
from the army who behaves towards others with a strict military style 
that evokes humour. Som’a is another comic character and is 
presented as a naive person who lacks experience of life and trusts 
other people, including government officials, too easily.  
 
In the politically satirical play Al-an Fahemtukum, Abu Saqer is 
presented as a Jordanian father whose family decides to rebel against 
his ‘dictatorship’ and strict family rules (The state is represented as a 
family that is controlled under a patriarchal system). This family 
revolution is designed to resemble that of the Tunisian revolution that 
removed President Ben Ali from power in early 2011. Hijazin’s two 
comic characters: Som’a and Abu Saqer, which have attracted the 
attention of many Jordanians in social media platforms, such as 
WhatsApp, Facebook, Twitter and YouTube. According to the 
information available on Hijazin’s verified Facebook page (موسى حجازين - 
Musa Hijazin), the comic characters of Som’a and Abu Saqer are 
designed to represent the largest segment of Jordanian society. These 
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two characters embody the image of an oppressed man whose rights 
have been stolen by the state. They represent the struggle for dignity 
for each Jordanian. In other words, they depict, in detail, the stumbling 
daily life and suffering of each Jordanian citizen.  
 
In one YouTube video entitled Som’a is a Jordanian refugee in Jordan, 
uploaded to YouTube on 5 January 2016, Som’a is shown disguised 
and seen queuing with several Syrian refugees at the front door of the 
Canadian Embassy in Amman, Jordan (Takarub, 2016). In this satirical 
video clip, Abu Saqer approaches Som’a and asks him why he looks 
Syrian in clothes and accent. Som’a told Abu Saqer about his hidden 
intentions to apply for asylum visa to travel to Canada, considering the 
new fact that Som’a is now a Syrian refugee in Jordan. Figure 5 below 
explains the above characteristics and shows Som’a (left) in a 
traditional Syrian-Shami’s (Damascene) dress at the front on what it 
looks like a Canadian Embassy in Amman, Jordan. The humour of this 
video resides in Som’a being both a Jordanian national and a Jordanian 
refugee in Jordan.    
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Figure 5. A still of Musa Hijazin’s comedy sketch ‘Som’a is a Jordanian 
refugee in Jordan’ [Video file], 2016 
 
To conclude, Jordanian social media spaces have become a venue for 
‘the carnivalesque’ that underpins young activists’ initiatives against the 
government’s rhetoric about the economy and its processes, and most 
importantly, against the IMF requirements that have increased austerity 
measures and taxes. The carnivalesque style of this online activism has 
often emphasised the deconstruction of socio-political relationships, 
including those between young people activists and the Jordanian 
government. It has highlighted the crisis of mistrust between the 
Jordanian citizen and the government. This latter theme has reflected in 
the polarisation of the relationship between the government and people.  
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Jordanian people in the streets, and predominantly in social media 
spaces, have become aware of one aspect of government discourse: if 
it confirms or denies something, this often understood to mean that the 
opposite is true. For many Jordanians, the ‘truth’ has thus now come to 
refer to any prevailing ‘rumour’ that has been denied by the 
government. In addition to mistrust in government, many Jordanians 
have no confidence in the role and function of parliament before the 
government. The Jordanian government has almost never been 
challenged by its House of Parliament. For many Jordanians, the role of 
parliament is to function as a ‘rubber stamp’ for the government. 
Consider, for example, Jordan-IMF deals (since 1989), the significant 
increase of prices of food and taxes (since 2012), and the Jordan-Israel 
gas deal (signed in 2016). From 2011, members of the House of 
Parliament have thus become the subject of an increasing amount of 
ridicule and mockery in post Arab Spring Jordanian political humour in 
Jordanian social media spaces, as the discussion in chapter 5 shows.                                    
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4.4 The applicability of Bakhtinian theories  
The Bakhtinian theory of carnival is connected to a number of other 
Bakhtinian theories and ideas: dialogism (and monologism) and the 
grotesque. These two concepts, I argue, are highly relevant to Bakhtin's 
carnival and Jordanian politics in many ways. In Jordan, policy in theory 
aims to reopen dialogue with the people, and promotes themes of 
freedom of speech and transparency, but in reality, the government is 
re-emphasising its monologic discourse and crackdown on critics.   
4.4.1 Dialogism   
In Problems of Dostoevsky's poetics (1984b), Bakhtin analysed the 
works of Dostoevsky from his philosophical perspectives. He proposed 
two notions about language: dialogism (as an opposite of monologism 
which asserts one’s voice) and polyphony (multiple voices). According 
to Bakhtin, monologism refers to any discourse that “denies the 
existence of outside itself and pretends to be the ultimate word” 
(Bakhtin, 1984b, p. 293). In her book The Bakhtinian reader (1994), 
Pam Morris argues that monologism is a typical discursive feature of 
authoritarian regimes (Morris, 1994, p. 247). Dialogism (as Bakhtin 
views it) is better explained in the context of polyphony which allows the 
multiplicity of voices. Bakhtin conceptualises dialogism in the context of 
everyday life and human experiences which are based on active 
dialogues, interactions and civic engagements between people. These 
utterances are communal; they are made by all members in a carnival 
square.  
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Dialogism (and monologism) are among the Bakhtin’s ideas about 
language that can be applied not only in novels, but also in other forms 
of literature and life experiences. Bakhtin considers the carnivalesque 
element of ‘truth’ as an opposite of the official monologism, which 
reflects, in principle, the “ready-made truth,” that is composed by official 
authority (Bakhtin, 1984b, p. 110). According to Bakhtin, truth is thus 
“not to be found inside the head of an individual person, it is born 
between people [who are] collectively searching for truth, in the process 
of their dialogic interactions” (Bakhtin, 1984b, p. 110). The 
acknowledgement of other voices is therefore the main feature of 
dialogism as well as the carnivalistic life and literature more generally. 
Dialogism, in its basic value and definition, generates and develops 
new meanings outside the monologic world of the first-person ‘I.’ It 
always “creates something that never existed before, something 
absolutely new and unrepeatable” (Bakhtin, 1986, pp. 119–120). The 
Bakhtinian description of dialogism suggests its dynamism in 
comparison to the state of inertia that characterises monologism.    
 
In his theory of carnival, Bakhtin explains that the development of 
discourse in societies began with ‘monoglossia,’ that is characterised by 
a unified language discourse, and then shifted to ‘polyglossia’ that 
engages two or more discourses in the same society, and finally 
‘heteroglossia,’ which shows conflict between the official and nonofficial 
discourses (Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevsky’s poetics, 1984b). From 
this perspective, Bakhtin considers Dostoevsky's work as a perfect 
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example to reflect the state of heteroglossia. He notes that 
Dostoevsky’s work contains many different voices, unmerged into a 
single perspective, and not subordinated to the voice of the author. 
Each of these voices has its own perspectives, its own validity, and its 
own narrative weight within the novel. According to Robinson (2011a, 
para. 8), Dostoevsky’s works are one of the best examples to reflect the 
multiplicity of voices and viewpoints in a text, as summarised here:   
The author [in Dostoevsky’s novels] does not place his own 
narrative voice between the character and the reader, but rather, 
allows characters to shock and subvert. It is thus as if the books 
were written by multiple characters, and not a single author’s 
standpoint. [Therefore] instead of a single objective world [that is] 
held by the author’s monologist voice, there is a plurality of 
consciousnesses, each with its own world. The reader does not 
see a single reality presented by the author, but rather, how reality 
appears to each character. 
 
Dostoevsky’s novels, as Robinson (2011a, para. 9) analyses them 
appear as “an interaction of distinct perspectives and ideologies borne 
by the different characters. The characters can speak for themselves, 
even against the author; it is as if the ‘other’ speaks directly through the 
text. Therefore, the role of the author is fundamentally changed, 
because the author can no longer monopolise the ‘power to mean’”. 
Bakhtin extends his analysis of dialogism through his elucidation of the 
concept of heteroglossia. In his book The dialogical imagination (1981), 
he focuses on the construction of ‘different-speech-ness’ which reflects 
viewpoints that are combined in a text. Bakhtin defines heteroglossia as 
“another’s speech in another’s language”. This explanation serves to 
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express “authorial intentions, but in a refracted way” (Bakhtin, 1986, p. 
324). Bakhtin identifies the direct authorial voice, which often arises 
from a monologist point of view rather than the dialogue between 
characters, as one of the primary challenges of heteroglossia in novel-
writing.  
 
Bakhtin criticises the work of Ferdinand de Saussure which views 
language as a product of a ‘closed system’ (Robinson, 2011a, para. 
31). Bakhtin sees such views as biased and involved in the 
configuration of a ‘unified language’ that serves the interests of 
centralised power. For example, the ‘standard’ language (such as 
Standard English or Standard Arabic) that is used in most formal 
speeches of the elite. Furthermore, the kind of Arabic that is used in folk 
humour is different from the ‘standard’ language that is used in news 
and newspapers. Such an elevation of the language of the elite and the 
hegemonic power is doomed to curb the heteroglossia of everyday 
informal speeches. Everyday speeches are thus commanded to comply 
with ‘official style’ to recognise that privilege and the “closed-off speech-
community” (Robinson, 2011a, para. 32). In Marxist ideology, this 
potential closure of language is associated with the power of the elite 
who are controlling the culture of that society, so that their imposed 
culture becomes the norm of that society. This is reminiscent of Antonio 
Gramsci's cultural hegemony theory, which views the elite class as the 
dominant social group over other classes.  
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One aspect of this analysis of heteroglossia is Bakhtin’s theory of 
speech genres. In Speech genres and other late essays (1986), Bakhtin 
defines ‘speech genres’ as the construction of specific language forms 
and particular conventional norms in a specific sphere or context. 
These speech genres embed particular social values, perceptions and 
decisions, as well as a set of time-space references (known in Bakhtin’s 
terms as ‘chronotopes’). In this context, the use of folk humour is often 
permitted, but it should conform to some uses and vocabularies that are 
deemed harmless. An example of a speech-genre would now be the 
social media spaces. Things must be said in certain ways in social 
media platforms such as Twitter. The word count, for example, is limited 
in Twitter so that each tweet tends to be sometimes more concise than 
the use of everyday language in general. Differences in speech genres 
(as I understand it) often limit what can be said within a discourse in a 
particular way.  
 
In the economic context of Jordan after the Arab Spring revolutions, we 
might think of the government’s neoliberal rhetoric about reform as a 
perfect and salient example of Bakhtin’s monologism. The nature of the 
government discourse and articulation sounds as if the direction of 
government reform, and therefore its rhetoric, reinforces or even 
strengthens economic inequalities. It thereby maintains existing social 
and political inequalities too. These possible effects of the government’s 
rhetoric make that rhetoric ‘monologistic’ in the sense that discourse 
was implemented despite popular outrage and protests. For example, 
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the government, in late 2018, endorsed a new tax bill that fights, in 
principle, tax evasion and tax exemption, but it has in reality imposed 
taxes on middle and poor classes. Economic liberalism in Jordan has 
grossly increased austerity measures, privatisation and price hikes, and 
not economic equality and successes.  
 
Quite often, the government discourse about economic reform and the 
IMF requirements are constructed around the assertion of a ‘non-
debatable demand,’ sometimes analysed as a fundamental rejection of 
dialogue and dynamism. In many ways, the government, for most 
Jordanians, is an epitome of monologism, and the King and the Queen 
are epitomes of dialogism. The government is insisting on IMF 
requirements and implementation of austerity measures even if these 
decisions have negative impacts on the poor and on the overall quality 
of life for most Jordanians.  
 
In addition to economic inequalities, parliamentary elections in Jordan 
(from 1993 to 2013) were held under a ‘one-man, one-vote’ electoral 
system. In Bakhtin’s terms, voting under this disproportionate electoral 
system can be considered monologist in the sense that it had enforced 
gerrymandering politics and an overall official discourse that favoured 
Transjordanian nationals from the hinterland over the majority of 
Jordanians of Palestinian origin in urban areas. The impact of electoral 
system has demonstrated a degree of façade reform that takes place in 
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Jordan, and the consequent governments have done little to reform 
Jordan’s elections laws.     
 
In the political context of Jordan after the Arab Spring revolutions, the 
state media can be considered another example of monologism in the 
sense that it often conforms to the limitations imposed by the 
government. In post-independence Jordan, the state media was 
harnessed by the government to promote the native Jordanian cultural 
and media productions. For example, the Bedouin life and culture were 
set to define and later promote tourism in Jordan (Massad, 2001, p. 74). 
Other differences in ethnic, linguistic, and cultural identities were 
marginalised in the state media to impose Modern Standard Arabic (first 
national language) and English (foreign language) as the defining 
languages of Jordan.  
 
From its inception in 1968, the Jordan Radio and Television 
Corporation was designed to celebrate and reflect the government’s 
unilateral discourse. Therefore, state radio and television grew as a 
government-controlled forum that has distanced itself from any dialogic 
programmes and/or critical discussions that attempt to challenge the 
government’s discourse and power. Some young people in Jordan 
therefore grew (albeit reluctantly) alienated from the state media and its 
productions. Perhaps this might explain how social media spaces (as 
an alternative and dialogic forums) have empowered young Jordanians 
after the Arab Spring to act against the government’s hegemonic 
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discourse after the emergence of social media technologies in the last 
decade.  
 
However, we can think of dialogism when King Abdullah responded to 
the Arab Spring protests in Jordan and sacked several governments 
following the ‘Jordanian Spring’ in 2011. The King responded to the 
protests and placated the protesters when he embarked on a reforming 
policy of the regime from above. In the context of post Arab Spring 
Jordan, we can also think about dialogism in respect of the growing, 
dynamic dialogue between the government and people on the internet. 
Over the last few years, the government has significantly enhanced its 
e-government services and now has a social media presence.  
 
For the first time in the country’s political history, Prime Minister Omar 
Razzaz has both a public Facebook page (Omar M. Razzaz  الدكتور عمر
 and a verified Twitter account (@OmarRazzaz), where he often (الرزاز
posts (or tweets) and sometimes interacts with people online. One time, 
he responded to a Jordanian university student named Qutaiba 
Bashabsheh and urged him not to leave the country and do not think 
about going abroad, as Jordan is now on the threshold of a new age 
and renaissance. This response has influenced a large number of 
humorous posts and comments in Jordanian social media spaces as 
evident in the hashtag above #هاجر_يا_قتيبة (leave the country, Qutaiba).  
 
Chapter 4 Jordanian politics in social media spaces                                     220 
 
 
 
Since he came into office, Prime Minister Razzaz has also initiated two 
government ‘dialogic’ social media accounts on Twitter: @HaggakJO 
(your right to know), as a platform to fight rumours and false news, and 
@Bekhedmetkom (a platform that serves you). These two accounts 
have aimed to re-open dialogue with the government where the citizen 
has the right to ask and the government has a duty to respond. 
Although these accounts can (but not always) function as dialogic 
spaces between the government and the people, they have not been 
particularly popular among many Jordanians in the streets and on 
social media spaces. My reading is that perhaps some people think of 
these accounts as government platforms designed to urge the 
Jordanian public to believe the government's ‘monologistic’ discourse 
and therefore think about the ‘ultimate’ version of its truth.               
 
Dialogism in Jordanian politics can also be demonstrated in a number 
of royal reform initiatives, such as the launch of dialogue activities from 
2011 to inform people about politics, including Jordan’s electoral laws 
as a means to enhance the role of political parties and thereby social 
inclusion after the Arab Spring. In the education sector, however, 
Queen Rania’s initiatives, such as Madrasati (My School, from 2008) 
and Edraak (Realisation, from 2014) have focused on the reforming of 
the traditional education system and improvement of learning 
environments in Jordanian public schools in the last decade. In these 
royal initiatives, the Queen has advocated for the abandonment of the 
power of the teacher as ‘knower’ of curriculum; instead, she has 
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promoted a student-centred approach that creates a ‘multi-voiced’ 
education system that puts students at the heart of the education 
process in Jordanian public schools. This approach to education has 
emphasised the role of individual agency and demanded dialogism to 
contextualise learning in a relational, more dynamic and creative way. 
In Bakhtin’s terms, the Jordanian government wants to give the 
impression of being dialogic, but in fact it is the royal initiatives that are 
calling for being dialogic interactions and being open with the people. 
The government has, however, re-emphasised its monologic discourse 
and cracks down on critics, as demonstrated above.   
4.4.2 The grotesque  
Grotesque imagery is a central theme to Bakhtin’s theory of carnival 
and the carnivalesque. Such images comprise one of the most 
essential elements of Bakhtin’s carnival. In Bakhtin’s terms, grotesque 
imagery is basically influenced by the notion of ‘degradation,’ which is 
“the lowering of all that is high, spiritual, ideal, abstract to the material 
level” (Bakhtin, 1984a, p. 19). These grotesque images celebrate 
transgression, incompleteness and debasement to disrupt expectations. 
In his analysis of Rabelais and carnival during the Middle Ages, Bakhtin 
argues that the tales of Gargantua and Pantagruel, two giants, are an 
example here. In grotesque realism, the carnival world is associated 
with the lower body functions, such as eating, drinking, defecation, 
urination, birth, regeneration and so on.  
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In the context of Jordanian political humour and satire after the Arab 
Spring, we might think of political cartoons, internet memes and satirical 
television news programmes as some of the best examples of uses of 
grotesque imagery. Some government politicians and officials are 
portrayed in a way that is filled with exaggeration and hyperbole that 
degrade their personalities. They are presented as ‘giants’ with 
deformed and large face qualities and big buttocks. Consider, for 
example, the political cartoons of Emad Hajjaj, Osama Hajjaj and Omar 
Abdallat as examples of uses of grotesque imagery in Jordanian social 
media spaces. Some Figures in chapter 5 of this thesis show these 
grotesque qualities.  
 
In his politically satirical YouTube show Man-saf Baladi (read ‘who 
robbed my homeland’, not as Mansaf), Jordan’s most famous socio-
political satirist Ahmad Hassan Al-Zou’bi creates some of the best 
examples of such grotesque imagery. In the introductory animation of 
the comic show, the view of the inside of a mouth suggests the 
grotesque in Bakhtinian terms. The mouth contains more food than 
actually would be possible. The national dish (Mansaf) is there 
metaphorically to connote gluttony and greed. Spittle (a bodily fluid), 
which is dribbling out of the mouth as it closes, suggests a greedy elite 
who robbed the country in the same way that Jordanians excess in 
overeating the Mansaf. The promotional trailer shows quite a lot of 
other satirical visual metaphors, such as the reduction in the availability 
of oil (smaller oil containers), increases in the prices of electricity and 
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bread, as well as censorship on literary expression, as shown in the 
image of a pen in a cage. In Jordanian political humour after the Arab 
Spring, the use of interaction between the body and food has been a 
key part and a component of carnivalesque politics and thus of 
carnivalesque political humour and satire in social media spaces.  
 
Modern carnival in the context of online and televisual Jordanian 
humour satire draws upon similar sources of counter-power, albeit 
mainly using entirely modern technologies. However, this approach has 
been challenged by the appropriation of such technologies by some of 
the powerful, and their monologism. This appropriation can even be 
cleverly disguised as dialogism because of its use of seemingly dialogic 
tools, for example Facebook and Twitter. However, the lack of 
enthusiasm for such monologism ‘dressed up as dialogism’ stands as 
evidence for an ongoing, popular appetite for ‘truly’ dialogic or even 
polyphonic carnivalesque resistance in Jordanian social media spaces 
after the Arab Spring.                
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4.5 Problems of the Bakhtinian carnival                
Despite the universality and wide applicability of Bakhtin’s ideas in 
cross-cultural contexts, Bakhtinian thoughts about carnival are full of 
controversies. This is perhaps because he was writing about an idea of 
16th century France and using, at the same time, a method of coded 
criticism to talk about the cultural politics and regime repression in the 
Soviet Union during Stalin’s reign. There is a heated debate and 
controversial dispute among literary and cultural theory scholars about 
whether Bakhtin was writing under the influence of Karl Marx to avoid 
communist censorship (Emerson, 1994, p. 302). This argument is valid 
and largely apparent when we think about Bakhtin’s critique of 
monologism, as opposite to dialogism.  
 
Bakhtin’s theory about carnival may seem static because it ‘ignores’ 
social and political developments. At first glance, this theory of carnival 
may seem ecologically invalid and even ethically questionable for the 
study of non-western empirical texts, such as Jordanian political 
humour and satire. Bakhtin’s cultural context is Medieval Europe and 
the Renaissance, and his analysis of carnival focused exclusively on 
16th century France and the works of François Rabelais. The specificity 
of that context needs to be taken into account when talking about the 
limitations that affect the application of Bakhtin’s theory of carnival to 
Jordan in the 21st century (notably, after the creation of IT and the 
internet), and the distinctiveness of the Jordanian socio-political climate 
after the Arab Spring. Nonetheless, Bakhtin’s theory of carnival is still 
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highly relevant. It provides a very useful reference point for thinking 
about the many forms of political humour and satire that have been 
disseminated in Jordanian social media spaces since the Arab Spring. 
In this final section of the chapter, I focus on some of the problems and 
some of the weaknesses associated with the application of Bakhtin’s 
theory of carnival and the carnivalesque to the Jordanian socio-political 
context after the Arab Spring, in terms of the followings: (1) the 
carnival’s overall positivity, (2) the idealisation of the populace who are 
participating in the carnival, (3) the question of women in the carnival 
square, and (4) the incarnation of the carnivalesque as an ‘effective’ 
tool for popular resistance against power and authority. 
 
First, Bakhtin describes carnival as an overwhelmingly positive act (or 
experience). He argues that the concept of carnival envisions the 
people participating in the carnival as “a unified [and] subordinate entity, 
whose homogeneity is in fact reinforced through the imagery of 
carnival” (Taylor, 1995, p. 34). This conception of carnival is influenced 
by Bakhtin’s analysis of the carnival square as a site for promoting 
collectivist culture among social groups who resist the elite and ruling 
classes. However, this representation of carnival as an overwhelmingly 
positive experience is problematic because it raises some issues in 
terms of the cohesion and consistency of social groups, and, 
sometimes, the state of dystopia in the carnival square. Bakhtin’s 
representation of carnival has tended to overlook other negative 
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aspects of carnival in the actual carnival square, such as the potential 
turn to violence, disruption and hostility among social groups.  
 
For example, some Jordanian street protests have resulted in 
significant localised disruptions, numerous road closures and violent 
confrontations between police forces and protestors, which led to 
several injuries and deaths. In many ways, the Jordanian police and 
government have reflected the state’s monologic approach that is 
opposite to the dialogic interaction with people in the streets. The power 
of the police and other security forces in the actual carnival squares has 
been constructed around the idea of the illegitimacy of protests against 
power and the government.  
 
Some of the Jordanian street protests were banned on the grounds that 
protests and demonstrations lead to further social divisions, nationwide 
unrest, increase in injuries, traffic congestion, and an increase in the 
national sense of instability and insecurity among many people who are 
not participating in street carnivals against the government. For some 
Arab ultra-conservative Islamic religious leaders who are affiliated and 
identified with their links to regimes, taking to the streets or 
transgression against power can be considered a ‘sin’ and therefore 
illegitimate on the grounds that this transgression opposes the ruler, 
who is presumably considered as Allah’s vicegerent (shadow of God) 
on the earth. This divine incarnation, I argue, has bolstered power and 
helped some Arab rulers to be removed from public scrutiny. Consider, 
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for example, the surprising stability of Arab monarchies in Jordan, 
Morocco and the Gulf countries.  
 
In the case of post Arab Spring Jordan and Morocco, Muasher (2017, 
para. 3) demonstrates that the governments have resorted to silencing 
their protests through the implementation of ‘cosmetic’ façade reforms 
that have not been intended to affect (or change) the fundamental 
structure of power and domination of political elite, but rather as a way 
to reinforce the status quo. He argues that the governments in Jordan 
and Morocco have in many times resorted to stoking fear in the public 
sphere and among the protestors. The fate of Egypt and Libya was 
used to quieten (and suppress) the Moroccan protests, and the fate of 
Egypt and Syria was used to quieten (and tend) the fire of the 
Jordanian protests. In Bakhtin’s terms, this state policy can be 
considered as monologic because it has reinforced the government’s 
discourse that fundamentally refuses dialogism with protestors and 
asserts therefore a non-debatable and often insignificant public 
demands for change. 
 
Second, Bakhtin’s idealised representation of the population as 
consistently united is problematic on the grounds that individuals who 
participate in Jordanian protests and in social media activism differ in 
their demands (although some similarities remain). Freud is important 
here to talk about the role of individual agency and motivation for the 
expression of individual anger and release as a result of political 
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repression and economic inequalities. From the perspective of Freud, I 
argue that this description of the folk (as Bakhtin conceptualises it) as 
an ‘idealised’ social group is questionable because individuals are 
different, and identity in social media spaces is more a matter of 
individual influences and decisions. It shows Bakhtin’s seeming 
dependence on a social duality: the ‘folk’ and the ‘authorities’ (in the 
context of this thesis Jordanian protesters or carnival-goers and the 
government). Indeed, his use of a social duality suggests that Bakhtin 
was heavily influenced by Marxist thinking: he insists on a uniform 
proletariat.  
 
In his description of carnival, Bakhtin neglected to take into 
consideration the politics of carnival perhaps because of the extreme 
political oppression of the Stalinist regime. He argues for its being 
ephemeral, and that the carnival is mainly “apolitical” and less 
oppressive (Bakhtin, 1984a, p. 6). To get his work past Soviet 
censorship, Bakhtin was perhaps obliged to make this point about 
carnival being apolitical and ephemeral. Bakhtin’s geopolitical context 
must therefore be taken into consideration when we think about the 
production of cultural politics during Stalin's reign. I argue throughout 
this thesis that the concept of Bakhtinian carnival against power and 
repression remains very political. The nature of carnival joking in 
Jordanian social media spaces is itself politically loaded because many 
Jordanian carnival-goers have shown (and continue to show) resistance 
to power and authority.  
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Third, we might think of the impact of the Arab Spring as a significant 
social and political transformation on gender equality between men and 
women to talk about some problems and weaknesses of application of 
Bakhtin’s theory of carnival to the Jordanian socio-political context after 
the Arab Spring. A feminist reading of Bakhtin’s theory of carnival raises 
several issues about the masculinity of Bakhtin’s ideas of carnival and 
popular resistance against power. Bakhtin’s marketplace represents a 
masculinist discourse, where the streets are largely controlled by men. 
The way in which Bakhtin presents his theory of carnival and the role of 
the marketplace intensifies this ideology (carnival-goers are normally 
referred to with male pronouns).  
 
In a feminist reading of Bakhtin’s carnival and the marketplace, Ruth 
Ginsburg (1993) argues that an analysis of Bakhtin’s carnival reveals 
masculinist features and, overall, a masculinist discourse (Ginsburg, 
1993, pp. 169–170). She argues that despite the significance of female 
imagery in Bakhtin’s analysis of Rabelais, the images of women in 
carnival and the grotesque are male dominated. This leaves women 
under-represented in carnival theory and in the carnival’s ideological 
orientation and significance. The absence of women from the carnival 
square can be understood in line with the masculinisation of public 
places during the Middle Ages in Western Europe and in Bakhtin’s 
particular focus on Rabelais and Dostoevsky (both men). This tendency 
might have imposed a hegemonic and masculinist discourse about 
street carnival and the marketplace, which is a very early 20th century 
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lens. The broad trends about the masculinity of carnivals are therefore 
unlikely to remain true in today’s time.    
 
In modern-day carnivals in streets and in social media spaces, 
protestors and carnival-goers are mostly young, and both male and 
female. As such, political participation in street protests is no longer, in 
Arab countries, restricted to men (Pratt, 2013). For example, in post 
Arab Spring Jordan, women took part in the 2018 protests that led to 
overthrow of Hani Al-Mulik’s government over new tax bills and price 
increases (Kuttab, 2018). With the rise and development of modern 
digital technology in the last decade, the mode for modern-day 
‘carnivals’ is now the social media spaces, and much less the streets 
and conventional public spaces. According to the most recent Arab 
social media report, the percentage of women who are using social 
media spaces in Jordan are more than men. 59.4% of Facebook users 
in Jordan are women (Salem, 2017, p. 40). This statistic is a testimony 
on women’s active participation and interaction online, and perhaps 
even more in popular resistance against power and social orders. The 
fact that all humourists and commentators in this thesis are male has 
some methodological reasons. The researcher has only selected 
famous Jordanian humourists who have significantly contributed to the 
development of Jordanian humour since the Arab Spring.  
   
On one hand, the Bakhtin’s theory of carnival treats the carnival square 
and public spaces (whether physical or metaphorical) as places for 
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political struggle and rallies against dominant power (the government in 
today’s context). On the other hand, the carnivalesque humour 
functions as a safety valve that both releases tensions (which can in 
fact be useful to those with political power) and can be a tool for 
resistance against many forms of power in government. This view on 
the carnivalesque makes Bakhtin and Freud complementary (Bakhtin 
on the collective psyche and Freud on the individual psyche). Bakhtin is 
useful when we talk about the collective experience of the social media 
and on using humour as a counter-political force and tool for resistance, 
while Freud is useful when we talk about some individual reactions 
experiences on using humour as a safety valve that releases individual 
repression and frustration about power and the government.    
 
Finally, the extent to which Bakhtin’s theory of carnival and the 
carnivalesque can be considered as an effective counter-political force 
and tool for popular resistance is highly debatable. Although Bakhtin 
understands this, not least in his frequent references to the ephemera 
of carnival, he tended to be empiricist in his argument about Rabelais 
and Dostoevsky. In his book chapter ‘The origins of the political joke’ 
(1988), which analyses political humour and satire under the Soviet 
authoritarian regimes, Gregor Benton arrived at a perfect and pertinent 
conclusion about the real impact of political humour and jokes on real 
life and politics. He argues that a  
political joke will change nothing. It is the relentless enemy of 
greed, injustice, cruelty and oppression. It is not a form of active 
resistance. It reflects no political programme. It will mobilise no 
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one. Like the Jewish joke in its time, it is important for keeping 
society sane and stable. It cushions the blows of cruel 
governments and creates sweet illusions of revenge. It has the 
virtue of momentarily freeing the lives of millions from tensions 
and frustrations to which even the best organised political 
opposition can promise only long-term solutions, but its impact is 
as fleeting as the laughter it produces (Benton, 1988, p. 54).  
 
Benton’s description of political joke function is notable not least 
because it combines elements of those humour theories that stress the 
psychological purpose of humour with elements of those that argue for 
a socio-political dimension in humour. The most important difference 
with Benton rests on his emphasis on the fleeting and ultimately illusory 
nature of humour’s contribution to political resistance and change. This 
notion fits well with Bakhtin’s carnival, arguably another kind of transient 
‘playing at rebellion.’ However, there is one problem with this line of 
argument. Benton seems to treat ‘impact’ rather simplistically, as if it is 
a linear and uni-directional phenomenon, when he talks about the 
fleeting moment of laughter and its negligible impact on the long term.        
 
Humour in political resistance has almost never achieved any change in 
the real world. It probably is almost always fleeting and illusory. It 
probably almost never has, in the near to medium term, any direct 
impact on politics. However, I think political humour can have, in the 
longer term, indirect impact on politics. If members of a society become 
more sophisticated in their sense of humour, many people can become 
better critical thinkers in political analysis. For example, political 
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cartoons can be considered as one of the fastest and easiest ‘windows’ 
for understanding politics. Hence, political humour is certainly more 
cognitively complex than, say, lightbulb jokes, blonde jokes or elephant 
jokes. It can help people to become more courageous and confident 
when taking to the streets or online and demanding change through the 
expression of critical comments and concerns about political power. It 
can help them to become literate and cognizant of their socio-political 
and economic conditions as a result.  
 
Although its impact is slow and indirect, with dispersed and hard-to-
articulate effects, the people who are accustomed to political humour 
and satire can be liberated and empowered to create actual political 
change in the long term. As Bakhtin and Benton have explained, 
political humour rarely if ever has a direct and/or immediate impact on 
real life or politics. Perhaps it can have a slow and indirect impact 
through its subtle intellectual and psychological effects on people. This 
is because such resistance has an internalised and psychological 
component. It can allow people in the short to medium term to cope 
with socio-economic inequalities and political repression, but in the long 
run it can allow people to be more confident about themselves, to resist 
power and demand change.  
  
In his analysis of political humour and satire under communism in 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, Christie Davies (2007) 
arrives at somewhat a similar conclusion about the role of political 
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humour shared under repressive regimes. He argues that political 
humour and socialist jokes, despite being apparently resistant, tend to 
have a negligible impact on reality. According to Davies (2007), political 
humour can therefore be considered, to a great extent, as ineffective 
form for popular resistance against power and authority. Here, Bakhtin 
and Davies’ view on political humour and satire is a little problematic. I 
argue that political humour can be considered ephemeral if ‘resistance’ 
is linked to tangible effects on external structures and processes. 
However, if ‘resistance’ has an internalised and more individual and 
psychological component, then political humour can be considered 
effective because it allows individuals to cope with socio-economic 
inequalities and political repression. This Freudian individual focused 
analysis can be best understood when we think about the psychological 
effects of humour and popular resistance. This explanation suggests 
some weaknesses in the application of Bakhtin and Davies’ theory 
about political humour and its impact on everyday life and politics 
against power.           
 
In the context of post Arab Spring Jordan, social media humour has 
routinely suggested subversion that critiques social order and the 
government’s rhetoric about reform and its processes. This form of 
subversion has ultimately been contained and resulted in minimal 
changes. Jordanians have resorted more to humour and satire in social 
media spaces (virtual spaces) because they might have unconsciously 
or consciously ‘chosen’ political resistance through social media spaces 
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due to the temporary suspension for time of carnival in the streets. 
Jordanian society has tended and continues to use political humour and 
satire for personal sanity (Freud’s theory of humour provides a useful 
framework to understand this) so they can ‘play at resistance,’ rather 
than genuinely fighting for it in the actual carnival squares and public 
spaces. Perhaps the Bakhtinian framework in this thesis allows us to 
see a certain strand of Jordanian ‘carnivals’ on social media spaces 
(politically satirical humour) as intentionally non-potent resistance 
against the government. This form of online resistance against power 
may represent an effective tool for popular resistance if we think about 
humour and its relationship to the unconscious.  
 
Bakhtin’s account of carnival has focused on its ephemeral nature. 
According to Bakhtin, carnival acts as a kind of safety valve through 
which people ‘let off steam’ at times of protesting against power. By 
providing a temporary space for hedonism, carnival ultimately functions 
for and sustains the dominant system and its political inequalities. It can 
sometimes reinforce regime dominant values by contrasting them with 
their rule- and value-free opposites. Alternatively, that temporary nature 
of carnival can turn into rebellion by demonstrating its potency for 
counter-hegemonic actions against power and authority. Freud’s ideas 
about humour provide a useful approach to think of the fleeting nature 
of carnivals in social media spaces. The role of the individual agency is 
important as a tool to control individual anger and repression (a 
pressure valve release).  
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In the context of Jordan after the Arab Spring, street and predominantly 
social media ‘carnivals’ reveal functional similarities to those that 
occurred in the Middle Ages in Catholic Europe in the sense that they 
were/are a time and place of socio-political ‘flattening’ and cathartic 
hedonism that did not/ does not provoke any social and political 
changes in reality. Very few ‘carnival-goers’ in Jordanian social media 
spaces have actually wanted to challenge (or change) the power of the 
King or the royal family. The carnival humour in Jordanian social media 
spaces has performed what has been called by scholars of Bakhtin as 
‘licensed disruption’ because it has allowed ridicule of the government 
but not of the monarch, as chapter 5 shows.    
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4.6 Conclusion  
This chapter has explored Bakhtin’s theory of carnival and the 
carnivalesque as a framework for examining Jordanian politics and 
political humour in social media spaces after the 2011 Arab Spring 
revolutions. In discussing the significant role of social media in digital 
politics and online activism against the government in post Arab Spring 
Jordan, this chapter has argued that Bakhtin’s ‘marketplace’ is now 
predominantly located in social media spaces, and much less the 
streets or conventional public spaces. The nature of the ‘digital carnival’ 
is in many ways just as carnivalesque, characterised as it is by, for 
example, polyphony, the overturning of social hierarchies, and the 
presence of the grotesque. This is evident from the examples of 
Jordanian social media spaces analysed in this chapter.  
 
This chapter has identified some of the weaknesses that are associated 
with applications of Bakhtin’s theory of carnival and the carnivalesque 
to the Jordanian socio-political context after the Arab Spring in terms of 
the representation of carnival and the populace as idealised and 
overwhelmingly positive, the absence of women in Bakhtin’s carnival 
and marketplace, and the negligible impact of carnivalesque humour on 
Jordanian social media spaces. These weaknesses suggest that 
Bakhtin’s theory of carnival would benefit from amendment or 
development in order to make it more useful as a tool for analysing 
modern-day carnivals in social media spaces. The applicability of 
Bakhtin and Freud to social media spaces shows how the 
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carnivalesque experiences can be both collective and individualised. 
Bakhtin is useful when we talk about the collective experience of social 
media and using humour as a counter-political force and tool for 
resistance, while Freud is useful when we talk about the individual’s 
voices in it and how humour can function as a safety valve to release 
individual repression and frustration about power.  
 
In the last chapter of this thesis, I set out to examine further the politics 
of popular resistance against the government in Jordanian political 
humour after the Arab Spring. I focus on what is ‘done’ in the space of 
the carnival in social media and how power is undermined but not 
necessarily brought up. The analysis of Jordanian political humour 
focuses primarily on the role of humour as a counter-political force and 
a tool for popular resistance against the government’s rhetoric about 
reform and its processes of change in Jordanian social media spaces. 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 5 Jordanian political humour after the 
Arab Spring  
5.1 Introduction  
In his book Problems of Dostoevsky's poetics (1984b), Bakhtin 
highlighted the four major themes of the carnivalesque understanding of 
the world as demonstrated in his classic theory of carnival: familiar and 
free interaction between people, acceptance of eccentric behaviour, 
carnivalistic mésalliances or conjunctions/ combinations, and 
admittance of the sacrilegious (Bakhtin, 1984b, p. 123). These themes 
set by Bakhtin identify the four broad qualities of carnival life in the 
carnival square as well as the human relationships between those who 
participate in the carnival. In the context of Jordan after the 2011 Arab 
Spring revolutions, I have found that these carnival qualities offer a 
useful (but not perfect) approach to understand a wide range of politics 
and political humour shared in Jordanian social media spaces.  
 
In this chapter, I address in much greater detail the application of key 
aspects of Bakhtin’s theory of carnival to specific examples of 
Jordanian political humour available in Jordanian social media spaces. 
Jordanians’ use of political humour against the government reveals 
counter-narratives that can be seen more specifically in relation to 
challenging state corruption (including cronyism, nepotism and 
embezzlement of government-funded projects), parliamentary elections, 
inflation, gerrymandering politics, and, most importantly, the 
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government’s rhetoric about reform and its processes. To show the 
relevance and some of the weaknesses of the application of Bakhtin’s 
ideas about carnival, this chapter examines key political cartoons, 
satirical articles, comedy sketches and internet memes that were 
produced by leading Jordanian humourists in Jordanian social media 
spaces. These include the works of Ahmad Hassan Al-Zou’bi (socio-
political satirist and online activist), Emad Hajjaj, Omar Abdallat, Osama 
Hajjaj (all political cartoonists) and some examples of comedy sketches 
performed by Jordan’s most famous comedian Musa Hijazin. The 
analysis in this chapter utilises the examination of five salient qualities 
of carnivalesque political humour in Jordanian social media spaces: 
praising the government (intentionally satirical); parodying the 
government; mocking the government; scatalogising the government 
and, finally, dethroning of the government (the temporarily and 
metaphorically comic death of the government). These five qualities 
emerged from the analysis of Jordanian political humour in the dataset 
(see the research methodology section in the introduction).  
 
Analysis of these five qualities reveals the relevance and some of the 
weaknesses (in the Jordanian context) of Bakhtin’s understanding of 
the carnival life in the actual carnival square in the streets or 
conventional public spaces. These qualities are (1) free and familiar 
contact among people that maintains equality and promotes egalitarian 
principles among all people who are participating in carnival; (2) 
eccentricity where life in the carnival square permits all forms of 
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eccentric and otherwise unacceptable behaviours; (3) carnivalesque 
mésalliance where life in the carnival square brings together people 
from all walks of life and unifies them; and (4) profanation where life in 
the carnival square helps carnival-goers strip the powerful people of 
their ‘sacred’ authority, and encourages instead resistance against 
them (Bakhtin, 1984b, p. 123). Considered in the context of political 
humour in Jordanian social media spaces after the Arab Spring, these 
four qualities make Bakhtin’s theory of carnival and the carnivalesque a 
useful (but not perfect) framework for the present study of 
contemporary Jordanian political humour after the Arab Spring.            
5.2 Qualities of Jordanian political humour  
The analysis in this section examines ordinary people’s resistance and 
its relation to Bakhtin’s themes of degradation, the grotesque and 
subversion. It also scrutinises the extent to which Jordanian people 
online have shifted their tolerance of subversive political humour and 
satire against power and government from 2011. The analysis reveals 
that carnivalesque political humour in Jordanian social media spaces 
has been used as a tool to challenge people in power and poke fun at 
government articulation and official discourses, but not to overthrow (or 
attempt to) the entire regime. I argue that carnival humour in Jordanian 
social media spaces that allows ridicule of the government but not of 
the monarch appears to be as a form of licenced disruption, an idea 
that is used extensively by scholars of Bakhtin to talk about the popular 
politics of resistance and its limits and targets. In this section, the 
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analysis of Jordanian political humour after the Arab Spring focuses on 
the examination of five salient qualities of carnivalesque politics against 
the government and of political humour and satire in Jordanian social 
media spaces. These five key qualities are described as follows:  
1. Praising the government (intentionally satirical): This quality 
focuses on a peculiar type of political humour and satire that 
defends power, rather than attacking it. It implies by intention an 
element of subversive humour and satire, but it never challenges 
government and its mainstream discourses. This quality was 
overlooked by Bakhtin, perhaps because he was writing in 
(disguised) opposition to the production of cultural politics and 
regime repression under the Stalinist regime   
2. Parodying the government: This quality underlines Bakhtin’s use 
of parody as a carnivalesque political tool that can deflate the 
serious tone of official discourse. The analysis in this quality 
focuses on three key sub-themes: corruption, inflation and 
parliamentary elections, including the weak function of Jordan’s 
House of Parliament as a ‘rubber stamp’ for the government  
3. Mocking the government: This quality deals with Bakhtin’s 
theory of the carnivalesque as a counter-political force and tool for 
popular resistance against power (in this case, the Jordanian 
government’s rhetoric about economic reform and its processes). 
It also focuses on other related carnivalesque qualities, such as 
degradation, the language of the marketplace and the hypocrisy 
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(the two lives) of the government’s official discourse and 
statements   
4. Scatalogising the government: This quality relates to Bakhtin’s 
acknowledgment and analysis of the use of lower bodily functions 
for the purposes of making insult, degradation and expressions of 
resentment and frustration. This can be applied to the criticism of 
the Jordanian government’s rhetoric about economic reform and 
its processes during and after the Arab Spring. The discussion of 
this quality includes a wide range of taboo topics, such as 
defection, flatulence and urination, in order to highlight certain 
aspects of Jordanian political humour and satire in the context of 
social media spaces    
5. Dethroning the government: This quality extends the application 
of Bakhtin’s notion of decrowning in order express the popular 
resentment, frustration and restive views about the government. 
Although this dethroning (or overthrowing of political power) is not 
real, it shows how the Jordanian government’s discourse about 
reform has been challenged, and how the Jordanian authorities 
have sometimes been stripped of their power in a very comic way, 
albeit temporarily and metaphorically.            
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5.2.1 Praising the government  
This first quality focuses on three aspects of Bakhtin’s notion of false 
“crowning,” but develops the Bakhtinian notion of power and popular 
resistance to include praising the absurd and glorifying humour that 
defends power rather than attacking it. In political humour shared under 
repressive regimes, the celebration of the ruler and/or the repressive 
regime suggests what Bakhtin (1984a, p. 18) called a moment of 
insincere praise or false crowning and evaluation that is intentionally 
satirical and derogatory. Instead of ridiculing and mocking the ruler, 
jokesters use hyperbole or exaggerated claims to ‘glorify’ their ruler and 
elevate him to a godlike status that does no wrong. This glorification is 
false, inauthentic and sycophantic towards people in power. It brings to 
the fore the arrogance of the ruler and the audience’s laughter at his 
actions that evoke humour and not celebration. This aspect of political 
humour and satire highlights the unpopularity of regime and ruler. It 
also reflects a growing disaffection with the regime in the eyes of the 
people. This form of ‘exaggerated praise’ where a comic effect is 
achieved not by challenging or inverting the status quo, but just by the 
unempowered overdoing of the praise is ironic. This is because irony, 
as evidence in this section shows, emerges from the exaggerations of 
power differentials and not from the subservience to the powerful. Ironic 
praise and criticism are two types of verbal irony (For recent application 
of verbal irony, see Bruntsch and Ruch, 2017 and Braun and 
Schmiedel, 2018).    
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In Bakhtin’s notion of crowning, this exaltation aims to unexpectedly 
challenge the ruler and his power. This glorification is therefore 
ridiculous and insincere. In the context of political humour and satire in 
Jordan after the Arab Spring, the humourist (or jokester) is forced to live 
the official life that is often sanctioned by the ruler, and avoids therefore 
the life of carnival square that is free, unrestricted and full of ambivalent 
laughter towards power (Bakhtin, 1984b, p. 129). The humourist in this 
“monolithically serious and gloomy” world is ironically “subjugated to a 
strict hierarchical order, full of terror, dogmatism, reverence and piety” 
(Bakhtin, 1984b, pp. 129–130). As a result, the humourist 
exaggeratedly exalts the ruler, and chooses not to mock or ridicule the 
political system and power directly.  
 
Examples of Bakhtin’s notion of false crowning in Jordanian political 
humour in social media spaces after the Arab Spring can be seen in 
Figures 6, 7 and 8 below. The cartoon in Figure 6 was drawn by 
Jordanian political cartoonist Osama Hajjaj in 2014. Hajjaj used to work 
for the Jordanian government-owned daily newspapers, such as Al-Ra’i 
(The Opinion) and Ad-Dustour (The Constitution), and more recently for 
the privately-owned newspaper Al-Arab Al-Yawm (Arabs Today) before 
its shutdown in 2015. He is now working for London-based Al-Quds Al-
Arabi (an independent pan-Arab daily newspaper).  
 
In Figure 6 below, Hajjaj uses Musa Hijazin’s well-known comic 
character Abu Saqer (father of Saqer) to comically ‘celebrate’ Prime 
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Minister Abdullah Ensour’s birthday. Addressing Ensour using flowery 
language and embellished discourse that is intentionally satirical, Abu 
Saqer (left) quips in the callout “I have lit the people of Jordan on your 
auspicious birthday, Prime Minister.” In Bakhtin’s terms, this political 
cartoon highlights a moment of ‘false crowning’ that is flattery in nature. 
Instead of using a set of candles on a birthday cake, Hajjaj uses the 
ordinary people of Jordan in order to demonstrate the Jordanian 
government’s repression and even aggression against its own people. 
The public disapproval of the government of Abdullah Ensour was 
growing after the government implemented strict austerity measures 
and increased the prices of food and fuel as part of a wider economic 
reform programme and restructuring, guided by the IMF, from 2012.  
 
   
Figure 6. Happy Birthday Prime Minister [Cartoon], Osama Hajjaj, 2014 
Chapter 5 Jordanian political humour after the Arab Spring   247 
 
 
 
 
In Figures 7 and 8 below, Bakhtin’s notion of false crowning can be 
seen with reference to the use of hyperbole and flattery as explained in 
the colloquial Jordanian Arabic word Sahij (a blind loyalist to the 
regime). Etymologically, the word Sahij is derived from the meaning of 
other Arabic words, such as applause or clapping. It is used locally 
among Jordanians in the streets and now, predominantly, in Jordanian 
social media spaces, to comically define a type of person who 
celebrates the actions of the government and exaggerates their 
decisions, although these actions are widely unpopular and sometimes 
seem to be unreasonable.  
 
In Figure 7 below, Emad Hajjaj, another Jordanian political cartoonist 
who works for the government-owned newspaper Al-Ra’i and its sister 
daily The Jordan Times, resurrects the image of the notorious Abbasid 
caliph Al-Mutawakkil in order to make fun of those few Jordanian 
people who remain loyal to the government. By doing so, he recalls 
elements of false crowning and the use of hyperbole in past Arab 
civilisations, and comically links them to the current Jordanian socio-
political situation after the Arab Spring. Today, Al-Mutawakkil is best 
remembered for his authoritarian regime style, as well as his 
insignificant government reform programmes that did not satisfy the 
public during the late period of the Abbasid Caliphate in the 9th century.  
 
Chapter 5 Jordanian political humour after the Arab Spring   248 
 
 
 
In this Figure, although the Abbasid caliph Al-Mutawakkil is presented 
as an idiot, he is exaggeratedly ‘glorified’ for his hunting incompetence 
by one of his accompanying ministers while on a desert trip. Here an 
anonymous minister (in this case a Jordanian Sahij) is seen greatly 
glorifying the tremendous incompetence of the caliph (in this case a 
Jordanian government official). The image of Al-Mutawakkil as 
incompetent is used here to reflect on today’s Arab rulers and senior 
government officials, who were either removed or existed in disgrace 
during the 2011 Arab Spring revolutions.  
 
The translation of Emad Hajjaj’s political cartoon in Figure 8 below 
reads as follows: The Abbasid caliph Al-Mutawakkil was reported to 
have hit a little bird with a stone. However, the stone missed the bird. 
Fearful of calling the caliph an incredible idiot, the minister who 
accompanied the caliph chose to exaggerate the caliph’s blatant 
incompetence by saying “You did a great job, caliph.” He [the minister] 
claimed enthusiastically that the caliph had done the right thing to the 
bird. He indicated that the caliph had in fact willingly chosen to “let the 
bird remain alive and unharmed.” Here occurred the punch line by the 
cartoonist: “It had been reported that this act of blind loyalty (known in 
Jordanian local context as Tashija, an act of applause or clapping) was 
considered amongst the earliest acts of wild loyalty in Arab history.” The 
inclusion of Hajjaj’s most famous comic character (Abu Mahjoob) is 
notable in this cartoon because it draws parallels between the minister 
and the developing group of the Sahij that has unconditionally 
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supported the regime and the government in Jordanian society from the 
time of the Arab Spring revolutions since 2011.   
 
Figure 7. The first applause to people in power [Cartoon], Emad Hajjaj, 
2015 
 
In Bakhtin’s terms, Emad Hajjaj’s political cartoon (in Figure 7 above) 
provides an example of praising the absurd. The cartoon focuses on the 
tremendous incompetence of Arab rulers and official autocratic 
discourses. It criticises the mistakes of some contemporary Arab rulers 
that are sometimes ‘glorified’ and seen as miraculous with brilliant acts 
of heroism by a few people who remain loyal to their regimes after 
2011, and who are too conservative about change. Some contemporary 
Arab rulers are set to rule for life and enjoy absolute monarchies, and in 
cases where there are elections, most elections are to varying extents 
fraudulent and manipulated for regime and government interests. For 
example, consider the results of the 2014 Syrian presidential elections 
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that kept the brutal regime of Bashar al-Assad in power, and the 
controversial 2018 Egyptian elections that renamed Abdel Fattah El-Sisi 
as President of Egypt and extended his rule for two additional terms, 
until 2034.  
 
The third example of this quality depicts the carnivalesque act of 
Bakhtin’s false crowning, but in the context of using a sacred formula 
that produces an explicit mockery of regime and structure of political 
power. In Figure 8 below, the internet meme portrays a new 
carnivalesque aspect of ‘deferential humour’ in Jordanian social media 
humour that defends power rather than attacking it. This carnivalesque 
aspect is seen through the total allegiance of one anonymous 
Jordanian Sahij to power and the government. The Sahij exalts a ruler’s 
incompetent actions and pronounces them as ‘incredibly great,’ despite 
the ruler’s blatant failure.  
 
In Figure 8, the Sahij celebrates the inability of anonymous Arab ruler to 
hunt a wild rabbit at a close range. By showing flattery to the ruler, the 
Sahij has enthusiastically expressed his utmost surprise and 
glorification using the Arabic sacred religious formula “Subhan Allah,” 
meaning ‘Allah is perfect and free of defects.’ The Sahij then exclaims 
“This is the first time I see a ‘dead’ rabbit running.” The evocation of the 
sacred phrase in this internet meme is important because it is mainly 
used in Arabic to express excitement and admiration for someone 
else’s works or deeds. The placing of the Arabic sacred formula 
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“Subhan Allah” aims to destabilise the genuine meaning of the 
expression in its normal religious discourse in Islam. Instead of 
admiring someone or something sincerely, the phrase is evoked to 
reflect an act of flattery and insincere praise to power.  
 
This internet meme produces a profound element of praising the absurd 
which was impossible for Bakhtin to take into account in his theory of 
carnival and the carnivalesque. Here the carnival world is not reversed 
and mocked, but rather the ridiculous actions are being praised and 
glorified to achieve flattery and sycophancy that is understood by the 
viewer as ironic. The ruler is exalted to a godlike status, free of defects. 
The humour in this meme is an example of exaggerated praise that 
may have a hidden irony. People under authoritarian regimes can grow 
‘fearful’ and scared of the regime. Because this false exaltation is 
insincere and crude, it implies in reality a fierce critique to power. It may 
also cause a ‘hidden’ laughter amongst the ruler’s entourage, and in the 
contemporary readership alike.   
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Figure 8. The loyalist’s mindset [Internet meme], 2013 
 
In Bakhtin’s terms, this element of false crowning includes an aspect of 
mésalliance, where contradictory things are combined, as if they are 
homogenous. This carnivalesque act shows the use of a peculiar 
language that praises the absurd, as well as, in these examples, the 
use of some local Jordanian expressions that add further mockery to 
the situation. This notion about the carnivalesque is discussed in further 
detail under Bakhtin’s notion of using the language of the marketplace 
in the carnival square.  
 
In this first quality of Jordanian social media humour, political humour is 
based on a peculiar type of carnivalesque political humour that has 
tended to defend power rather than attacking it. This form of 
carnivalesque political humour was omitted from Bakhtin’s ideas about 
carnival and the carnivalesque. It creates an imaginary world of 
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exaggerated praise for the purposes of promoting pleasure and 
entertainment among people who take to the carnival marketplace, 
which, in the modern period, predominantly comprises social media 
spaces.  
 
The quality of carnivalesque political humour and satire does not lead 
people out of the existing social orders that are thoroughly managed by 
the ruling authority. It does not create a second world for carnival-goers. 
It shows how people’s behaviours and attitudes towards power, 
surreptitiously ironic, are often imposed by some of the regime’s 
existing patterns (Bakhtin, 1984a, p. 9). In this carnivalesque 
understanding of the world, political humour asserts “all that was stable, 
unchanging, perennial: the existing hierarchy, the existing religious, 
political, and moral value, norms and prohibitions” are disputable 
(Bakhtin, 1984a, p. 9). The autocratic discourse of the ruler and regime 
is, however, predominant and always tends to the triumphant.   
 
This quality of the carnivalesque shows an interesting type of glorifying 
humour that presents itself in the context of Bakhtin’s notion of false 
crowning and flattery. Here, the political power and authority, its official 
discourse and its ridiculous actions, are surprisingly celebrated by a 
small number of people who remain loyal to the regime, and who too 
have conservative views about change. The ruler (in this case a 
Jordanian government official) is depicted as infallible and therefore 
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exalted. The sanctity of the ruler is promoted and yet ridiculed in order 
to make fun of the ruler and his actions.  
 
This type of carnivalesque political humour, which is shared under a 
repressive regime, can be linked to “the early period of the Roman state 
[when] the ceremonial of the triumphal procession included on almost 
equal terms the glorifying and the deriding of the victor … The funeral 
ritual was also composed of lamenting (glorifying) and deriding the 
deceased” (Bakhtin, 1984a, p. 6). In this type of glorifying humour that 
is intentionally satirical, the serious and the humorous are treated 
equally as sacred and ‘official.’ In Bakhtin’s terms, this ceremonial of 
the absurd implicitly represents a fierce type of criticism against the 
regime’s established orders and laws that ban the freedom of 
expression and criticism. It therefore encourages resistance against the 
regime’s repression. The humour expounded here in this quality about 
praising the government appears as a form of licenced disruption 
because it allows ridicule of the government but not of the monarch. It 
may be that this form of political humour has arisen because of the 
particularly Jordanian political context, with split power and leadership, 
with one branch ‘untouchable’ by, in this case, exaggerated praise or 
ironic praise.   
 
Chapter 5 Jordanian political humour after the Arab Spring   255 
 
 
 
5.2.2 Parodying the government  
This quality focuses on the use of parody in Jordanian political humour 
shared in Jordanian social media spaces after the Arab Spring. In 
Bakhtin’s theory of carnival and the carnivalesque, parody is considered 
as a kind of style that belongs to the culture of carnival and the 
carnivalesque. It represents a subversive form of humour that sheds 
light on the double-voicing discourse of political power and authority. It 
deflates the serious tone of official discourse and changes it into irony 
for further carnivalesque comic effects. According to Bakhtin, this can 
be done through the act of insertion, “a new semantic intention into a 
discourse which has, and which retains, an intention of its own” 
(Bakhtin, 1984b, p. 189).  
 
Furthermore, in Bakhtin’s terms, this type of parody reflects a 
carnivalesque discourse which recognises the idea of dialogism i.e. the 
multiplicity of voices that challenges the discourse of dominant power. 
This quality focuses on three key themes that are most parodied in 
Jordanian political humour and satire in Jordanian social media spaces: 
government corruption, inflation, and parliamentary elections. The last 
of these is notable because it draws on a popular perception of 
Jordan’s House of Parliament as a ‘rubber stamp’ for the government.  
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As the discussion of this section will show, the use of parody, when 
referring to these issues, introduces an antithetical discourse that 
refutes the government’s official discourse and invokes resistance 
against it. These issues are “re-evaluated and reinterpreted” to become 
“a ridiculous image,” and “a comic carnival mask” that challenges 
people in power (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 77). The examples below show the 
relevance of Bakhtin’s theory of carnival and the carnivalesque and its 
applicability to Jordanian political humour and satire after the Arab 
Spring.  
 
Government corruption is one of the most parodied themes in 
Jordanian social media humour. Corruption in Jordan is not channelled 
through the direct involvement and actions of government, but rather 
through other illegal interpersonal actions that are often covered using 
interpersonal connections. This is known in the Jordanian context as 
wasta, which is defined as the intervention of a middleman. These 
informal interpersonal networks occur in several ways, including 
cronyism, favouritism, nepotism and bribery, in order to gain influence 
and advantage from people in power (Jones, 2016, p. 20). This 
explanation highlights the predominance of state corruption in Jordan.  
 
In the context of Jordanian political humour after the Arab Spring, the 
government’s rhetoric about challenging state corruption sometimes 
triggers carnivalesque politics and popular resistance. It thus promoted 
the use of parody to mock government actions towards fighting 
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corruption. The popular discourse about the government fighting 
corruption often sheds light on a type of government that tends to 
‘reward’ the corrupt, and which has been unable to prosecute them. 
Through highlighting this ambivalence in the government’s stance, 
Jordanian political humour in social media spaces has sought to 
challenge its discourse about fighting corruption. Social media humour 
has also introduced into that discourse a “semantic intention that is 
directly opposed to the original one” (Bakhtin, 1984b, p. 193). This 
element highlights the government’s inability to fight corruption in 
Jordan.   
 
For example, in the comedy sketch from which a still is shown below 
(Figure 9), the famous Jordanian humorous character Som’a (left), 
played by veteran comedian Musa Hijazin, is seen holding a floor wiper 
in an attempt to drive waves (for which, corruption) away from the shore 
(for which, Jordan). The use of the sea metaphor and waves refers to 
the impossibility of fighting corruption in Jordan. Feeling outraged, Abu 
Saqer (right), another humorous character that is played by Hijazin, 
approaches Som’a and rebukes him, and his useless actions. He (Abu 
Saqer) tries to convince Som’a that the Jordanian government itself is 
not ‘fighting’ corruption, but rather sponsoring it.  
 
The parody in this comedy sketch resides in the use of homonym of the 
two Arabic words: yukafy’ which means to ‘reward’, and yukafeh which 
means to ‘combat.’ The signpost in the video image below is indicative 
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of parody about the government’s corruption and its inability to fight it. 
The sign reads as The sea of corruption, an implicit reference to the 
lenient actions of the Jordanian government towards fighting corruption 
and prosecution of the corrupt. The still image below is from a famous 
comedy sketch available at a Jordanian YouTube channel called 
Takarub, with a title that reads ‘Somʿa wants to “reward” corruption … I 
mean to “challenge” government corruption’ (Takarub, 2017).  
 
 
Figure 9. A still of Musa Hijazin’s comedy sketch’s ‘Som’a wants to 
reward corruption … I mean to challenge government corruption’ [Video 
file], 2017 
 
Another example of carnivalesque political humour shared in Jordanian 
social media spaces after the Arab Spring is the famous politically 
satirical programme Man-saf Baladi (malapropism of Mansaf). This 
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programme is written and presented by the renowned Jordanian socio-
political satirist Ahmad Hassan Al-Zou’bi. The title of the programme is 
itself ironic because it produces a humorous utterance and amusing 
effect. Mansaf (the name of a famous Jordanian dish) is being 
pronounced by the presenter as Man-saf, which is to be understood as 
Who robbed my country? In his interview with Jordan’s Al-Ghad 
Newspaper on 10 June 2015, the satirist Al-Zou’bi indicated that the 
aim of this politically satirical programme is to “challenge corruption and 
expose the corrupt before the new generation” (Ali, 2015). He claimed 
that government corruption, not the IMF loans and deals, is the root 
cause of Jordan’s economic crisis and thus the government’s severe 
austerity measures. This programme highlights Jordan’s economic 
problems and the negative consequences of the government’s reform 
programmes that have proved to be disadvantageous to Jordan’s 
economic independence and autonomy.    
 
In one notable episode that parodies WikiLeaks, entitled ‘Corruption 
offshore’ (2016, April 10), Al-Zou’bi openly criticised the government’s 
anti-corruption strategy. He argued that corruption is state-sponsored 
and more often fostered by some government officials for their own 
interests and not the country’s. He maintained that the government is 
rather ‘supporting’ corruption, and not fighting it. In Figure 10 below, a 
still from the video, where he states that, “whenever we [people] 
disclose a corruption case, a government official will stand up and wrap 
up the case by any possible means.” This comic parody indicates the 
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lack of confidence in the government’s intentions about fighting 
corruption and prosecuting of the corrupt.  
 
 
Figure 10. A still of Ahmad Hassan Al-Zou’bi’s Man-saf Baladi [Video 
file], 2016 
 
The second most parodied theme in Jordanian political humour in social 
media spaces after the Arab Spring is inflation. This economic term is 
concerned with the rise of prices and it has been accompanied by other 
austerity measures after each Jordan-IMF deal. For example, in Figure 
11 below, one famous Jordanian internet meme shared in Jordanian 
social media spaces parodies government rhetoric about economic 
reform and its processes that have, contrary to expectations, resulted in 
negative consequences that ultimately hit the poor in Jordan.  
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The meme focuses on the rapid increase in the price of clothes during 
Eid (Muslim religious festival). The meme draws connections between 
Jordanian citizens and the fictional character of Tarzan, with a line that 
reads as “If someone sees a Jordanian who looks like Tarzan during 
Eid, one should not be surprised. Thanks to the government of Abu 
Zuhair (Prime Minister Abdullah Ensour), May Allah lengthen his term in 
power.” The meme below produces a specific type of carnivalesque 
political humour and satire that parodies the government’s economic 
plan that led unexpectedly to an increase in the prices of clothes during 
Eid. It also deflates the government’s official tone about the positive 
impact of government economic reform after the IMF loans since 2012. 
  
 
Figure 11. The new customs fees on clothes [Internet meme], 2013 
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In the above Figure, the title of the Prime Minister Abdullah Ensour is 
crudely reduced to Abu Zuhair (Father of Zuhair). This caustic turn, 
which drops the PM’s name and title and refers to him through his first-
born son ‘Zuhair,’ is a rare indiscretion about those in power in Jordan. 
The reference to his premiership is erased here for the purposes of 
“uncrowning” and degradation, as the last section of this chapter on 
dethroning the government will show in greater detail. The meme strips 
the Prime Minister of his power and honorific title as Jordan’s prime 
minister. The use of the language of the marketplace (in this case the 
Jordanian vernacular) is ambivalent and endowed with resistance to 
power. The Jordanian citizen who is dressed like Tarzan (where the 
body is emphasised and uncovered) shows the use of grotesque 
imagery, which Bakhtin highlights in his description of the 
carnivalesque.     
 
The third most parodied theme in Jordanian political humour and satire 
in social media spaces after the Arab Spring is parliamentary elections. 
Jordanian parliamentary elections have become one of the core targets 
for carnivalesque politics and resistance against power in Jordanian 
social media spaces after the Arab Spring. Elections in Jordan are often 
gerrymandered to increase the number of MPs from tribal and rural 
areas where East Jordanians dwell, who are largely considered the 
bedrock of the regime. Jordan’s electoral system has tended to 
safeguard the over-representation of Jordanians from the hinterlands 
against Jordanians of Palestinian origin in urban centres. Hence, most 
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of the notable results of Jordan’s elections, such those that took place 
in 2007, 2010 and 2013, were somewhat ‘forged,’ in fear of producing a 
house of parliament from Jordanians of Palestinian origin from the 
urban centres, who may oppose traditional Jordanian political power 
and the government.  
 
After the Arab Spring, the Jordanian government implemented a plan to 
reform Jordan’s electoral law and system. In the last legislative 
elections in September 2016, Jordan moved onto a more democratic 
electoral design, through the implementation of electoral rolls and 
proportional representation, where voters have the right to select 
candidates from a voting bloc based on their preferences. Although this 
radically significant shift has been applauded by many local and 
international observers, the results of the 2016 election again produced 
a largely loyalist, weak and compliant house of parliament with little 
power in reality.  
 
The results of the 2016 elections have led many Jordanians to continue 
to perceive their House of Representatives (Majlis An-Nuwaab) as a 
‘rubber stamp’ for the government. For example, Omar Abdallat’s 
political cartoon in Figure 12 emphasises this public issue through the 
representation of the members of Jordan’s parliament as ‘puppets’ that 
are controlled by the central government. The cartoon portrays Jordan’s 
House of Parliament as weak and incompetent, and whose decisions 
are heavily influenced by the central government’s dictates. 
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Figure 12. Jordan’s House of Parliament as a puppet to the government 
[Cartoon], Omar Abdallat, 2014 
 
Jordan’s most famous socio-political satirist Ahmad Hassan Al-Zou’bi 
made similar observations about the 2016 parliamentary elections. In 
one Facebook post published on 23 July 2016, he argued that the 
results of the 2016 parliamentary elections led in reality to no real 
democratic transition and change, as the government promised. In this 
Facebook post (see Figure 13 below), Al-Zou’bi parodied the 2016 
parliamentary elections, stating that “Jordanian elections are ba’el 
(fruitless).” He noted that Al-Kalaldeh, [Chairman of the IEC], 
proclaimed that the possibility of one candidate’s victory without 
receiving any votes would be possible. Here the satirist is parodying: 
“Yazem, what is wrong with you?” Yazem is a comic shorthand for ya 
zalameh, man in the Jordanian vernacular. He goes on: “under this 
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prejudiced electoral law (meaning the proportional representation 
electoral law), a candidate, as Al-Zou’bi proclaimed, can even win 
without running for an election.” Figure 13 below shows Al-Zou'bi’s 
Facebook post on his news satire agency (Sawaleif), which he 
established in 2011 as an online platform for criticising and making fun 
of the government and its official discourses.     
 
 
Figure 13. Jordanian parliamentary elections are ba’el (fruitless) 
[Facebook post], Ahmad Hassan Al-Zou’bi, 2016 
 
Jordanian political humour and satire in social media spaces has 
produced some carnivalesque politics that are similar to those 
highlighted by Bakhtin in his analysis of Rabelais and 16th century 
France about “carnival festivities and the comic spectacles and rituals 
[that are] connected with them” (Bakhtin, 1984a, p. 6). In the light of 
Bakhtin’s ideas about carnival, it can be argued that the Jordanian 
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elections have turned into comic protocols and a set of formalised, 
affirmative and cosmetic practices for reform that have produced so far 
little impact on the freedom of choice and democracy.  
 
In Figure 13 above, the official tone of Khaled al-Kalaldeh, the Head of 
the Jordanian IEC, has been comically parodied to the extent that the 
entire process of electing in Jordan has been stripped of its prerogative 
for change. The placing of the local phrase “ba’l,” as used by the satirist 
Al-Zou’bi at the beginning of his Facebook post, parodies the end result 
of such elections. The reference for the Arabic word “ba’l” is farcical 
here. It represents an experiential metaphor that is borrowed from the 
agricultural domain. It refers to a plant (read elections) being left without 
being watered and nurtured, and thus dependent on rainfall to survive 
(read the execution of elections without proper government oversight 
and supervision). The metaphor shows the government’s apathy 
towards the result of the elections, as the would-be elected MPs will be 
entirely controlled by the central government. The would-be elected 
MPs are understood therefore to work for the government and not for 
the people. 
 
Elections in Jordan have tended to sanction the government’s official 
stance about reinforcing the regime’s established norms. In Bakhtin’s 
terms, this stance has tended to present “the triumph of a truth [that is] 
already established, [which is] the predominant truth that was put 
forward as eternal and indisputable” (Bakhtin, 1984a, p. 9). In this way, 
Chapter 5 Jordanian political humour after the Arab Spring   267 
 
 
 
elections in Jordan have consequently led to the perception of 
reinforcing the stable, hierarchical and the monolithic nature of the 
regime. In the light of Bakhtin’s ideas about carnival, such perception is 
intolerant and oppressive because it can restrict the language of 
change and progress for modernity. As a result, the whole process of 
elections and democratisation in Jordan, in Bakhtin’s terms, has 
become like “an entire system of crooked mirrors, elongating, 
diminishing, distorting in various directions and to various degrees” 
(Bakhtin, 1984b, p. 127). The views of Al-Zou’bi about elections in 
Jordan suggest that the later have had in reality little impact on political 
change.  
 
To sum up, the use of parody in Jordanian political humour in social 
media spaces after the Arab Spring has targeted, mostly, three key 
themes: government corruption, inflation and parliamentary elections. 
This form of carnivalesque parody against power was not expounded 
and developed by Bakhtin. This is perhaps because of the oppressive 
and dangerous regime in which he lived, or, more likely, because it was 
just not part of the texts he studied (in this case the work of Rabelais 
and Dostoevsky). Jordanian political humour and satire after the Arab 
Spring has exposed to the people the true meaning of the government’s 
rhetoric, and parody has embodied its lower credibility among carnival-
goers in Jordanian social media spaces.  
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From a Bakhtinian perspective, the use of parody in Jordanian political 
humour and satire has replaced the semantic intention of the 
government’s rhetoric about reform with a set of words and phrases 
that have produced comic and parodic effects among the carnival-goers 
in Jordanian social media spaces. Such parody has some connections 
and links with the counter-political culture of carnival in the Middle 
Ages, and the disaffected public in the Soviet Union. In the context of 
Jordanian political humour after the Arab Spring, parody has functioned 
as a tool for counter-political force against the government’s rhetoric 
about reform and its processes. The use of parody in such context has 
become a subversive tool that has enabled many Jordanian people 
online to fiercely critique the manipulative use of language produced by 
government officials when addressing the public. Such use of parody 
relates to Bakhtin’s theory of carnival and the carnivalesque and its 
application to understand modern-day carnivals in social media spaces. 
The humour expounded in this quality performs a licensed disruption 
because it allows parody of the government but not of the monarch. 
Such parody appears to be presenting opposing points of view but are 
in fact reinforcing the regime’s core issues and norms.  
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5.2.3 Mocking the government  
In this quality, Jordanian political humour moves from ‘glorifying’ the 
government to provocatively challenging the power of government. This 
is done through the degradation of the lofty image of, in these 
examples, the Prime Minister, and some government officials. In 
contrast to the earlier form of glorifying humour, the mocking in this 
quality is expressed using the use of unironically crude language (the 
language of the marketplace), ambiguity and indirect speech acts to 
promote popular resistance against political power. This approach 
makes Jordanian political humour after the Arab Spring more 
subversive than infringing in nature because it implies a strong degree 
of disrespect that speaks truth to power.  
 
This quality of Jordanian social media humour relates to three context-
relevant applications of Bakhtin’s notion of mocking dominant power 
and its hegemonic discourse: (1) the use of the carnivalesque as a 
counter-political force and tool for resistance against the government’s 
rhetoric about economic reform, which has had negative impacts on the 
livelihood of many Jordanians, (2) the use of the grotesque for mocking 
senior government officials, and (3) the use of hypocrisy (Bakhtin’s two 
lives) against government statements: one official, and the second 
evoking the life of carnival.  
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In this quality as applied to this context, carnivalesque political humour 
plays out as a counter-narrative against the government’s rhetoric 
about economic reform. It implies particular popular resistance against 
government austerity measures that lifted subsidies and increased the 
price of food and fuel after the Jordan-IMF deals from 2012. The 
Jordan-IMF deals were meant to introduce new, reforming fiscal and 
monetary policies to reduce the country’s burgeoning fiscal deficit and 
national debt (The IMF, Press Release, 2012). However, the deals have 
proven to be repressive and disadvantageous to Jordan’s economic 
independence and autonomy. For example, in Figure 14 below, 
government rhetoric about economic reform has been comically 
mocked, ridiculed and called into question.  
 
The cartoon shows a Jordanian citizen engaged in a hypothetical 
conversation with the Prime Minister Abdullah Ensour. The Jordanian 
citizen, seen in a skeleton form, asks Prime Minister Ensour about the 
end result of the government’s economic reform programme. The 
citizen claims that “We (Jordanians) are about to disappear.” The Prime 
Minister (left) responds too coldly to the Jordanian citizen and asks him 
to be patient about the result of the economic reform programme. 
Addressing the citizen, the Prime Minister says, “No man, I can see that 
you still have a little bit of spirit (soul) to support government economic 
reform programmes.”  
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Figure 14. The impact of Jordan’s economic reform programme 
[Cartoon], Alaa Tabash, 2014 
 
In Bakhtin’s terms, this cartoon uses the carnivalesque and the 
language of the marketplace as a counter-narrative to the government 
rhetoric about economic reform and its processes. The mockery in this 
cartoon above resides in the implicit meaning of the Jordanian Arabic 
colloquial expression “Ihna khalasna ‘ala el-akher,” meaning “We 
[Jordanians] are about to disappear.” The Jordanian citizen looks 
skeletal and nearly dead, reflecting his poor health and economic status 
following government economic reform. This colloquial expression has 
a meaning in local Jordanian culture. It connotes the demise of 
someone or something due to the impact of an external and greater 
power (in this case the government). The expression conveys the 
message that many Jordanians are no longer able to bear the 
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government’s economic reform programme and the IMF-guided 
financial policy.   
 
In Figure 14 above, the carnivalesque political humour resides in the 
cold response received from Jordan’s Prime Minister Ensour when he 
replies “La ya zem … ana shayef inu dhayel feek shwayet rouh,” which 
can be literally translated as “No man, I can see that you still have a 
little bit of spirit (soul) to support government economic reform 
programmes.” The mockery in this cartoon is noted when the Prime 
Minister uses the colloquial shorthand “la ya zem” for “la ya zalameh 
(No man)” in order to denote an element of informal fraternity between 
the Prime Minister and the Jordanian citizen. In local Jordanian culture, 
the use of informal language connotes an element of ‘bromance’ 
between men.  
 
Here the conversation divorces the Prime Minister from his ‘glorified’ 
status and achieves therefore an element of Bakhtin’s theme of the 
carnivalesque as a tool against political power and people in authority. 
The Prime Minister is portrayed as apathetic and careless. He uses the 
informal language of the marketplace that further enhances the 
mocking of the dominant force and its attitudes towards the ordinary 
people. This discourse represents, in Bakhtin’s terms, an “internally 
persuasive discourse” in which the Jordanian citizen’s use of colloquial 
linguistic expression provides “newer and more novel ways of meaning” 
(Bakhtin, 1981, p. 346). The colloquial discourse in the cartoon above is 
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infused with persuasive double-voiced words. This wording in the 
cartoon represents, in Bakhtin’s terms, a counter-discourse that is “half-
ours and half-someone else’s” (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 345). In other words, 
part of the meaning in the citizen’s words belong to the denotative 
meaning about ‘the demise of Jordanians,’ but the other part, belongs 
to the connotative meaning about the negative impact of economic 
reform programme.   
 
The carnivalesque politics against government emerges from the 
evasive use of language that echoes two different voices, implicitly 
challenging the government’s rhetoric about economic reform, and 
explicitly confronting the result. This interplay triggers, in Bakhtin’s 
terms, an element of “festive laughter” that both mocks and derides the 
political power. The result is similar to what Badarneh (2011) termed in 
his analysis of Arab political jokes a “centrifugal” unofficial discourse 
(Badarneh, 2011, p. 308). The words of the Jordanian citizen are 
infused with an implicit act of resistance against power, which is an 
essential element of Bakhtin’s notion of the carnivalesque.  
 
The mode of Bakhtin’s carnivalesque resistance is primarily achieved 
using satire and ridicule, and not through direct opposition in the 
streets. As such, the cartoon reflects the use of carnivalesque political 
humour and satire as a subversive communication strategy against the 
government. The words of the Jordanian citizen show an attitude of 
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irreverence toward the official discourse of the government, and a 
desire to mock the government and its economic reform programme.   
 
In post Arab Spring Jordan, it should be noted that the government has 
been given some ‘derogatory’ labels, such as ‘the government of 
collection,’ ‘the government of corruption,’ ‘the government of high 
prices’ and ‘the government of taxation.’ As a result, Jordanian political 
humour and satire in Jordanian social media spaces after the Arab 
Spring has always tended (and continues to) emphasise a type of 
government that frequently resorts to ordinary people’s pockets, rather 
than the elite’s, as a means to reduce the country’s fiscal deficit and 
public debt.   
 
For example, in one politically satirical article ‘Why the people of Jordan 
reject the government’s nuclear programme’ (2014), Jordan’s most 
famous political satirist and online activist Ahmad Hassan Al-Zou’bi 
mocks the government’s narrative about the guaranteed success of 
Jordan’s nuclear reactor in saving energy. In this article, he refutes the 
official statements made by Dr Khalid Touqan, the President of Jordan 
Atomic Energy Commission, about Japan’s mistakes. Al-Zou’bi argues 
that Jordan, given its new experience in this field, will not overcome the 
problems that faced Japan. The satirist Al-Zou’bi mocks Touqan’s 
unconventional and hard-to-believe explanation that the failure of 
Japan’s nuclear programme was attributed to a small ‘administrative’ 
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mistake that could have been avoided if managed properly by the 
Japanese government.  
 
In this satirical article, Al-Zou’bi mocks the Jordanian government’s 
rhetoric about the safety of its nuclear programme, compared to 
Japan’s programme. He argues that “if the Japanese people, who know 
how to do kohl for one lice’s eyelid, have committed a small 
administrative fault in their nuclear programme, how can Jordan, which 
has little experience in this field, be immune” (Al-Zou’bi, 2014). It is 
observable that the satirist’s use of mockery of the official government 
statements about reform suggests that many Jordanian people do not 
now trust their government.  
 
Most Jordanians, according to an opinion poll conducted by the 
University of Jordan’s Centre for Strategic Studies in 2019, remain very 
sceptical about the government’s reassuring statements regarding the 
guaranteed success of Jordan’s reform programmes and the country’s 
future. The survey shows that 65% of the Jordanian people believed the 
government is going in the wrong direction (Husseini, 2019). Overall, 
the results show that level of trust between the government and people 
in Jordan is decreasing rapidly.  
 
Omar Abdallat’s political cartoons in Figures 15 and 16 below perfectly 
reflect this type of carnivalesque political humour that challenges the 
power of the government and the regime’s established idea about 
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Jordan being the only oasis for peace, security and stability in the 
Middle East region. In Figure 15, the political cartoon mocks the state of 
inertia of the Jordanian government amid growing fears of nuclear 
attacks in neighbouring Syria. The cartoonist allegedly reports that even 
the government of Israel (Jordan’s enemy) has managed to distribute 
nuclear masks to its citizens. However, the government of Jordan has 
not even distributed Hisn al-Muslim (Fortress of the Muslim), which 
refers to supplications from the Quran and the Sunnah (narrations of 
Prophet Muhammad’s sayings and acts and those of his companions) 
in times of fear and insecurity.  
 
The humour in this political cartoon resists the regime’s promotion of 
the idea of Jordan’s security and stability. In contradiction, the cartoon 
highlights the greater state responsibility for the safety and security of 
its citizens in non-Arab countries (Israel in this context) than those in 
Arab countries, such as Jordan. The cartoonist has implied therefore 
that living in Israel is better than Jordan, when it comes to the state’s 
responsibility for the safety and security of its citizens at times of war.                       
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Figure 15. Distribution of nuclear masks to the people of Israel 
[Cartoon], Omar Abdallat, 2013 
 
In Bakhtin’s terms, the humour in the above cartoon is subversive 
because it challenges the established regime’s idea about Jordan’s 
security and stability. By the same token, in Figure 16 below, the 
cartoonist Abdallat mocks the very basic idea of the government’s 
discourse about its economic reform programme. He is pessimistic and 
implies in the cartoon below that “waiting for a progressive government 
reform programme is like waiting for Haifa Wehbe to appear on the Al-
Resalah Satellite Channel.” The cartoonist reflects that waiting for the 
implementation of a genuine government economic reform programme 
in Jordan is difficult, if not impossible. This explanation is based on the 
failure of past government policies on economic reform, and how they 
have adversely impacted ordinary people’s living.  
 
Chapter 5 Jordanian political humour after the Arab Spring   278 
 
 
 
In this cartoon, Abdallat mocks Jordan’s economic reform and 
compares it with the unlikely act of waiting for Haifa Wehbe, infamous 
Lebanese singer and actress, to appear on Al-Resalah, an Islam-based 
satellite channel that airs from Saudi Arabia and which would never 
sanction the appearance of Ms Wehbe in its broadcasts. The view of 
Wehbe’s chest and body suggest a powerfully sexualised image. The 
notion of the use of over-sexualised images, taboos and scatological 
humour in Jordanian political humour after the Arab Spring is discussed 
in further detail in section 4 of this chapter: scatalogising the 
government. In Figure 16 below, the cartoonist is asserting that a 
genuine economic reform programme has not and will never be 
achieved in Jordan, given the government’s unwillingness to implement 
real reform programmes. Hence, the cartoon directly reflects the lack of 
confidence in official discourse about economic reform, based on the 
current government approach that has benefited only the political elite 
and their entourage.  
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Figure 16. Waiting for a Jordanian government progressive reform is 
like waiting for Haifa Wehbe to appear on Al-Resalah [Cartoon], Omar 
Abdallat, 2015 
 
Furthermore, in Jordanian political humour after the Arab Spring, the 
image of the belly has been a source for the grotesque, with reference 
to the corruption of some government officials and the political elite. 
Figure 17 below shows a Jordanian citizen, pointing to the belly of a 
government official, and asking him “Where did you get that from?”, as 
an indication of government corruption. The government official is 
clearly represented with a grotesque image that is related to overeating 
and greed. The cartoonist has also made the official’s belly a safe to 
show the corruption political elite. In Bakhtin’s terms, the belly relates to 
acts of pregnancy and birth, which Bakhtin highlighted in Rabelais’ 
Gargantua and Pantagruel, two giants. The image of the belly is also 
central to Bakhtin’s notions of the grotesque body, and the belly-laugh. 
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In Bakhtin’s ideas about carnival, the belly is fundamentally linked to 
carnivalesque politics against power because it represents an element 
of subversion and resistance to people in power.   
 
According to Bakhtin, the belly is one of the essential sources for 
degradation. It is also sometimes used in grotesque realism to draw 
reference to the lower bodily acts of defecation and excess. The belly 
has also been related to other acts of regeneration and production. To 
substantiate this claim, Bakhtin has argued that degradation “digs a 
bodily grave for a new birth; it has not only destructive, negative aspect, 
but also regenerating one” (Bakhtin, 1984a, p. 21). Therefore, the 
image that presents the government official with a belly suggests a 
perfect way for degradation and debasement in Bakhtinian terms, as 
reflected in political humour and satire in Jordanian social media 
spaces after the Arab Spring. 
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Figure 17. This is from the blessing of my God [Cartoon], Osama Hajjaj, 
2013 
 
In political humour and satire shared under repressive authoritarian 
regimes, Bakhtin highlights (rather indirectly because of the oppressive 
and dangerous regime in which he lived) the state of ambivalence and 
duplicity of the official discourse of these regimes. His argument is 
outlined through his concept of the “two lives” of regime: one official, 
which is filled with fear, and the other the life of carnival, which he 
defines as a permitted violation of established norms that are often 
endorsed by a repressive regime (Bakhtin, 1984a, p. 96). Bakhtin’s 
notion of licensed transgression is useful when we think about the 
degree of criticism that is allowed, increasingly albeit inconsistently in 
Jordan, by those in power to enable the people to let off steam and to 
cope with socio-economic inequalities and political repression.   
 
In Figure 18 below, Prime Minister Abdullah Ensour is said to have 
proclaimed two official (but different) statements about his opinion on 
military actions and interventions in Syria. In the morning, he officially 
states that “We are with any military actions in Syria.” At night, however, 
he officially declares that “We are against any military actions in Syria.” 
Here, the Prime Minister gives two official statements, one public and 
one private, which makes Bakhtin’s conception of the “two lives” 
pertinent. These two statements aim to express an equivocal position 
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and to distract public opinion about a particularly sensitive issue for 
many Jordanians.  
 
To explain Bakhtin’s ideas about carnival, the internet meme in Figure 
13 below mocks the gap between the government’s public discourse 
and its private position. The placing of the famous Egyptian actor 
Saeed Saleh (right) from the comedy play Madrasat el-moshaghebeen 
(The school of the mischievous, 1973) further mocks the Prime 
Minister’s two official statements. This is done by inserting a ‘new third 
life’ that calls for opposition and resistance towards the government 
because of its two different stances: ‘for’ and ‘against.’ The inclusion of 
the Egyptian comedian is intentionally farcical because it makes fun of 
the government’s two opinions about military actions and interventions 
in Syria.  
 
Figure 18. Prime Minister Abdullah Ensour’s position towards military 
actions and interventions in Syria [Internet meme], 2013 
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According to Badarneh (2011, p. 314), Bakhtin’s ideas about carnival 
highlight two different approaches. The first is “the official life,” which 
“sanctions and supports what the foreigner is about to commit against a 
‘fraternal country,’ the term favoured by the official discourse of the 
regime.” The second life, as Bakhtin conceptualises it, is “the life of 
carnival square,” which is “free and unrestricted, [and] full of ambivalent 
laughter” (Bakhtin, 1984b, p. 129). In the view of the meme above, the 
second approach is apparent when the Prime Minister stands in support 
of public demands (albeit falsely) and is portrayed as saying “We are 
against any military actions in Syria.”  
 
According to Bakhtin (1984b, p. 130), “both these [two lives] are 
legitimate” for carnival-goers. These two lives contribute to the 
carnivalesque theme of mésalliance which combines the opposites or 
the grotesque in order to create a mockery of political power and its 
official discourse. As such, Bakhtin’s concept of the two lives is 
necessary to understand differences in the government’s official 
discourse and its carnivalistic mésalliances, which have created 
mockery among many Jordanians in social media spaces.   
 
As evidence analysed here shows, Jordanian political humour and 
satire shared in Jordanian social media spaces after the Arab Spring 
has thus become a tool for carnivalesque politics and power resistance. 
It uses a subversive tool for expressing resistance and disaffection with 
the government and its official discourse about reform. The mode of 
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resistance here is the mode of satire and critique, and above all the use 
of mockery as a tool to challenge the legitimacy of political power. This 
quality has identified the relevance and the application of Bakhtin’s 
ideas about carnival to Jordanian humour after the Arab Spring. The 
humour expounded here about the mocking of the government 
performs a licensed disruption of accepted societal and political norms 
because it allows mock of the government but not of the monarch. Such 
mockery encourages a certain degree of criticism, but within the 
confined limits and accepted societal norms in Jordan.     
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5.2.4 Scatologising the government 
In this fourth quality, I focus on how Jordanian political humour after the 
Arab Spring has used bodily functions to degrade, disrupt, and express 
resentment and frustration over the government’s economic and 
political reform programmes. Scatological humour (also known as toilet 
humour) uses a wide range of taboo topics, such as defecation, 
flatulence, urination and other types of lower body functions (Badarneh, 
2011, p. 321). Jordanian scatological humour has involved a wide 
range of references to body parts, similar to those identified by Bakhtin, 
such as “apertures or convexities, or various ramifications and 
offshoots: the open mouth, the genital organs, the breasts, the phallus, 
the potbelly, [and] the nose” (Bakhtin, 1984a, p. 26).  
 
In Bakhtin’s terms, scatological humour and satire can be considered a 
key and effective device for degradation and insult to people in power. 
Through degradation, the sanctity and solemnity of a government’s 
official discourse is ridiculed and put into question, with the purpose of 
challenging and deflating it. The official discourse becomes therefore 
the subject of comic parody. According to Badarneh (2011), this type of 
humour is associated with a high level of risk because it “associates the 
regime with the lower stratum of the body, which is extremely insulting 
in social and cultural terms” (Badarneh, 2011, p. 321). This explanation 
suggests that such a type of carnivalesque political humour is 
precarious because it involves the use of the grotesque and sexual 
analogy in describing political power and official discourse.  
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Examples of scatological humour can be found in earlier Jordanian 
political humour during the 1996 Bread Riots. That year witnessed a 
crucial government economic decision that removed state subsidies 
and offered a compensation mechanism to mitigate the impact on the 
poor of the subsequent increase in prices. For the purposes of clarifying 
the government’s intention and proposed plan, the then Prime Minister, 
Abdul-Karim Al-Kabariti (in office from February 1995 to March 1997), 
unintentionally stated in a news conference “... ad-daf’ qabel al-raf’,” 
which can be literally translated as paying [the people] before raising 
[the prices]. The Prime Minister was meant to say that the government 
would first compensate the poor, before raising the subsidies. However, 
the phraseology was deliberately interpreted by many ordinary 
Jordanians in the streets as carrying out a sexual act of penetration and 
“striking a deal with a prostitute” (Farghal, 2006, para. 7; Badarneh, 
2011, p. 319). The phraseology was derived from the local Jordanian 
culture and pertains to the interpretation of heterosexual intercourse, 
where the man raises high his partner’s leg before penetrating her.  
 
As a result, the government’s solemn statement about economic reform 
was comically and mischievously viewed by many Jordanians as a 
symbolic act of prostitution, where the government aimed to penetrate 
the poor. Since then, that phrase has been widely used by many 
ordinary Jordanians to poke fun at the government’s intentions and 
economic plans and woes. Drawing on Bakhtin’s notion of the 
grotesque, the carnivalesque images of prostitution and copulation 
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portrayed in such contexts are used to comically challenge the 
authoritative role of the government, and its lofty image. This form of 
scatological political humour and satire is notable because it has 
created what Charles Schutz (1976, p. 67) called a “psychological 
equality” between the lofty and the low, where the government and the 
poor are equal. The transformation of the government’s rhetoric about 
economic reform into grotesque images and acts of sexual intercourse 
serves to challenge the government’s rhetoric about economic reform, 
and further degrade the dominant power and its superiority over the 
ordinary people.  
 
Jordanian socio-political humourists and satirists have used their social 
media spaces as a platform to present a wide range of scatological 
humour and satire in order to make fun of the government and its 
rhetoric about economic and political reforms. For example, in Figure 
19 below, Omar Abdallat's political cartoon pokes fun at the negative 
impact of economic reform on the poor through the depiction of 
government economic reform as khawazigs (impalements) that aim 
metaphorically to ‘penetrate’ the people. This cartoon refers to what 
Bakhtin calls “the transfer of every high ceremonial gesture or ritual to 
the material sphere” (Bakhtin, 1984a, p. 20). The image of the triangle 
(in the form of an impalement) that touches the anus indicates a sexual 
allusion to the negative impact of economic reform in Jordan after the 
Arab Spring. The cartoon aims to criticise Prime Minister Abdullah 
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Ensour’s statement about the government’s willingness to persist with 
its subsidy removal and overall economic reform.  
 
To achieve its carnivalesque scatological parody, the cartoon uses the 
voice of one Jordanian citizen (sitting as if impaled) ironically urging the 
Prime Minister to keep penetrating. Furthermore, the cartoon involves a 
sexually motivated allusion based on the implicit meaning of khawazig 
(impalement) in the Jordanian socio-cultural context. It should be noted 
that the act of impalement is an old method of torturing that involved the 
act of penetration of a human in order to achieve a partial or complete 
perforation as a punishment for major crimes against the state.  
 
In the light of Bakhtin’s theory of carnival and the carnivalesque, the 
cartoon achieves its humorous effect from the voice of the citizen who 
urged the Prime Minister to keep penetrating. The Jordanian colloquial 
phrase “rouh ya kbeer,” which literally can be translated as “Go on, big 
boss,” implies a surprising degree of the citizen’s satisfaction despite 
being impaled. Many Jordanians in social media spaces have used the 
term ‘impalement’ as a tool to scatologise the government’s decisions 
after each increase in prices, including electricity, food and fuel.  
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Figure 19. Jordan’s Prime Minister Abdullah Ensour: There will be no 
more increase of prices [Cartoon], Omar Abdallat, 2013 
 
A second scatological example analysed here comes from another 
widely circulated local phrase which reads as As-Sha'ab makel kharaa 
doultak, which can be translated as “The people of Jordan are hungry 
… They are eating shit, Prime Minister” (Malkawi, 2017). The phrase 
has been widespread in Jordanian social media spaces and its first 
recorded use was viewed by thousands of people on YouTube at the 
time of writing this thesis. The phrase was uttered directly by a local 
Jordanian citizen to the Prime Minister Hani al-Mulki when he visited 
the city of Irbid, in the north of Jordan, in April 2017. The phrase 
metaphorically depicts the effect of the government economic reform 
programme on the poor, and links it with the lowering act of defecation, 
as in the case of carnivalesque, scatalogical political humour and satire. 
It was also used frequently as a subversive tool by young Jordanian 
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people in social media spaces after the 2011–12 protests that 
demanded political reform, and after the 2018 protests over tax 
increases and increasing IMF-backed reform and austerity measures. 
 
Using scatological humour, carnivalesque Jordanian political humour in 
social media spaces has been notable because it has created a 
grotesque image of the government’s rhetoric about economic reform, 
and its negative impact on the poor. In their book The politics and 
poetics of transgression (1986), Peter Stallybrass and Allon White 
argued that the grotesque body has a “transformative power” that helps 
to challenge the lofty and their divine status, and treats them as normal 
human beings (1986, p. 43). From this perspective, the grotesque in 
carnivalesque Jordanian political humour in social media spaces after 
has operated as a vehicle to critique the government’s dominant power 
and its overall economic methodology about reform.  
 
In this quality, the government has been transformed into a perpetrator 
of sexual act as in the two local phrases: “ad-daf’ qabel al-raf’” and “As-
Sha'ab makel kharaa doultak,” and also as in Figure 19 above. These 
examples have demonstrated the relevance of Bakhtin’s theory of 
carnival and the carnivalesque as a framework to understand the 
negative impact of the Jordanian government’s rhetoric about reform 
and its processes among carnival-goes in Jordanian social media 
spaces. The reaction of some Jordanian people to these phrases was 
evident in the number of views, likes and shares in social media 
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spaces. Many comedy videos have implied sexual analogies of the 
government’s rhetoric about economic reform and its negative impacts 
on people.           
 
Other corporeal and sexual references can be found in political 
cartoons that were drawn by Jordanian political cartoonist Omar 
Abdallat. For example, in Figure 20 below, the cartoonist parodies the 
Prime Minister's official discourse about the proposed economic 
conditions that were set to get improved after a period of 9 months with 
an inserted comic line that reads as “I do not know if this is tasrih 
(official statement), or talqih (fertilisation).” This scatological humour 
comes from the use of two rhyming Arabic words: tasrih which can be 
literally translated as ‘declare’ and talqih which can be literally 
translated as ‘impregnate.’ These two words give reference to the act of 
copulation between the government and Jordanian people. That nine-
month period here is indicative to the meaning of scatological humour 
because it relates to the life cycle of a foetus and the process of 
pregnancy, which Bakhtin highlighted in his analysis of Rabelais’ 16th 
century Gargantua and Pantagruel. As the political cartoon below 
shows, the government is metaphorically seen as a ‘sperm,’ and the 
local Jordanian citizen is depicted as an ‘ovum,’ in order to create this 
notably carnivalesque sexual imagery of power.    
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Figure 20. Jordan’s Prime Minister Hani al-Mulki: Economic and living 
conditions will get improved after 9 months [Cartoon], Omar Abdallat, 
2017 
 
The use in Jordanian political humour of the lower functions of the body 
is significant because such functions are extremely offensive, pejorative 
and insulting in local Jordanian cultural norms. References to sexual 
organs and other sexual behaviours and imagery have been extremely 
taboo in Jordanian society and in public settings. Jokes of this type 
were restricted to intimates before the Arab Spring. However, with the 
notable political influence of the counterculture of the Arab Spring and 
emergence of social media spaces in the last decade, jokes that allude 
to sexual analogies have become more prominent in Jordanian social 
media spaces. They have been used as a tool to further critique the 
government and the negative impact of its economic and political 
reform programmes on people’s lives.  
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Today, these sexual jokes are sometimes shared overtly in public 
discourses, and predominantly in Jordanian social media spaces, with 
less attention to individual reservations and local cultural restrictions. 
This usage suggests that this kind of scatological humour was always 
there in Jordan before the Arab Spring, but it was hidden by local 
cultural norms that prohibited its wider circulation. I argue that there are 
two factors that gave rise to the development of scatological humour in 
Jordanian society since 2011: (1) the Arab Spring, which has instigated 
a lasting socio-political and cultural shift, and (2) social media 
technology, which can, if used wisely, permit anonymity. These two 
factors have arguably liberated this kind of latent humour, which seems 
not to have been imported from other cultures. This kind of scatological 
humour has been widely used as a tool for criticising the government 
and the negative impact of economic reform programmes, perhaps 
because it has created a lasting cultural shift in Jordanian society after 
the Arab Spring. The humour expounded here about scatologising the 
government performs a licensed corruption because it allows 
scatologising the government but not of the monarch. Such use of 
scatological humour that alludes to sexual analogies and the lower 
body functions was found in earlier Jordanian political humour but grow 
even faster after the Arab Spring and advancement in social media 
technology from 2011.            
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5.2.5 Dethroning the government  
In this final quality, examples of carnivalesque political humour and 
satire in Jordanian social media spaces will be linked to Bakhtin’s 
notions of decrowning and the comic death of the lofty (temporary and 
imaginary). In the first quality identified in this chapter, it was shown that 
the lofty image of the prime minister has been exaggeratedly glorified 
and exalted by some Jordanian humourists in order to poke fun at the 
government. However, political humour that demands the metaphorical 
dethroning of prime ministers can arguably be considered 
unprecedented in the relatively short historical tradition of Jordanian 
political humour since 1989.  
 
Early Jordanian political humour and satire tended to maintain a very 
respectful stance towards the government and the political elite, using 
affectionate satire that defended power rather than attacking it. 
Examples of this satire are available in the politically satirical theatre of 
Hisham Yanis and Nabil Sawalha in the early 1990s. However, the 
‘new’ form of political humour and satire that calls for the dethroning of 
political power could not have existed without the socio-political impacts 
of the Arab Spring revolutions and the resulting 2011–12 protests that 
removed the state of sanctity around government officials.  
 
In this last quality of Jordanian political humour and satire in social 
media spaces, the Jordanian prime minister, in Bakhtinian terms, “is 
beaten and mocked” (Bakhtin, 1984a, p. 207). It prepares the “carnival 
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king” (read Jordan’s prime minister) for “mock crowning and 
subsequent decrownings” (Bakhtin, 1984b, p. 124). This explanation 
emphasises that the glorifying humour, outlined in the first quality, is 
intentionally satirical and insincere to power. It alludes to the prime 
minister’s ‘comic death’ and dethroning from power.   
 
In the context of Jordanian political humour shared in social media 
spaces, the act of dethroning happens when the prime minister is no 
longer appreciated and celebrated by the public at large. For example, 
one recent Jordanian political cartoon by Emad Hajjaj portrayed 
Jordanian prime ministers as ‘light bulbs’ with external hands (most 
probably by the royal hands) controlling them, replacing one bulb after 
another, when convenient. This example relates to Bakhtin’s notions of 
decrowning and comic death because it strips the prime minister of his 
power in a very comic way, albeit temporarily and metaphorically.  
 
In the context of post 2018 Jordanian protests that removed Prime 
Minister Hani al-Mulki from power in June 2018, the Jordanian 
cartoonist Emad Hajjaj wanted to emphasise that the replacement of 
Hani al-Mulki with Omar Razzaz was not going to make a real 
difference to the people of Jordan. Razzaz served as al-Mulki’s 
Education Minister. According to Hajjaj’s political cartoon (shown in 
Figure 21 below), they are both seen as two sides of the same coin. It 
should be noted that political humour that critically targets the King or 
the Hashemite royal family is categorically unavailable in Jordan. This is 
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perhaps due to the Hashemite religious legitimacy, being the direct 
offspring of the Prophet Muhammad. In Bakhtin’s terms, such use of 
carnivalesque humour which allows the metaphorical death and 
dethroning of the government, but not, here, of the monarch, performs a 
licenced disruption of the carnival humour in Jordanian social media 
spaces.  
 
In his newspaper article ‘Jordan’s protests are a ritual not a revolution’ 
(2018), Sean Yom argues that the primary role of Jordan’s prime 
ministers is to “implement policies while serving as shock absorbers for 
popular anger” (Yom, 2018, para. 11). The political cartoon below views 
Jordanian prime ministers as very ‘fragile’ whose main role is to absorb 
public discontent and dissatisfaction. Such metaphor is new to 
Bakhtin’s theory of carnival and the carnivalesque. One authority (in this 
case the power of the Hashemite regime in Jordan) can remain 
‘crowned’ and untouchable whilst a parallel authority (in this case the 
power of Jordan’s prime minister) can be regularly decrowned and 
mocked for the purposes of safeguarding the higher power. Such use of 
carnivalesque political humour challenges the application of Bakhtin’s 
notion of crowning (and decrowning) to contemporary Jordanian 
political humour in social media spaces, because there is no one, single 
leader to be ‘crowned’ and ‘uncrowned’. More complex structures of de 
jure and de facto political leadership, as with that in Jordan, necessitate 
a more subtle articulation of the Bakhtinian idea of ‘decrowning’.    
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Figure 21. The ‘new’ government of Omar Razzaz [Cartoon], Emad 
Hajjaj, 2018 
 
Another example of Bakhtin’s “decrowning” can be seen in Figure 22 
below. The former Prime Minister Abdullah Ensour is being stripped of 
his power and authority in a very comic way that triggers his dethroning 
and comic death. The dethroning is even encouraged by a member of 
Ensour’s government, the Minister of Islamic Affairs. This internet 
meme is presented in the form of a joke-telling when King Abdullah of 
Jordan, the Prime Minister, and several government ministers happen 
to be on an aircraft. The King is seen to be preoccupied with a way to 
placate the people of Jordan. To do so, the King suggests throwing a 
20 Jordanian Dinars note from the plane to placate one of his people. 
At this time, the Minister of Finance intervenes and says, “Your Majesty, 
why don't you divide the 20 note into two, and placate two people 
instead on one?” The King concurs. However, the Minister of 
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Agriculture intervenes, and suggests “Your Majesty, why don’t you 
divide the 20 note into four, and placate four people instead of two?” 
The King concurs again. However, the Minister of Islamic Affairs 
intervenes, and suggests “Your Majesty, why don’t you throw Prime 
Minister Abdullah Ensour off the plane in order to placate the entire 
people of Jordan.”  
 
This joke reflects Bakhtin’s notion of decrowning and the comic death of 
a ruler. Such humour reflects, according to Bakhtin, “the defeat of 
power, of earthly kings, of the earthly upper class, of all that oppresses 
and restricts” in the people’s short-lived life in the carnival square 
(Bakhtin, 1984a, p. 92). This type of carnivalesque political humour and 
satire achieves in imaginary world an element of psychological victory 
over those in power, over death and over all the sacred things in life. In 
his essay ‘Wit and politics: An essay on laughter and power’ (1998), 
Hans Speier describes this death-wish as a type of carnivalesque 
political humour because it plays “with death thoughts and mocks the 
enemy for rejoicing about his morality, or even treating his death as a 
comic death” (Speier, 1998, p. 1396). This explanation about 
dethroning humour can be found in Figure 22 below.     
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Figure 22. Jordan’s King Abdullah on a plane with Prime Minister 
Abdullah Ensour and senior government officials [Internet meme], 2013 
 
Another political cartoon by Omar Abdallat (See Figure 23 below) takes 
a slight detour from the moment when the government official is being 
exalted to the moment of decrowning and comic death. This political 
cartoon presents a conversation between a government official and a 
Jordanian citizen. The government official is seen using a religious 
expression “hadha min fadhle rabbi”, meaning “this is from the blessing 
of God” while making a reference to his belly. The official figure wants 
to highlight that all his wealth and fortune has come to him from the 
blessing and grace of the God. This representation is depicted through 
a special reference to grotesque imagery of his belly, which can be 
seen sticking out from his clothes. Seen invoking God too, the 
Jordanian citizen yells at the government official “Allah yokhdhak,” 
which can be translated as “May God take you then.” In this way, the 
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Jordanian citizen has voiced his disaffection with those people in 
power. He expressed his resentment and wished death for government 
officials because of their corruption and wealth. It should be noted that 
the use of colloquialism in the citizen’s phrases reminds us of Bakhtin’s 
views and thoughts about the use of the language of the marketplace in 
the carnival square against power and in resistance to those people in 
power.  
 
In his book about Rabelais and 16th century France, Bakhtin argues that 
this type of language has a peculiar ability to “mock and insult the deity 
[sacred figures]” (Bakhtin, 1984a, p. 16). In addition to the grotesque 
images of the belly and the buttock as sources of degradation, as in 
Bakhtin’s theory of carnival, this cartoon relies on the use of a religious 
phrase “Allah yokh-dhak” to achieve its carnivalesque political humour 
effect. The placing of “hadha min fadhle rabbi” as a sacred religious 
formula by the government official has produced an implicit mockery 
that is meant to destabilise its genuine meaning in Islamic religious 
discourse. The invocation from the Jordanian citizen, however, has 
produced a carnivalesque image of decrowning and comic death to that 
government official. This is shown when the death of a government 
official becomes a ‘blessing’ and a source of happiness for many 
carnival-goers in Jordanian social media spaces.    
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Figure 23. The fortune of a Jordanian government official is blessed by 
God’s grace [Cartoon], Omar Abdallat, 2013 
 
The last political cartoon presented here can be best analysed through 
Bakhtin’s concept of comic death, but this time using a unique 
phraseology that aims to put an end to the Prime Minister’s tenure. In 
Figure 24 below, the comic dethroning of Jordan’s Prime Minister 
Abdullah Ensour happens when Abu Saqer (right), a fictional humorous 
character played by Jordanian veteran comedian Musa Hijazin, 
engages in a hypothetical conversation with the Prime Minister Ensour. 
Abu Saqer, who looks shabby and tramp-like in appearance, asks 
Prime Minister Ensour about the end date of his post as a prime 
minister for Jordan, indicating from his clothes a worsening economic 
situation for many Jordanians under Ensour’s government. The humour 
in this last political cartoon resides in the multiple meanings of the 
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Arabic word (Eid) and its humorous derivatives in Jordanian culture and 
vernacular. The word can either refer to a time of religious festival 
celebration that marks the end of the fasting month of Ramadan and 
the beginning of the new Islamic lunar calendar, or it can be used as a 
humorous adjective to indicate an interrogative linguistic expression 
that conveys a wish to end someone’s duty. This semantic ambivalence 
resonates with Bakhtin’s theory of carnival and his notion about the 
dethroning and the comic death of political power. It expresses people’s 
disaffection and frustration with people in power.  
 
 
Figure 24. We [the people of Jordan] are about to be penniless 
[Cartoon], Osama Hajjaj, 2015 
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As evidence analysed in this chapter shows, Jordanian political humour 
after the Arab Spring has some distinctive qualities that (unsurprisingly) 
go beyond Bakhtin’s concept of carnival. Bakhtin’s ideas about carnival 
can be considered static because they understandably ‘ignored’ how 
socio-political and technical developments could influence the 
expression of certain types of humour and satire against power and 
authority. For example, humour in social media spaces permits greater 
anonymity and its contributions are more individualised than Bakhtin 
could ever conceptualise. The way humour is shared, liked or even 
retweeted in social media makes the role of individual agency 
important. However, that does not make Freud more important than 
Bakhtin, but rather, the collective experience of social media spaces 
makes Bakhtin more important than Freud. Carnivals in social media 
spaces and in most online platforms can be archived and therefore can 
be easily retrieved. These qualities that characterise modern-day 
carnivals in social media spaces are among the biggest challenges to 
the application of Bakhtin’s ideas about carnival and the carnivalesque.      
 
Furthermore, there have been some significant changes in the 
development of the role of humour in socio-political spheres in Jordan 
after the Arab Spring. The country has implemented a series of socio-
political and economic reform programmes since 2011. These 
developments have caused only ‘façade’ reforms and little changes to 
the real political scene, which has not changed much in the direction 
that protesters have hoped. However, this does not mean that the ‘new 
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humour’ has no effect. Its very continuation and expansion can suggest 
it has had some indirect effects. These include some ‘soft’ 
psychological changes to what is considered a suitable target for 
humour, to what is and is not too risky and to what is considered rude 
and unacceptable in societal norms. Such humour has performed, 
nevertheless, a licensed disruption because the Hashemite regime has 
remained ‘crowned’ and untouchable, whilst the government has been 
regularly decrowned and mocked to safeguard the higher power.      
 
Given the extreme political oppression and unpredictability of the 
Stalinist regime, Bakhtin did not really discuss the impact or legacy of 
carnival: he argued for its being ephemeral. Nonetheless, the 
application of Bakhtin’s ideas about carnival to the (less oppressive and 
increasingly less so) modern Jordanian context suggests that this 
‘carnival’ can be considered more than just ephemeral, even though its 
consequences are, in Jordan, as yet slow and indirect. His carnival 
qualities can sometimes be problematic because both the Arab Spring 
(a major political and social transformation period) and social media 
spaces (which were unavailable in Bakhtin’s time) are two of the 
biggest challenges to the application of Bakhtin’s ideas about humour 
on the Jordanian socio-political context after the Arab Spring. In his 
theory of carnival and the carnivalesque, Bakhtin did not and perhaps 
could not acknowledge, first, how political dynamism and change (in 
this thesis the Arab Spring) could influence the expression of certain 
types of political humour and satire against political power and 
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authority, and second, how carnivalesque political humour is exercised 
in open and social platforms (in our age, social media spaces). Bakhtin 
overlooked (and, probably, had to for his own safety) how the political 
act of popular resistance and quasi-rebellion could enable the creation 
of a newly barbed, radical kind of political humour and satire against 
power. The use of humour in Jordanian social media spaces has led 
this research to conclude that such humour has had slow and indirect 
impacts on people’s lives. Political humour shared in social media 
spaces helps people to express critical comments about political power 
and its absurdities. It can help them to become literate in and more 
cognizant of their socio-political and economic conditions. These 
findings help us better gauge the impact of political humour and satire 
in Jordanian social media spaces after the Arab Spring. Therefore, it 
could be argued that Bakhtin’s theory of carnival would benefit from 
amendment or development to make it as a more useful tool for 
analysing modern-day carnivalesque political humour and satire in 
social media spaces.  
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5.3. Conclusion   
This chapter has explored Jordanian political humour in social media 
spaces after the Arab Spring in the light of the application of Bakhtin’s 
theory of carnival and the carnivalesque. In the context of Jordan after 
the Arab Spring, the analysis in this chapter has found that Bakhtin’s 
ideas about carnival are sometimes problematic for an analysis of 
political humour in Jordan after the Arab Spring. This is perhaps 
because Bakhtin was writing about different times and places. He could 
not acknowledge how a different political context, time and social 
platforms could influence the expression of certain types of humour 
against power. His ideas about carnival are static, perhaps because he 
was trying to analyse historical fictions (the work of Rabelais and 
Dostoevsky), or perhaps because of his own political environment, 
which was static and unchangeable (life under Stalin). To identify the 
relevance and some of the weaknesses of Bakhtin’s ideas about 
carnival, the analysis in this chapter has addressed five salient qualities 
of Jordanian political humour after the Arab Spring: praising the 
government (intentionally satirical), parodying the government, mocking 
the government, scatalogising the government, and, finally, dethroning 
the government (the temporally and metaphorically comic death of the 
government). Such humour, I found, has performed a licensed 
disruption because it has ridiculed the government but not the monarch. 
The Hashemite regime remains ‘crowned’ and untouchable whilst the 
Jordanian government has regularly been decrowned and mocked for 
the purposes of safeguarding the higher power.   
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The analysis of political cartoons and comedy sketches has revealed 
that Jordanian political humour has been imbued with several 
carnivalesque qualities that demonstrate relevance, but also some of 
the weaknesses, in the applicability of Bakhtin’s theory of carnival to 
Jordan and the Arab Spring. To identify some of these weaknesses is 
not to criticise Bakhtin directly, but to show how Bakhtin’s theory of 
carnival would benefit from amendment and development in order to 
make it more useful as a tool for analysing modern-day carnivals in 
social media spaces. The use of carnivalesque political humour against 
the government in Jordanian social media spaces has been evident 
especially in relation to the following qualities: government corruption, 
inflation, the government’s rhetoric about reform and its processes, 
gerrymandering politics, and last but not least the representation of the 
Jordanian House of Parliament as a ‘rubber stamp’ for the government.  
 
Jordanian political humour after the Arab Spring has had a number of 
functions: (1) it has functioned as a subversive tool that helps to 
challenge the government’s rhetoric about reform; (2) it has reflected an 
ambiguous kind of resistance that is reactionary in effect and has had 
(so far) little impact on everyday realities; (3) it has offered a solace, a 
space for growing alternative opposition voices against the government. 
These functions, I argue, sometimes challenge Bakhtin’s ideas about 
carnival the carnivalesque. The use of political humour in Jordan after 
the Arab Spring has offered a platform to highlight the socio-economic 
inequalities and the absurdities of political power, but it has done little to 
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destabilise or change that power directly. Nonetheless, the Jordanian 
economic and socio-political situation since the Arab Spring has offered 
an interesting and original reading of Bakhtin by considering something 
that he obviously could not and that few if any scholars of Bakhtin have: 
the significant impact of social media technology on the nature of the 
carnival and (here) the development of political humour and satire. Most 
importantly, it shows how Bakhtin’s theory of carnival would benefit 
from amendment and development to make it more applicable and 
useful as a tool for analysing modern-day carnivals in social media 
spaces. Such development is potentially the key contribution of this 
thesis. 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Jordanian humour has a relatively short research history. Previous 
attention given to Jordanian humour has tended to over-emphasise 
linguistic and translational analyses (e.g. Shakir & Farghal, 1992; 
Farghal & Shakir, 1993; Shunnq, 1996; Al-Khatib, 1999; Al-
Kharabsheh, 2008; Bader, 2014; Al-Momani, Badarneh & Migdadi, 
2016). These studies have utilised the application of two linguistic 
theories of humour, the 1985 script and semantic theory of humour and 
the 1991 general theory of verbal humour as a framework, to analyse 
Jordanian humour and jokes from the perspective of a linguistic 
approach. In these studies, Jordanian humour has been studied 
exclusively from the perspective of language that has highlighted the 
problems in the translation of Jordanian humour into English. What was 
largely missing, however, is the analysis of Jordanian humour from the 
socio-political and cultural approach, where humour has been used as 
a counter-political force and tool for popular resistance against power 
and the government in Jordan through social media in the aftermath of 
the Arab Spring revolutions.    
 
This thesis has offered a different reading of contemporary Jordanian 
humour before, during and after the 2011 Arab Spring revolutions. It 
has utilised the application of Mikhail Bakhtin’s mid-20th century theory 
of carnival and the carnivalesque as a framework for thinking about 
Jordanian politics and contemporary Jordanian political humour in 
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social media spaces. It has particularly focused on how humour has the 
potential to be used as a counter-political force and tool for popular 
resistance against the government during and after the Arab Spring 
revolutions.  
 
The Arab Spring and the subsequent Jordanian protests (in this case 
the 2011–12 Jordanian protests) had a significant impact on the 
development of Jordanian political humour, and the extent to which 
Jordanian society has increased its tolerance of subversive political 
humour since the Arab Spring. This thesis argues that before 2011, 
ethnicity and the idea of ethnic jokes are more relevant than after. 
Based on a corpus of material that has not been previously subject to 
an academic analysis, the analysis undertaken in this thesis has shown 
how humour has challenged people in power and poked fun at the 
Jordanian government’s political discourse about economic and political 
reform programmes since the Arab Spring.  
 
The analysis has focused on five salient qualities of popular politics 
against hegemonic power and the government. These qualities have 
been described as follows:  
1. Praising the government (intentionally satirical): This quality has 
focused on a peculiar type of carnivalesque political humour that 
has only superficially defended the power of the government. It 
could be considered mocking rather than reinforcing its legitimacy. 
Such humour has intentionally carried out subversive satire 
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against power, but it has never challenged its legitimacy and its 
mainstream discourses. This is not a quality which Bakhtin 
discussed in the context of his work: Rabelais and 16th century 
France 
2. Parodying the government: This quality has been concerned 
with the application of Bakhtin’s use of parody as a counter-
political tool against the Jordanian government to deflate the 
serious tone of official discourse and its articulations. The analysis 
in this quality has focused on three key sub-themes: challenging 
corruption, inflation and parliamentary elections (including the 
weak function of Jordan’s House of Parliament as a ‘rubber stamp’ 
for the government) 
3. Mocking the government: This quality has focused on 
carnivalesque-related themes, such as degradation, the language 
of the marketplace and the hypocrisy (the two lives) of the 
government’s official discourse and statements   
4. Scatalogising the government: This quality relates to Bakhtin’s 
acknowledgment and analysis of the use of bodily functions for the 
purposes of making insult, degradation and expressions of 
resentment and frustration about power. This quality sheds light 
on the application of Bakhtin’s conception of parody to the 
criticism of the Jordanian government’s rhetoric about economic 
reform and its processes from 2011. The discussion of this quality 
has included the use of a wide range of taboo topics, such as 
defection, flatulence and urination, in order to highlight certain 
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aspects of Jordanian political humour and satire in the context of 
social media spaces    
5. Dethroning the government: This quality extends the application 
of Bakhtin’s notion of decrowning as a tool to express resentment, 
frustration and restive views about the government. Although this 
dethroning or overthrowing of power is unreal, it has shown how 
the Jordanian government’s discourse about reform has been 
challenged, and how the Jordanian authorities have been stripped 
of their power in a very comic way, albeit temporarily and 
metaphorically.   
 
This thesis has found that Bakhtin’s marketplace, which existed 
traditionally in the streets and in conventional public spaces, is now the 
social media spaces, and much less the streets. Whilst many Jordanian 
people have used their social media spaces as platforms to mobilise 
politically and initiate strikes and demonstrations, the government’s 
rhetoric about reform and its processes have mostly been challenged 
online using ‘hashtag activism’, the most common form for internet 
activism. The mode of modern-day carnivals can be both at the same 
time about social and community participation and about individual 
presence and expression. (The audience is now the act.) That said, 
social media carnivals are in many ways just as carnivalesque, being 
characterised by their polyphony, the overturning of social and political 
hierarchies and the existence of the grotesque. The analysis in this 
thesis has also found that many Jordanian people have used their 
social media spaces (since 2011) for social and political ‘flattening’ and 
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cathartic hedonism against the government, and not for revolution (i.e. 
overturning the whole system).  
 
Jordanian people online have used extensively their social media 
accounts as places for social and political commentary about the weak 
performance of the government and the House of Parliament (originally 
described as an oversight body to the actions of the government). This 
existence of a ‘new’ form of carnivalesque political humour in Jordanian 
social media spaces, that calls for the ‘dethroning’ of political power, 
could not have been developed before the Arab Spring and the advent 
of the social media spaces in the last decade. In Jordan, both the Arab 
Spring and social media spaces have changed the way of people’s 
engagement with politics. In that sense, it can be argued that the purely 
political act of popular resistance and quasi-rebellion against power had 
to happen first to enable the creation of a newly barbed and radical kind 
of political humour and satire. Humour did not give rise to the politics, 
but the politics of resistance gave rise to the humour.  
 
The Jordanian protestors’ use of humour in placards (in real space) and 
memes (in social media space) has reflected a collective sense of 
dissent and frustration that helped them to break down barriers and 
socio-political differences. Such use of folk humour has achieved a 
shared comic relief and solidarity among people who took to the streets 
and more among carnival-goers in Jordanian social media spaces. This 
form of carnivalesque political humour is highly relevant to Bakhtin’s 
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ideas about carnival against power because it highlights the role and 
function of humour as an active form for promoting collectivism, political 
mobilisation and resistance against the government.  
 
For example, we might think about how the Jordanian social media 
activism provoked a public furore through active engagement in political 
mobilisation against government discourse following the appointment of 
three people to high positions with high salaries in the government in 
early 2019. A government climb-down on the decision came after 
nationwide public anger and a leak, shared widely on Jordanian social 
media spaces, of official documents that indicated the appointments. In 
one famous Facebook video post entitled The Government Farm 
(posted on 5 February, 2019), Dr Maen Qatamin, a famous Jordanian 
economist turned online activist, rebuked the government of Omar 
Razzaz (in office from June 2018) and asked it to cancel what he called 
a very shameful government decision. In the video, he compared the 
actions of the government to that of a farm where people are allocated 
certain lands and rights, based on their social and political privileges. 
This Facebook video was liked by more than 10,000 people, with 1,700 
shares at the time of writing this thesis. The Jordanian people’s anger 
and outcry on social media came at an extremely difficult time when 
hundreds of young people from remote rural towns and areas were 
heading on foot to the Jordanian Hashemite Royal Court to demand 
employment and end of marginalisation politics. This example shows 
how the popular politics of resistance in Jordanian social media spaces 
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has turned into an element of subversion that ultimately challenged the 
government action.  
 
The impact of this subversion is not easy to quantify or unambiguous in 
its implications and impact. Based on my findings, I would argue that:   
1. It has represented a form of subversion which has helped to 
undermine the power of government and its rhetoric about reform 
and its processes  
2. It has reflected an ambiguous kind of resistance which does little 
to definitively overturn the dominant discourse of the government. 
One of the features of the carnival – as Bakhtin argued – was its 
ephemerality    
3. It has offered solace and a space for growing alternative 
opposition voices using social media technologies. Such humour 
has offered a platform to highlight the absurdities of political 
power, but does little to destabilise or change that power  
4. It has functioned as a safety valve that both releases tensions 
(which can in fact be useful to those people with political power) 
and can be used as a tool for popular resistance against many 
forms of power in government  
5. It has functioned as a time and place for socio-political ‘flattening’ 
and cathartic hedonism (but not revolution) that has led to 
changes in Jordanian society where people are more willing to 
criticise and mock the government. This has not (so far) in Jordan 
provoked any significant social and political changes in reality. In 
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this respect, very few carnival-goers in Jordanian social media 
spaces have actually wanted to undermine (or change) the power 
of the King or the Hashemite royal family. The resilience of the 
Hashemite regime in Jordan in place since 1921 has given rise to 
a new form of carnivalesque political humour which I called in 
chapter 2 ‘resilience humour’ in Jordanian social media spaces 
that has constantly called for reform and not for regime change or 
revolution. Such humour has allowed ridicule of the government 
but not of the monarch. This enables us to draw some parallels 
between Jordanian carnivals in social media spaces and those 
experienced in Western Europe during the Middle Ages 
6. The target is not just the government in contemporary Jordanian 
political humour. One of the interesting findings which has 
emerged from the research in this thesis is the intersection 
between laughing up and laughing down. Some of the jokes 
examined in this thesis mocks the government and groups with 
less power (e.g. rural people) whilst others also mock urbanites 
and the government so ‘laugh up’ two-fold. This is shown when 
one kind of power relationship can be broken down or flattened 
out through humour, at the same time, as another kind of power 
relationship that is being reinforced. Since the Arab Spring in 
Jordan, many rural young people in Jordanian social media 
spaces have developed a counter-superiority tendency to laugh at 
urbanites and their feminised accent.  
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Political humour rarely if ever has a direct and/or immediate impact on 
real politics, as many humour scholars have argued (e.g. Benton, 1988; 
Davies, 2007). Jordanian society online has perhaps tended to, and 
continues to use, subversive humour for personal sanity (Freud’s theory 
of humour as a safety valve is an important theoretical framework for 
consideration here) and a coping mechanism to deal with socio-
economic inequalities, political absurdities and political repression, a 
means of ‘playing at resistance’. The use of the Bakhtinian framework 
of carnival allows us to see a certain strand of Jordanian ‘carnival’ on 
social media spaces (politically satirical humour) as intentionally non-
potent resistance. 
 
Political humour can be considered ephemeral if ‘resistance’ is linked to 
tangible effects on external structures and processes. However, if 
‘resistance’ has an internalised and psychological component, then 
political humour can be considered effective precisely because it allows 
individuals to cope with socio-economic inequalities and political 
repression. In this respect, political humour in Jordan after the Arab 
Spring can be best placed in the context of the indirect effect(s) of 
psychological humour and political resistance, which Bakhtin’s theory of 
carnival and the carnivalesque do not really take into account.  
 
Humour can have a slow and indirect impact through subtle intellectual 
and psychological effects on people. For example, political cartoons 
can be considered as one of the fastest and easiest windows to 
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understand contemporary politics and the politics of popular resistance. 
The nature of political humour and satire is certainly more complex 
(cognitively) when compared to other forms of social humour, such as 
lightbulb jokes, blonde jokes or elephant jokes. Political humour helps 
people to express critical comments and concerns about political power 
and its absurdities. It can help them to become literate and more 
cognizant of their socio-political and economic conditions.  
 
In the context of power and resistance in Jordan since 2011, Asef 
Bayat’s work, influenced by James C. Scott work, on popular resistance 
provides (in the broader context) a useful framework to think about the 
application of Bakhtin’s theory of carnival to the Jordanian context 
following the Arab Spring. In his book Life as politics (2013), Bayat 
(2013, p. 33) coined the term “quiet encroachment of the ordinary” to 
describe how ordinary people in the Middle East have succeeded in 
violating rules and tapping into power in public spaces. He describes 
how ordinary people, such as street vendors and slum dwellers, have 
benefited, improved their lives and enhanced their local businesses on 
the pavements and in rural areas, through the transgression of 
established orders and laws imposed by the state and local authorities.  
 
Such people, he found, sometimes sell counterfeit merchandise, 
compromise major international brands, and build their houses without 
seeking permission from local authorities. He argues that ordinary 
people in the Middle East have used and continue to use these 
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transgressive acts as part of their everyday life and politics to survive 
without guidance from a certain ideology, or from leaders. This makes 
the idea of resorting to public carnivals against power in the Middle East 
another form of ‘survival strategy’ that helps ordinary people to cope 
with their hard lives under the autocratic regimes.  
 
According to Bayat (2013), these quiet and encroaching actions against 
power have changed the lives of ordinary people in the Middle East and 
helped to transform the societies of many developing countries 
worldwide. By so arguing, Bayat applies Scott’s (1990) notion of 
infrapolitics and other forms of covert strategies of popular resistance 
that often go unnoticed by political authority. Bayat (2013) argues that 
most ordinary people in the Middle East are apparently not protesting in 
the streets and calling for their demands. Instead, they are creating 
these infringements daily in order to survive and to weather difficult 
economic conditions and state repression. These findings are important 
because they provide a medium to enhance the application of Bakhtin’s 
theory of carnival to the Jordanian context after the Arab Spring.  
 
“Every joke is a tiny revolution,” and in contemporary Jordan, some (but 
by no means all) jokes, those that constitute satire and other kinds of 
political humour, are exactly against power. The idea of ‘tiny 
revolutions,’ viewed through a Bakhtinian lens, reveals itself by tiny 
moments of carnival, conducted in the traditional carnival squares 
(streets or public spaces), and now predominantly located in the new 
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carnival space (social media spaces) in virtual platforms such as 
Facebook, Twitter and YouTube (these are now fairly conventional and 
accepted platforms for popular resistance). The internet does seem to 
speed up this circular process of new and accepted forms for popular 
resistance against power.     
 
Political humour and satire disseminated in Jordanian social media 
spaces after the Arab Spring can be considered as catharsis and as a 
safety valve to release tension at an individual and/or group level. 
Political elites can even permit or encourage such release to preserve 
their own longer-term power. They can also be politically intentional, but 
the evidence of this context suggests that such intent rarely if ever 
translates into genuine political change. Whilst there have been 
significant changes in and development of the role of humour and satire 
in Jordanian socio-political spheres after the Arab Spring, these 
developments have only corresponded to the ‘façade’ changes to the 
real political scene, which has not changed much in the direction that 
protestors in the streets and carnival-goers in social media spaces 
hoped.   
 
It would be easy, therefore, to dismiss political humour as politically 
meaningless. But this would be to miss something. Carnivalesque 
political humour can look impotent and feel fleeting, but when the 
music, jokes, feasting and social levelling are over, what might have 
changed is (some of) the people’s minds. Political humour and satire 
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can after all be transformative, because whilst it does not liberate the 
oppressed, it can, slowly and almost imperceptibly, perhaps even 
unconsciously, liberate the way that everyday people conceptualise 
power and its role in their lives. Its very existence and expansion can 
suggest that it has had indirect, e.g. ‘soft,’ psychological changes and 
cumulative effects on what is considered a suitable target for humour, 
what is and is not too risky, and what is considered rude or 
unacceptable.     
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